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ABSTRACT
Property tanka, Instead of acquiring capital through 
the cash sales of* stocks, obtained their capital by a band 
loan secured by mortgages on tangible properties provided by 
the stockholders. These mortgage banks were chartered by 
several Southern States to assist planters in dlsposing of 
their crops and to aid in the development of income- 
producing properties*
People purchased stocks of these concerns by giving 
in exchange mortgages on their property, and tha stocks en­
titled the holders to obtain loans from these banks upon 
placing their stocks as collateral for such loans*
Bonds were issued by the property banks to acquire the 
necessary capital. Mortgages served as security for these 
bends, accompanied in many instances by a state pledge or 
guarantee*
The underlying principle of this system of banking was 
that the basis of all value is property and that it appre­
ciates in value* Some increase in value of land occurred as 
a result of this system of credit extension, but loans by 
these tanks to individuals were based upon the appraised 
value of the property when offered for mortgage, not on any 
appreciated value occurring thereafter.
iv
During the 18309s and the early X840fs no leas than 
mlas Southern States established such Institutions to develop 
agriculture and for improvements. Louisiana was the first 
to employ this system and other states tended to model their 
system of mortgage banking after it.
This treatise is a case study of Louisiana9a three 
mortgage banks— The Consolidated Association of the Planters 
of Louisiana incorporated in 1827, The Union Bank incorpora­
ted in 1338, and the Citizens9 Bank first incorporated in 
1838. A large portion of the data comes from documents, 
manuscripts, end records of the concerns under observation; 
the remainder, for the most part, is derived from government 
documents, laws, records, reports, contemporary newspaper 
articles and periodicals, and Louisiana court cases.
Chapter II gives an historical background for the evo­
lution of property banks in Louisiana and describes in some 
detail the theory and general principles of mortgage banking. 
Chapter III is a ease analysis of the Consolidated Associa­
tion of the Planters of Louisiana, the first property bank, 
and it is based largely on the bank9 s records now deposited 
In the Department of Archives and Manuscripts at Louisiana 
State University. Chapter IV deals with the Union Bank and 
emphasizes the Baglish brokers9 manipulations of the bonds 
of this eeqpany. Chapter V is concerned with the Citizens9 
Bank. This ease provides an excellent 11 lustration of the 
complicated end intricate practices of speculation rife at
vi
the time* Chapter VI weaves the three experiments into the 
general pattern of banking in Louisiana , the South, and the 
Nation by indicating the relative importance and Influence of 
these particular oonoerns in agricultural developments and 
internal improvements* Chapter VI also presents a picture of 
the role played by these mortgage banks in the construction 
of the international credit bridge. The last chapter, Chapter 
VII, shows that while the system of mortgage banking could not 
of itself cause a spiral Inflation, once the spiral was Intro­
duced by outside factors, it could and did contribute to the 
existing inflation. This chapter presents the probable major 
causes for the failure of property banking in Louisiana. It 
also completes the discussion on the theory and principles of 
mortgage banking Introduced In Chapter II.
Throughout the entire study particular emphasis is 
placed upon (1) the circumstances under which the various 
specific bonded debts contracted by the mortgage banks and 
underwritten by the State were incurred; (2) the inducements 
held out to the investors; (3) the difficulties encountered 
by the lenders and borrowers In attempting to understand 
each other during alternating periods of Illusory and enthu­
siastic optimism end of pessimistic depressions; (4) the 
efforts of the State to rid Itself of a contingent liability 
and to reform the banking privileges and restrictions; (5) 
the part played by the debtor and creditor in aiding or ob­
structing thS debt settlements; and (6) the economic effects
vii
and the international repercussions of these almost forgotten 
debt controversies.
The major contribution of this study, probably, is the 
presentation of additional ibcts and information of a phase 
of Anssrioan economic and financial history. This study is of 
Louisiana's experience in banking during an era of optimistic, 
speculative and inflationary developments; and it reviews the 
controversial and prolonged settlements of the bonded debts 
incurred by the State for property banks.
CHAPTER I
ucraoDVCTioN
A little mo re 'than a century ago property banks were 
peculiar to the South, During the 1630’s and the early 1640*a 
no leas than nine Southern States followed Louisiana ’a ex­
ample and established property banks in an effort to entice 
foreign capital for the purpose of developing agriculture 
and internal Improvements,1 The securities of many of these 
property or mortgage banks were endorsed by the States. The 
amount of available local capital funds was insufficient to 
foster a rapid expansion of agriculture and to facilitate 
the sale of the products to distant or foreign markets, 
therefore, the States created banks for the avowed purpose 
of securing the necessary capital through the sale of bonds, 
«nd these bank securities had to have the States9 endorse­
ments to make them marketable in foreign money markets. The 
influence of property banks in the economic, financial, and
^Davis R. Dewey, ^Bonking In the South,M The South 
In the Building of the Nation (Richmond, Va.: The Southern 
Historical" Publieation, 1509) , Vol, V, pp. 461-474; hniery 
Hawk, Economic History of the South (New York; Prentice-Hall» 
1954), p. 563.
1
2political affairs of the Nation was considerable, but the 
history of the important role they played in the development 
of the South during the nineteenth century has been neglected, 
if not almost forgotten.
Students of economic and financial history have neither 
overlooked, nor neglected, the role played by foreign capital­
ists in supplying credit to Amerloan promoters and speculators. 
The services and functions of international bankers have been 
presented with precision and clarity by a few industrious re­
searchers and authors# Nevertheless, most of their studies 
have failed to give adequate stress to the theory, structure, 
operations, influence, and importance of property banks, espe­
cially with reference to the part they played in the develop­
ment of American resources, commerce, trade, and finance in 
relation to world needs and international investments. This 
treatise, therefore, attempts to give a more complete analy­
sis of those enumerated phases which have been insufficiently 
studied# It is an attempt to accomplish the task by reviewing 
Louisiana 9s experience with property banks. This utate was 
the first to institute the system of mortgage banking, and it 
had three such Institutions; its experience should be repre­
sentative •
A large portion of the data for this study comes from 
documents, manuscripts, and records of the banks under obser­
vation, and the re‘winder of the information, for the moot 
part, is derived from government docuuonta, laws, records,
3®nd reports. Only necessary secondary sources of* infOTO- 
tion are included*
The treatise approaches the problem of determining 
and explaining the role and importance of property banks by 
first discussing the theory and principles involved; then it 
undertakes to present o historical analysis of the specific 
organisation and operation of each of the three mortgage 
banks in Louisiana; and finally it attempts to indicate the 
importance and influence of the particular experiments and 
to dree specific conclusions on the soundness of the theory 
and the principles involved. Chapter XI begins by giving an 
historical background for the evolution of the establishment 
of property banks and continues by explaining the theory and 
general principles of property banking. The writer antic­
ipates part of the ensuing analyses in this chapter In order 
to give the reader an understanding of what follows, but no 
speolflc case illustration is given; that is left for the 
three chapters dealing with the experiments* Chapter III is 
a case study of the Consolidated Association of the Planters 
of Louisiana, the first property bank, and It Is a detailed 
analysis based cm the bank's records now deposited in the 
Department of Archives at Louisiana State University. Chapter
IV deals with the Union Bank of Louisiana, and it emphasizes 
the Sngllsh manipulations with American securities. Chapter
V is concerned with the Citizens' Bank of Louisiana. The 
stress in this chapter is chiefly on the complicated and In-
4trieste practices of speculation at th@ time. Chapter VI 
weaves the three experimente into the general pattern of 
banking In Louisiana, the oouth, and the Nation, by Indicat­
ing the importance and influence of the property banks In 
agricultural developments and internal i mp rove roe n ts. It gives 
also a concrete picture of the role played oy the mortgage 
institutions In the construction of the International credit 
bridge. The last chapter, in order to complete the discussion 
introduced in Chapter II, presents conclusions pertaining to 
the theory and principles of property banks.
briefly, the study deals with the technique employed 
In placing and liquidating specific bond issues by the Louisi­
ana property banks on the European money markets--the English 
money market in particular. It Is an analysis of the proced­
ure followed by the individual property banks to negotiate, 
transmit, refund, and redeem bonds issued in their favor and 
endorsed by the State of Louisiana.
The period covers a span of seventy-five years, it 
begins with the inception of the Consolidated Association of 
the rlanters of Louisiana in 1837 and extends to 190E when 
the bonds issued for the Citizens* Dank were finally liqui­
dated.^
The treatise considers the circumstances under which 
the various specific debts underwritten by the atate were
^Eeporb of the Louisiana btate Auditor, 1914, p .78.
5incurred; the inducements held out to investors; the difficul­
ties encountered by the lenders and the borrowers in attempt­
ing to understand each other during periods of illusory 
and enthusiastic optimism and of pessimistic depressions; the 
efforts of the State to rid itself of a contingent liability 
and to reform its banking privileges and restrictions; the 
part played by debtor and creditor in aiding or obstructing 
the debt settlements; and, finally, the economic and inter­
national repercussions of these almost forgotten debt ccatro- 
versies. Emphasis, however, is placed upon the economio, fi­
nancial, and political effects of the property banks upon 
the people of Louisiana in general, the cotton ani sugar 
planters in particular. The outlook is that of the oltlzens 
of Louisiana, not that of the foreign financier, but the in­
tention is to be unbiased and unprejudiced. The aim is to 
adhere to facts in every instance.
Particular stress is placed upon the statistical data 
acquired from the available banking and other records. Such 
data, however, are evaluated, because not all of the existing 
data give true facts. Indeed, if all the figures were taken 
at their face value, utter confusion would result. Only 
through the appraisal of certain data is it possible to de­
termine the profits and losses of the marketing firms, to ob­
tain the contractual relationships and obligations, and to 
assess the influences of the transactions.
While, it is advantageous and necessary to oite orig-
6Inal material* the process of footnoting is difficult and 
quite complicated. The manuscripts are so varied and numerous 
that a complete description of each document would b© cumber­
some and not too helpful* Therefore, some simplification in 
the process of footnoting is in order* Thus, at this point the 
author takes the opportunity to state how he proposes to in­
dicate the source of his infomation; it is a codification of 
the data that serves as a basis for the treatise:
GAHL
Any citation with this le: ter grouping means 
that the Information is to be found in the 
Consolidated Association of the Planters of 
Louisiana Collection of Miscellaneous Letters* 
These letters are chronologically arranged in 
corrugated boxes placed an shelves in an air- 
conditioned room of the Department of Archive© 
and Manuscripts at Louisiana State University.
With each citation is included the name of 
sender and receiver, the place of origin, 
and the date*
CABUE*
This group of letters refers to the Collection 
of Bound Miscellaneous Letters of the same 
company
CABtf
Citations with these letters refer to the Con­
solidated Association Books of Minutes* There 
are numerous volumes of theee, but the collec­
tion is not complete, and, furthermore, some of 
the existing volumes are partially destroyed* 
Therefore, no volume number Is given with the 
reference* Only the date for the minutes of a 
Directors* Meeting is given.
CABL
A reference with these letters applies to the 
Consolidated Association Letter Books* These 
books contain transcribed copies of letters sent 
by the company and other reports which were mail 
ed or delivered by the officers of the bank* There 
are several Letter Books, but th© same situation 
exista with these as with th© Books of Minutes* 
Only the dnte and th© naraes of sender end receiv­
er is stated*
7CASS
This group or letters refers to the Consolidated 
Association Stock Books*
CAGLB
Citations with these letters refer to the Con­
solidated Association General Ledger Books.
CHIC, 1838.
This is an abbreviation for a special paraph let 
entitled, "Report of the Consulttee of Investiga­
tion (selected from the stockholders} Appointed 
by the Direct ore of the Citizens* Bank of Louisi­
ana, in Conformity with the Resolution of the 
Board of 18th October, 1838/ (Hew Orleans;
R. Join and Co., 1339}•
GBXC, 1843.
Shis is an abbreviation for a similar pamphlet 
entitled, ""Rapport du Comite d*Investigation—  
Somme par les Aetionaires—  de la Ban qua des 
Citoyens le premier aout 1843, aoumis le 7 no- 
vsmbre aulvant." (Hew Orleans: Xmprimerle de 
L 1 Abel He, 1843).
CBB4C, 1843.
This is an abbreviation for an independent manu­
script published in 1S43. It refers to the "State­
ment of the Board of i&nagers of the Citizens* Bank” 
(no publishing company, and no date of publica­
tion) .
CaW, 1844.
A citation of this sort refers to a report sent 
to the President of the State Senate, February 8, 
1844* It Is a printed oopy of the report with­
out a specific title.
UBFC
This is an abbreviation for a special report en­
titled, "Report of the Joint Committee, on the 
Affairs of the Gtolon Bank of Louisiana,1833."
UBAR
A oltation with these letters refers to a print­
ed copy of the act of incorporation, along with 
the rules and regulations. The pamphlet la en­
titled, "Act to Incorporate the Subscribers of 
the Union Bank of Louisiana with Rules and Reg­
ulations of the Company." (New York: Clayton 
and Van Norden, 1833).
8La* Ann*
Each citation with this abbreviation ha a a num­
ber before and after the abbreviation, for exam­
ple* 4? Lb * Aon* 43£* The abbreviation stands for 
Louisiana Annuals which include court decisions. 
The number before the abbreviation Indicates the 
volume, and the number following gives the page 
of the case being cited.
la * Acts
Whenever this reference is made It applies to the 
Aota of Louisiana* Th© year that is included 
wTST the abbreviation indicates the volume where 
the particular act is to be found.
Leg. Doc.
This is an abbreviation for Louisiana Legislative 
Documents. The year included represents the vol­
ume. A word of warning must be given about this 
source* however* The documents now included in 
fc*3* Louisiana Legislative Documents were previous­
ly part of either tt© Louisiana Lena to or House 
Journals* Vhen the last two mentioned were re­
bound by the Louisiana State University Library, 
the reports that were included in the appendix 
were bound separately. Therefore, if the reader 
does not find the source in th© Leg. Doc.. he 
will find it in either th© Senate or Louse Jour­
nal for the particular year. The title of th© 
document is the guide.
House Jour.
This abbreviation represents the Journal of the 
House of Representatives of Louisiana* TE© year 
Included in the citation gives th© volume.
Sen. Jour.
The abbreviation stands for th© Journa 1 of th© 
Senate of Louisiana * Th© year stated represents 
the volume.
House Deb.
This citation refers to the Debates of the House 
of Representst1vea of Louisiana.
Sen. Deb.
This citation refers to the Debates of the Uenate 
of Louisiana *
Yte ether r e f t m e t s  or citations g l m  in this trea- 
tlM do not Mod to to codified. A bibliographical note at 
the end of this etxi&y gives a detailed description of the 
prtaary oonreoa of Inf oration.
CBAi-T&R IX
THE THEORY AND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY RANKING
Property banka were established In Louisiana in order 
to entice foreign capital funds that would serve the purpose 
of extending credit to Individuals for developments beneficial 
to the State. It was the continuation of an effort that had 
become prevalent In every State In the Union after 1812. It 
was part of a contest that had been going on between this 
country and Great Britain since after the War of 1812; the 
American object was to secure a market for its production, 
while the English aimed to defeat our tariffs devised for
1
that purpose in order to maintain and Increase their markets.
An Economic Background
Shortly after the \Var °f 1812, the United States em­
barked upon a vast program of internal development, especial­
ly in the fields of transportation, agriculture, and natural 
resources. At first, the Federal Government, as well as the 
States of the Union, took active part, but soon, however, the 
United States Government was forced to curb Its extensive ac­
tivities because of a Supreme Court Opinion on the oonstltu-
*Cf. Leg. Doc., 1843, "Report of the Board of Currency.
11
tioaaUty of Its undertakings. The decision* nevertheless* 
instead of noting as a deterrent* stimulated the States to
g
foster expansion and development with relentless fervor*
Hew York initiated the large-scale movement in 1817 by pro- 
Tiding the funds for the construction of the Erie Canal.
Other states were not backward in following the practice.
Prior to 1815* banks* trunpik© companies, bridge compa­
nies, insurance companies* jrfe cetera * had been incorporated 
by several States* mostly Eastern States* but it was after the 
ear when such enterprises appeared in profusion* At first* 
eueh improvements were undertaken with the use of local cap­
ital* Soon* however* developments became too great In scope 
to be financed by local funds* Larger undertakings had to be 
financed from larger money-markets such e.s New York and Phila­
delphia. Banks and investment houses in these centers looked 
favorably toward the corporation shares* Corporation stocks 
and bonds sold as well as government shares* and the yield of 
corporate certificates was higher. On the other hand* London 
and other European money-markets preferred government bonds or 
government pledged securities to the more speculative corpo­
rate shares* for the obvious reason that distance added more
-  -
Cf. L . L. Bogart * Economic History of the American 
People (New York: Longmans-Green „ 19 £6")’ * p • 3&5.
J* Shultz and M. R. Caine* Financial Development 
of the United States (New York: Prentice-Ha 11* 1937), p. 190.
IS
diffieultiea to th© collection at corporate shares than it 
did to securities or the government. Difficulties arising 
from distance, however, were not so troubles am© to th© domes­
tic investment houses as they were to the foreign investors.
On this account, large Eastern banking establishments invested 
in corporate enterprises for themselves in order to acquire 
larger incomes and acted only as Intermediaries In th© sale 
of government bonds.
The development of th© South and Southwest was different 
frost that of the Bast. After independence was achieved in 1783 
and the recognized boundary became the Mississippi River, the 
frontier settlers advanced more aggressively through the Alle­
gheny barrier. Waves of pioneers settled in the fertile plains
4
of the great valley. Yhen the Louisiana Territory was acquir­
ed from Trance planerring began in the Mississippi Valley in 
the West and in the South. The opening of the Croat River and 
its tributaries to transportation did much to foster migration 
to and within the new region. Furthermore , th© increased de­
mand for cotton after the War of 1812 and the invention of the 
cotton gin did much to open a new theater for rapid expansion, 
and the new South and Southwest were well suited to th© growing 
of cotton. This meant, however, that unlike the Eastern States
*Henry C . White, "The Expansion of the Area of Cultiva­
tion, 1783-1865,’ The South in the Building of the Nation. 
(Richmond, Virginia: The Southern Bis t orlca1 Tublloatlon 
Society, 1909), Vol. V, p. 41.
13
vdiere most of tbs agriculture was for home consumption , the
newer regions "were glean over almost entirely to the produc-
tion of a single crop for sale In a distant market*; and
only through a foreign martoet could these newer sections profit
from the Increased production in agriculture , because they had
no t o m  or domestic non-agriculture 1 population to demand their 
6
products • Furthermore, the newer regions were not suited as 
was the East to the creation of corporate enterprises* Bf forts 
by the people of the new Southern States were bent mostly to­
ward agricultural Improvements which did not lend themselves 
to the corporate form of organization* Eastern capita lists, 
therefore, could not be persuaded to Invest in such endeavors, 
especially when more lucrative opportunities existed much closer 
home* Profits resulting from the sale of staple agricultural 
products were not as lucrative as the profits realized from 
industrial and commercial enterprises in or near their vicinity.
Xa the newer regions the income from the sale of 
crops enabled the plantation owners to secure slave laborers 
seeded and much of the clothing and food for these laborers, 
also mules and supplies. The proceeds, however, were far too
^Hatthew B. Hammond, "Agriculture 1 Credit and Crop Blort- 
gages in the South." The South in the Building of the Ha tion. 
OP* clt * * P• dSV.
*Cf *. John Stuart Hill, Frlaolplea of Polltloel Econ­
omy, Vol." I, Bk. I, Chapter VIlTy P*MgxapE 3.
14
amall to meet the planters* ambitious needs and desire®. 
Furthermore, the development of the system was hindered by 
the lack of capital; very little of it existed in these newer 
regions, and capital was essential for rapid development and 
international trade. Individuals had none and very few bank® 
existed because capital was required for their inception. Some 
schema, therefore, had to be devised to entice capital from 
those who possessed it. That scheme was the property bank.
Banks in Louisiana Prior to 1627
Before property banks were introduced in 132?, there 
were, or had been, several banks In Louisiana , and their struc­
ture should be reviewed in order that the reader may visualize 
sore clearly the evolutionary process of mortgage banking.
Louisiana, like most States of the Union, had its share 
of bank® created for the purpose of development. Even though 
the first bank ever to be created in Louisiana was established 
In 1804, five were chartered between then and 1827, there 
being three still in existence in 1827. The amount of funds 
rendered available through these early institutions was consid­
erable, but not sufficient for the ever-optimistic speculators 
end over—zeelous legislators. By 1827 the potential capital 
of State banks had reached the total of vG,500,000; the
15
population mi lews than £00*000.^
The Louisiana Bank* —  On the twelfth of March* 1804* 
Governor Claiborne granted a charter for the first bank ever 
to exist in the territory*® The charter incorporating the 
Louisiana Bank was signed by the Governor after receiving a 
petition for such an Institution from the leading citizens of 
Hew Orleans and vicinity* These leaders wanted a bank because 
they thought it would serve to unify the three national groups
a
— the French, Spanish, and American. President Jefferson was 
of the same opinion and he approved Governor Claiborne*s action* 
After the charter was granted, however, Madison, Secre­
tary of State, and Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, were 
opposed to the Governor’s move* They were opposed because they 
were anxious to establish a branch of the Bank of the tJhlted
IDStates in New Orleans. Nevertheless, the bank was established*
7
The three banks were: the Bank of Louisiana with a cap­
ital of £4*000*000, the Louisiana State Bank with #8*000*000, 
sod the Bank of Orleans with $500,000* (Of* Leg* Poe*. 1843, 
"The Report of the Board of Currency*; the Sen* Jour*. 1857; 
and 1 n f w  pp. 17-19). According to A* Q,. Hawk, the popula- 
tion of Louisiana by 1830 was £15,739 (op* olt.« pp. £18-819). 
It should be noted, however, that the banks of Louisiana 
served as a banking and trading center for a large portion 
of the South, Southwest, and the New Middle West.
®Dunbar Rowland, The Official Letter Book* of W. C. C, 
Claiborne (Kedlsoa, v;isconains Democratic Printing Pres*.
191$3, Vol. II, pp. 29-34.
9Ibld.. pp. 22-23.
l0Ibi4
The massee were not In favor of the bank; In their 
minds the lnetltutlon could have no other purpose than to 
Issue paper money* To them It could only result In an expert 
eaee similar to that experience with the French "Kings Money" 
leraed in the 1750 *s, or with their more recent experience 
with the Spanish "li bronzes •" They felt the bank to he an 
American scheme to legalise robbery. Nevertheless, these peo­
ple believed In their leaders and they abided by their decis­
ions* They accepted the bank, therefore, and slowly became
sceustemed to It, along with the branch of the Bank of the
11Baited States established In New Orleans January, 1305*
The Planters* Bank and the Bank of Orleans* —  A defi­
ciency of currency was being felt seriously In New Orleans 
during 1811, partly as a result of the expiration of the char
ter of the Bank of the TJnited States, and partly as & result
12
of as increase In business. To alleviate the scarcity the 
State Legislature granted two bank charters; 'Hie Planters* 
Bank on April fifteenth, and The Bank of Orleans on April
Of* H. £. Chambers, A History of Louisiana {New 
York and uETc&go: American His¥ortoai Society, I n c 1925), 
Vol. I, p* 444; N. M. M. Surrey, The Commerce of Louisiana 
Paring the French Regime* 1 6 9 9 - 1 7 (New York; Columbia Uni- 
versi tyTrees,16 16), p. 124; Aieee Fortier, A History of 
Louisiana (New York: Century Historical Association, 1914}* 
Vol. flT7 p. 16: Charles Oayarre, History of Louisiana (New 
Tort: Harpers, 1861), Vol. IT, p. I K  
12Victor Debouckel, Hlstolre de la Louie lane Papula 
les Premieres Pecouvertes Jusqu*on 1640 (New Orleans: y. y* 
Lellevre, 1841), p * 112 .
1?
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thirtieth. The authorised ©apital of the Planters * Bank 
w a b  $600*Q00 to bo procured through the sale or shares at 
♦300 each, payable In specie. The primary purpose of the In­
stitution was to meet the needs of the agricultural Interests 
of the Territory; that is* the bank was /oainly concerned In 
discounting praaissory notes which were agricultural in char- 
ester* and in advancing credit for the iniprovesaent of agri­
cultural property.^ The charter was granted for a period 
of fifteen years* hut the bank became Insolvent prior to 1826* 
without having been too successful in accarapllshing the de­
sired aim,15
The Bank of Orleans was incorporated with an author­
ised capital of $500*000. Its shares were ^100 each* payable 
in money or notes. This bank was primarily for comereial 
purposes * but it dealt* also* in agricultural endeavors* Its 
original charter was for fifteen years, but in 1323 the State
Legislature extended It to 1347* for which the State was to
*. 16 receive a bonus of $25*000.
*^Mfts of the Territory of Louisiana, 1811* pp. 86-100 
and 164-1787"
Attention is called to the fhet that another bank Is 
sometimes referred to as "The Planters* Bank.** That bank is 
the Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana* 
incorporated In 1827 (see next chapter)* They were both agri­
cultural banks* but they were different in their structural 
nature* and * therefore* should not be confused.
**Benry Right or* A Standard History of Mew Orleans. 
Louisiana (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Co., 1900)* p. 565.
**Sr. Debouehel, ioe.elt.
“ l*. Acts. 1623* pp. 66-6©.
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The Louisiana State Bank* — By 1818 the people of 
Louisiana had become thoroughly accustomed to banking, and 
they no longer resented the "money creators•" Furthermore, 
the creation of banks by the ■various State Legislatures had 
become the vogue in every State after the closing of the 
first Bank of the United States, and the fervor had not sub­
sided with the chartering of the second Bank of the United 
States* Louisiana took action in 1818 by providing for the 
establishment of the Louisiana State Bank with an authorized 
capital of $2,000,000; and, fearing that this capitalization 
might not be adequate, it further provided that. With legisla­
tive sanction, the capital of the bank could be increased at
the rate of $400,000 a year, the total never to exceed the sum
17
of $4,000,000. For granting this generous oharter, the State
reoeived a bonus of $100,000 and subscribed to the bank's stock
18
in the amount of $500,000. The bank was a sucoess even though
it was found expedient to discontinue the branches in all the
19important centers, except the St. Martinvilie branch, which 
of course was done with the consent of the Legislature.
The Bank of Louisiana. — The first bank to receive di­
rect aid from the State was the Bank of Louisiana, incorpora­
ted April 7, 1824; the State issued bonds for and in favor of
17
Ibid.. 1818, pp. 78-90.
18
Franooia X. Martin, The History of Louisiana includ­
ing The Annals of Louisiana by J*. T. Oondon (New Orleans: J .
A. Gresham, 1882*7, p. 414.
l$L a . Acts, 1825, pp. 6-8.
so
this hash in payment for the bank stocks purchased* This 
institution was incorporated with a capital of $4,000,000* 
ha IT of which was subscribed by the state. To pay for its sub­
scription, the State Issued bonds for the bank to a total of 
$£,400,000, and pledged its faith for the payment of the 
principal and interest thereon. That amount of bonds was is­
sued for the $£,000,000 of shares because it was known that 
the bends would not sell at face value. It was felt, however, 
that the bonds would sell above 83 1/3 per cent of par* Any 
amount obtained on the bonds above $£,000,000, therefore,
21was to be distributed as dividends among the stockholders.
The bonds Issued in favor of the bank were sold to
22Thomas Wilson and Company of London and the negotiation re-
e g
suited in a profit of $321,822 for the bonk; and this was be­
cause the bands sold at above 83 1/3 per cent of par expected 
by the State.
The law provided that the profits should be distributed 
as dividends, and this the bank did. The method employed,
20Ibid. , 1824, pp. 72-132; Y. Debouch© 1, op. olt. . p. 139 
E. C . McGrane, Foreign Bondholders and American Btate Debts 
(Xew York: MeemlllanV19351 » pp. 168-173; F / Q,. Hawk, op, clt., 
pp. 359-360.
Because the State issued bonds for this bank as it did 
later for property banks, some (i.*®.** H* C. MeGmne, op. clt.. 
p. 168) have placed th© bank in the category of property or 
land banks. The Bank of Louisiana, however, was not a property 
bank .  * *
la. Acts, 1824, op. cit.. sec. 5.
22f — — *■ \
8. A. Xrufant, "Review of Banking in New Orleans,„ 
1830-1840," Louisiana Historical Review {Louisiana Historical
Society). Vol. X, pp. 25-40.
A. Fortier, op. clt.. Vol. I, p. 60,
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h o w w  waft to be a subject of much caatrowray. The dis­
tribution favored the stockholders, but not th© State* In 00 
fhr as the Incident illustrates the flagrant abuses on the 
part of the bank of the privileges granted, It will be help­
ful, therefore, to explain what actually took place with re- 
spect to this new method of securing profits.
The policy followed by th© bank In th© distribution of 
the profits from the sale of the bonds was on the basis of the 
fhee value of the stock subscript lens and not on the amount 
actually paid In for the shares* Inasmuch as half of the 
14 9000,000 stock capitalization was subscribed by the state, 
the remaining ?S,000,000 was to be subscribed by Individuals* 
Nevertheless, the law provided that only one-fifth of th© 
amount subscribed by the individual stockholders, or $400,000, 
had to be paid at the time of the bank’s inception* Of that
initial subscription payment, however, only *133,640 was act-
£4uelly paid In* Thus it was that the stockholders, not in­
cluding the State, received one half of the profits realised, 
or 1150,911 on an act m l  paid-in investment of $133,840-— a
profit of 1X5 per cent* Naturally, th© State as a stockholder
S3
objected to th© method employed for the division of profits*
24
6 La * Ann* 645, Louisiana v* Bank of Lout a lam *
55Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking History of Louisiana 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2935), ppV 
44—45*
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0& $2,400,000 of obligations for *2*000,000 of stocks, 
the Stats was receiving $160,911, while the other stockholders 
were receiving the same amount of profits on en actual com­
mitment of $138,840* That was not nn equitable distribution. 
When the matter was brought to court, therefore, the State
secured a dec la ion requiring the profits to be divided on the
26
basis of paid-stock, saving the otate more then £140,000, while
still granting a profit of 14 per cent to the individual stock- 
27holders.
With the profits belonging to the State, the bank was
ordered to purchase State bonds, such bonds to be placed in a
sinking fund for the redemption of bonds originally Issued in
28fhvor of the bank. Two years later, in 1829, the court’s 
order had not yet been put into effect. The State Treasurer 
reported to t#he House of Kepresentatives,
... I requested the President and Cashier of 
the Bank of La* (they being with the State Treas­
urer, Administrators of the sinking fund) to unite 
with me to carry said resolution into effect. As a 
preliminary step, we applied to the Board of Direc­
tors of said institution, to ascertain whether an 
amount of the profits made on the sale of the State 
bonds, proportioned to the stock of the Bank owned 
by the State would be by them paid over to us as 
such administrators••• »
26
6 La. Ann. 645, State of Louisiana v*_ Bank of Louisiana~ ' ’*’"*
S. A. Caldwell, loc.clt,
28
La. Acts, 1827, pp. 180, 182.
29
Beton Rouge Gazette, "Report of the Treasury Depart­
ment? February 2 8,1829.
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Apparently* hoiatep, tbs opftep of the court was never com­
plied with* Aleee Fortier relates:
The order to buy beads for the sinking; fund 
wee evidently not comp lied with, for on March 7, 
1S54, the attorney-general of the State was direct­
ed by act of the general assembly to 'institute 
suit without delayf against the Bank of Louisiana 
bo compel said bank to place to the credit of the 
State as available means on July 1 next the amount 
the State was entitled to in &*ins or profits made 
by the bank on the sale of State bonds; such por­
tion as the State might be entitled to in the bal­
ance of the profit and loss account; and any other 
claim end amount which the attorney-general might 
think was due the State
The bank appeared to have good management and It pros- 
51pared* The interest payments of 5 per cent, payable semi­
annually, were met, and the bonds were reimbursed an the 
maturity dates, 10, 15, EO, and 25 years from July 1, 1324.
The Bank of Louislane, therefore, while not a property
beak in structure, had some characteristics which were soon
to be Incorporated by che property banks. One important
characteristic was that the capital of the bank was acquired
from Europe through the sale of bonds. The bonds, however,
were mot assured by mortgagee* Rather they were secured by
the bank9 s assets and the State fs pledge* Therefore, when the
property bank scheme was introduced, it was not a radical
chugs* Instead of the bonds being secured by the general
assets, they were secured by a multitude of mortagoa sup­
plied by stockholders.
*°A. Fortier, op* clt., Vol. I, p. 60*
g*Cf* ffllea Weekly Register. Vol. XXXVIII, p. 35.
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The Theory and Principles
Property banka, sometimes improperly named ’land banks’, 
were banks of loan, deposit, and discount, not mere banks of 
note issue* They were similar to State or regular stock banks 
exoept in organization* Their capital funds, instead of being 
acquired through a sale of stocks, were obtained by means of a 
bond loan* Mortages which were supplied by the stockholders 
served as security for the bonds* Xn essenoe Immovable 
tangible property served as a basis for an acquisition of credit 
and specie* The scheme was an elaboration of the "John Law” 
idea*
In 1650 William Potter in The Key to Wealth: or a new 
way of improving Trade * stated that the greater the quantity 
of money the more prosperous was a nation’s trade* As a means 
of obtaining more money Potter proposed to Issue bills drawn 
on the security of land and other property* This was the core 
of John Law’s monetary doctrines* It was the idea behind 
colonial *land banks *.
According to John Law in Money and Trade Consider’d 
with Proposal for Supplying the Nation with Money:
Domestick Trade depends on the Money: A greater 
quantity employs more People than a lesser quantity*
A limited Sum can only set a number of People to work 
proportion’d to it, and tis with little Success Laws 
are made for employing the Poor or Idle In Countries 
where Money Is scarce; good Laws may bring the Money 
to the full Circulation ’tis capable of* and force it 
to those Employments that are most profitable to the 
Country: But no law can make It go further, nor can 
more People be set to Work, without more Money to
£4
to circulate so, as to pay wages of a greater Number.
They may be bought to Work on Credit; and that is 
not practicable, unless the Credit have a Circulation, 
so as to supply the Workman with Necessaries; if 
that9s suppos’d, then that Credit is Money, and will 
have the same effects, on Home and Foreign Trade.32
John Law accepted silver and gold as money, but criti­
cised both as an adequate standard of value. Paper money,
Law claimed, was a more stable measure of value, and his es­
sential idea was that money was only a voucher for buying 
goods. Money was not the value for which goods were exchanged, 
but the value by which goods were exchanged. He believed in 
stability and security, provided the supply of money was 
adequate to meet the needs for money.
In Lawvs estimation, land gave the ideal stability and 
security to money and still enabled a country, irrespective of 
its geographic location, to have an adequate quantity of these 
vouchers for the purpose of exchanging goods. Furthermore, 
land, besides existing in adequate quantity, had intrinsic 
value, and a value which would be enhanced by the issuance of 
money having this land as security. His idea consisted in giv­
ing notes to anyone who was prepared to mortgage his land or 
to sell it to a public body created for that purpose. The idea 
is a familiar one, and it had its first application in this 
country with the "colonial land bank."
Colonial land banks were simply note-issue banks. They 
were designed to issue "batches" of paper notes on the security 
of real estate mortgages. Since currency was scarce in the 
colonies, several of the residents in a community devised a
*>^ Qp. cTt., p • 11
plan for note-issue purposes; they "created" a bank and 
subscribed to It by giving mortgages on their real ©state*
The bank, using these mortgages as seourity, issued its own 
notes* These notes the subscribers acquired from the bank 
and used them in the daily trade* An agreement was made to 
keep the paper money in circulation in an amount proportional 
to their subscriptions. No capital funds were required.
There was no reserve backing the notes, and there was really
33no redemption.
Like the colonial land banks the property banks adopted 
the idea presented by Potter and law that land had intrinsic 
value, but it was not for the purpose of issuing money or 
circulating oredit-notes as was done by the colonial land 
banks. Instead, it was for the purpose of procuring credit 
and specie from another locality, not for the mere creation 
of money or circulating credit; this was a point of departure 
from the John Law scheme and a difference from the colonial 
land banks.
The financial structure of property banks was different 
from that of the colonial land banks, Mere paper money could 
not satisfy the needs of the people of the South. For Instance 
specie and credit was wanted In Louisiana because commerce, or 
exchange, was not local in character. If the securing of equip­
ment, slaves, and markets for their products— sugar and ootton-
f. K. B. Westerfield, Money. Credit and Banking 
(New York: Ronald Press, 1939), pp. 345-346; DavTs R. Dewey, 
Financial History of the United States (New York:Longmans- 
Green, 1924), 9th. ed., pp* 19-21.
had been loetl la character, "batches*9 of paper mo m y  might 
hare suftie«d> hat the equipment and slaves had to he bought 
frtffi the outside, either front the Seat, the older South, or 
abroad* Product© had to be sent outside the community for 
sals. Gold, silver, bills of exchange, credit, et cetera* 
were essential, and individuals by themselves could not read­
ily obtain them, ©specially in a vicinity where little cap­
ital funds and credit wore eve liable locally* They could not 
persuade outsiders to accept local "batches" of paper money, 
premises to pay, mortgages on their individual property, #t 
cetera, la payment for the things they did need. Individ­
ually, they could not bear the expense end time of the spe­
cific transactions In international trade* Only by collective 
action of some sort could the endeavor be rendered feasible. 
Banks, therefore, were brought into the picture* Because 
there existed vary little capital in the community, banks 
were to be the means of enticing specie and credit in from 
the outside* Any plan of this nature, furthermore, had to af­
ford stability and security. Otherwise the bank could not get 
p*qoh capital* Through the medium of th© property banks, the 
legislators were informed that all problems would be solved 
m ©  rapid development and prosperity would result*
Credit for origins.ting the underlying theory of prop­
erty banks Is given to a Mr* Mouasler of New Orleans; it 1© 
M i d  that he introduced the idea of establishing a system of
collateral 9«oaritl«® teat Xoauae.3* This Idea was adopted 
mteii Louisiana, Misnissippi, izte&sas, the Florida Territory, 
aad otter Southern State# granted ohortora for the establish- 
seat of property banhe in aid of agricultural and cotton 
dev* lepaen ts.35
JShe financial structure of property beaks consisted of 
a pool of mortgagee to form a collateral trust, much like the 
present practice of pooling a multitude of real estate mort­
gagee and issuing trust certificates or bonds* Property banka, 
therefore, represent a aidesy point, or a second stage, be­
tween the colonial ‘ land*’ banks and the existing Federal 
3d
Land Saaks, a step of departure from the John Law scheme 
and a step toward sounder banking practice*
Mortgages on agricultural properties serwd to purchase 
stocks in a property bank* A cotton or sugar planter, desirous 
of besoming a stockholder in a property bank chartered by the 
State for agricultural developments, acquired the stock with 
mortgages on the plantation, not necessarily v lth money* The 
property banks took these mortgages and placed them in their 
vaults to servo as security for the bonds lesued for sale* 
tecs sold, these bonds obtained for the banks the funds 
essential to do business*— capital funds for loans to clients*
Citizensf Bonk and Trust Company of Louisiana (Mew
psrspETErr T s rrF )T p \ i 4T '
S«R. Cw. Hawk, op, clt* * pp. 303—368*
36s. 3. Sparks, History and Theory of Agricultural 
Credit in the United States t N evT7 ork‘; C r O: rw e il.Ite £ £).
p* 83.
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Xnneasteh as tl» stockholders warn to be the clients of 
ttie banka as well as o a ais9 ttere remained a problem to be 
solved* ffca client-stockholders bed already siren their only 
security— mortgages— to aoqulre the stocks and had nothing 
left la the form of security for loans from the banks except 
the stocks themselves. Property banks, therefore, accepted the 
stocks of their banks as collateral for loans granted* It may 
he M id,  therefore, that th© agricultural land owners were per­
mitted to "lift thenselves by their awn boot strops."
Becoming a stockholder in a property bank, nevertheless, 
c m  not a simple matter. Not everyone could become a stock­
holder* Generally, only those with fixed tangible property of 
a certain nature could qualify. A qualifying applicant desir­
ous of becoming a stockholder bed to meet additional re­
quirements and his application had to be approved by the di­
rectors of the bank. Pirst, the applicant signed the stock- 
book of a property bank, stating the amount of stock desired
j
aid the type of property offered for mortgage. Then, investiga­
tion was made by the officers for acoeptano© or rejection of 
the prospective subscription. The institution*a attorney in­
vestigated all the titles of the properties offered for mort­
gage; he ascertained the amounts and nature of any mortgages, 
privileges, and other charges with which the properties might 
be incumbered; and ho affirmed the affidavits filed and pre­
sented by the prospective subscribers* The a gents of the bank­
ing firm made a thorough and detailed evaluation of the prop-
£9
ertles ottered for mortgage; and they presented a sworn es­
timate-oe rtifio&t© to the attorney for approval* If th© stand­
ard sat by the charter was met, th© officers so advised the 
subscribers tod Issued in their names the sx)©clf led stocks of 
tbs corporation* When issued, these stocks permitted the hold­
ers, if and when they desired, to make use of their account at 
the bank; that is, they were granted a loan after the bonds 
were sold and the funds were available at the bank*
Nevertheless, a stockholder was not permitted to obtain 
e loan equal to the par or face value of the certificate* Most
regulations required that only from one-half to two-thirds of
37the face value of the stocks could be had as a loan*
There was a specific reason for a limitation being placed 
es the amount a stock certificate could serve as collateral for 
a loan, and that reason was that the State and the organizers 
of property banks wished to have more than adequate security 
behind any credit extended* Based on the same belief John 
Law had, It was thought that twice th© property value was a 
double assurance that there was adequate security* Besides, 
the limitations restricted the amount of credit the stockholders 
could obtain below the amount that was secured by the sale of 
bonds, and this permitted the banks to have enough funds to 
carry on other business activities; that is, if a property
The Louisiana property banks specified that a loan 
Could be granted up to one-half the par value of the stocks*
30
bank, for Instance, had sold §2,000,000 of bonds mad bad 
issued $3*000,000 of stooks, the limit of credit that could 
he extended cm the stocks would be §1,500*000 at most, leaving 
$300,000 for other busies os endeavors and opera tion costs .
So similar to Lawism were property banks In some re- 
speets, that the question arises, V^hat about in flat ion V Did 
property beaks have inflationary characteristics a
Uhlik© the earlier John Law schemes, property banks 
were not intended to foster, encourage, or accentuate infla­
tion. theoretically, there were to be no inflationary effects 
free the establishment of property banks. There was to be no 
spiral rise in the value of land as a result of these banks. 
Increases in property valuation were not to affect the status 
of the mortgaged property as far as an individual property 
bank was concerned. Once the property was evaluated it became 
the basis for the mortgage. If the value of the land Increased, 
and it was firmly believed that land always increased in value, 
the amount of the mortgage did not change. It was necessary 
for the mortgage to remain the same , and no new mortgage could 
he obtained on. the added value.
To illustrate the above, let ua take a hypothetic© 1 
ease: /or instance, A is a planter with agricultural property 
worth ^500,000. Ho subscribes to the extent of "200,000 in the 
B property bank by giving a mortgage on his property for 
that amount. How, he ban not hypothecated his £>roperty for 
stocks to the full amount set in the evaluation; that Is, 
there is a value of §300,000 on his property that is unincum­
31
bered. Xf b# vanned ibt and If th# subscription book of the 
institution permitted it, he oould become a stockholder for 
1300,000 more. Let us say that A waits a yea r or two be­
fore he decides to Increase his holdings in the bank*s stocks, 
in the meantime, for some reason or other, the value of land 
la general has increased, and at the end of th© interim his 
lead is worth f 600 fOOO. According to the principle involved,
X  oould obtain but $300,000 in stocks and not $4-00,000; that 
is, he could obtain additional stocks on the basis of the orig­
inal valuation and not the new. Under such circumstances no 
lnflatternary boom of a spiral type can be fostered or encour­
aged by action of the bank.
Nevertheless, in actual practice, sole© degree of infla­
tion. alight have bean possible in a cQfiumnity like New Orleans 
share more than one property bank existed, "or example, where 
severe! banks of this nature were situated In on area, it 
some time s happened that property owners were stockholders in 
more than one property bank, and, as the restriction on val­
uation mentioned above did not apply beyond the sphere of the 
individual bank, there might have been a possibility of some 
Inflation, unless e further restrictive measure was taken 
into consideration. That measure was that whenever property 
was offered for mortgage which was elrendy incumbered, twice 
the amount of the incumbrance was deducted from the valuation 
for purposes of issuing stock certificates on the remainder 
of valuation.
5 2
jo roturo bo ©up X o&sfl i If» instead, of fit*
tempting to increase hie stock holdings in the B property 
hanky A decides to subscribe to stocks in the C property 
baaky there arises e different situation; and the difference 
is that the original valuation is not extended beyond the 
province of the Individual firm. Once the valuation of a 
piece of property is determined and declared by a firm It re­
mains fixed during the entire period and it serves as security 
ea the mortgage given for the purchase of stocks. This does 
not lean, however, that other fires ere bound to accept the 
same valuation on this property as that accepted by property 
bank B when it is Involved in transactions with the prop­
erty owner A. For instance, when planter A subscribes for 
stocks in property bank C, he presents the titles on the 
property and specifies to what amount the property is incum­
bered* Then the appraisers of bank C determine the valuation 
of the property independently of any appraisal made previous­
ly by any other bank. Such a procedure, therefore, leaves open 
a possibility for an inflationary practice; that is, if the ap­
praisers declared the property to be worth f 600,000 instead of 
#900 ,000, it Might permit some spiral inflation to the extent 
of f100,000 as far as the valuation on that particular prop­
erty is concerned, if it were not for a further restriction 
that has not been introduced In our illustration* That re­
striction was that at least twice the amount of the debt 
had to be deducted from the appraised valuation before the
35
remainder b«eaa» employable on hypothec for the purchase of 
dteeke* The net result m s ,  therefore, that the valuation of 
the property had to increase considerably before inflation 
resulting from the bank's action could have ^ny effect in 
causing an upward spiral in prices or property value®; that 
Is, the restriction had as its p u r p o s e  Q check to the pos­
sibility of Inflation.
frO® the above illustration there m?:y prise a question 
as to whether or not a property owner at * later date might 
obtain a mortgage on the basis of increased valuation if his 
property were already fully mortgaged, Th® answer to the ques­
tion has been given and it is repeated: it is ^ 0/  it is 
not sseessaxy that property be mortgage-free for the purpose 
of offering it for mortgage, but a mortgage could not be 
granted on what was already hypothecated. Thus, if a property 
owner had a mortgage covering his entire property, he could 
not obtain & second mortgage on the sane property, or on the 
increased valuation* All a property owner could hypothecate 
was the uruaort^gsd portion of his property; and If the prop­
erty was partially incumbered, twice the amount of the in­
cumbrance was deducted from the appraised va luation before 
a mortgage was granted on the remainder.
Another question ia that of transferability of stock 
certificates of a property bank, and that question might have 
perplexed n»ny. V ith property tied up with stocks it is dif­
ficult perhaps to visualize how the stock® of the property
34
banks could be transferred from one Individual to another* 
Impression must not be had, however, that "once a stockholder 
always a stockholder” prevails until the expiration of th© 
corporation• Transference was possible, even though it was 
not as simple a matter as It was for common stock bank certif­
icates purchased with specie, other money, or notes. To sell 
a stock of a property bank, permission from th© institution 
was essential* Furthermore, the new owner had to supply 
property to be mortgaged which was equally as satisfactory as 
the one it replaced; the directors of the corporation had to 
be assured that the position of the bank with respect to the 
total of mortgages held was not altered* nud the idea behind 
sush a policy m s  to protect the security of the bonds issued 
by the bank.
3SWlll* permission was essential for proper transference 
it was not always sought by the seller and buyer of th© stock* 
For instance, there is evidence from the records and manu­
scripts of the Consolidated Association of the Planters of 
Louisiana that several transactions in stock ownership occurred 
without the knowledge of the institution* During the later 
years of the firm9s existence, during the long period of liqui­
dation, the matter of stock ownership became very confused and 
complies ted because of this; and when assessments were declar­
ed on the stockholders, it was found that some planters had 
purchased property mortgaged for stocks in the corporation 
without even knowing that such a mortgage existed and that 
they were owners of stocks in the corporation*
The individual mortgagescould he changed, but the 
total had to remain intact until the expiration of th© band 
Obligations; that is, the ratio of mortgages to bonds had to 
remain equal* If the bank redeemed a portion of its bonds, it 
could reduce by a like amount the mortgages It held as secu­
rity for bonds, but it could not reduce the fund of mortgages 
until this was done, and it could not reduce the fund by a 
larger portion than the amount of bonds redeemed*
35
Sush a policy ac described a boro was sound as far as 
%% tout It osrlooked certain conditions which might have
impaired the security. For instance, when a transaction took 
place, the terms or exchange were agreed upon by the buyer and 
seller, either the seller or the stocks settled his account 
with the hank ir he had a loan on the stocks, or had it trans­
ferred In the m s s  or the new stockholder* If it was the 
latter, there was not much danger of Impairing th® security. 
But if It was the former, there was some danger If the settle* 
went was in the form of a note* The best way to indicate 
the difference is by illustration:
Xn Case I, A, the old stockholder, decides to sell his 
property worth #400,000 to B, the new stockholder, for £400, 
000, the amount of the mortgage fcr which £400,000 of stocks 
were received. A had obtained a loan of #300,000 on his 
stocks, $10,000 of which had been repaid* The agreement 
reached is that B shall assume the loan A had on the stocks, 
paying A the difference**#210,000* Under such conditions, 
the same property serves for the new mortgage replacing the 
eld. The stocks and the loan are now in B fa name Instead of 
in A*s name* B is not entitled to an additional loan, ex­
cept on the £10,000 that has been repaid, because his stock 
serves as security for the loan he has assumed from A*
Under this sort of a transaction, therefore, the pool of 
mortgages is not impaired.
Xn Case XX the same conditions apply, except that B 
pays A the full amount and does not assume A fs loan, that
feeing settled fey A himself* If B pays A in money end with 
this money A settles his account, it leaves B with the priv­
ilege of securing a lean up to $£00,000 at the bank, but it 
dess not impair the pool of mortgages more than doss Case X *
If, however, B pays A with a note secured fey the same property, 
or its agriculture 1 productivity, the situation is different* 
To clear his account on the loan A discounts B 9s note with 
the bank* Thus, while it appears that the security of the 
bondholders is unimpaired because of the pool of mortgages 
feeing intact, the security is not the same because in effect 
the bank has resorted to loaning to the full amount of the 
stocks* Indeed, the bank has granted a second mortgage on 
property already mortgaged, and theoretically bondholders 
were to be protected from such a practice. Heedless to say, 
however, both the bank and the stockholders favored the 
latter type of transaction mentioned in Case IX*
Soundness of the Theory and Principles
At the time of their inception, property banks were 
balled by many as e worthy innovation and a salvation to the 
needy agricultural people of the South* The soundness of the 
reasons given for their inception was questioned by many 
others, especially fey those who witnessed the deplorable «x- 
parlances with these institutions, mostly during the latter 
years of their existence* Some indications have already been 
given to substantiate both views, depending on the outlook*
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Ho thorough aaalysis ]»« boos mads as yet, howeor, to pro­
vide a basis for judgment on the soundness of the theory and 
principles Involved , and it la not the purpose of this chap- 
tor to do sof especially whan specific case histories have 
not boon m i n o d .  the task at present m e t  neeemrlly he 
limited to the presentation of additional phases playing a 
part In determining the soundness of the theory and princi­
ples of property banks, or what Is a system of collateral 
securities for the purpose of acquiring loans* a  conclusion 
can he drawn only after certain fee tors ha ire been conaid- 
ared rather carefully. For Instance:
1* The method of evaluating property requires sound, 
scientificp and skillful Judgment on the part of 
appraisers* In the case of property banka, however, 
there Is no definite guide for evaluation* Evalua­
tion was a guess— et best, an inaccurate guess* 
Furthermore, the firm belief of the adherents of prop­
erty banks was that land had intrinsic mlue in It- 
as If and that value invariably augmented with time 
and progress. Such a method of evaluation and such 
a concept of value, therefore, might easily lead to 
over-valuation and it might stimulate boom' prices 
of land— inflation.
8* ran cost of obtaining capital must not exceed the
revenue to be received therefrom* Ph«t Is, the Incame 
derived from the capital must be adequate to meet the
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fixed semi-annual interest and current costs*
Besides, there should be enough funds available 
by the time of the maturity of the bonds to redeem 
the obligations in full plus other costs involved, 
irrespective of the amount received at the time of 
the sale of the bonds* In other words, the bonds 
mast not be sold at too great a discount and with 
a rate of interest which is excessive*
S* The date of maturity of the bends must be distant 
enough to permit the funds to yield a revenue in the 
meantime* Irrespective of the fact that bonds are sold 
at a low rate of discount and with a small interest 
rate, it will not be profitable to obtain this cap­
ital if there is little time given for it to yield 
an Income*
4* The capital obtained from the sale of bonds must not 
exceed the needs of a community* Appropriate capital 
funds foster business activity and development, en­
courage an increase in land valuation, and accentuate 
a general rise in prices* Sxcessive capital for 
credit purposes, however, may be expected to foster 
speculation and may cause inflation*
5* Ho theory or principle can be expected to operate in 
practice if there axe flagrant abuses and Intentional 
circumventions* Buies, regulations, restrictions, and 
limitations are intended to be abided by and adhered 
to* Good, sound, and honest management is essential*
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Ho Institution should be permitted or encouraged 
to prostitute end violate laws pertaining to it, 
the specifications guiding its behavior, and the 
limitations restricting its operations*
The succeeding chapters reveal in part the information 
necessary to formulate some conclusions pertaining to the 
soundness of mortgage banting, although they should not he con­
strued as presenting adequate material to disprove and reject 
conclusively the theory and principles applicable to prop­
erty banks In general • Conclusions that may be drawn from 
the ease studies that follow apply to the specific experiences 
la Louisiana and not to all mortgage banking experiences* Only 
in so fhr as it is possible to give a deductive analysis of 
the general principles can it be permissible to venture into 
a broader generalization **°
40The theory and principles described in this chapter 
ere based on the manuscript material of the three banks 
studied in the next three chapters*
CHAPTER III
THE CONSOLIDATED ASSOCIATION OF THE PLANTERS OF LOUISIANA
The creation of the Bank of Louisiana in 1324 was of 
considerable assistance to conmaorcial endeavors, but inad­
equate for the agricultural needs of the State* About four 
and a half per cent of th© State's population were engaged in 
soaneroe of some sort*1. On April £1, 1617, Judge Dominick 
A. Ball of the United States District Court for the Louisiana
District rendered a decision which broke the Fulton-Liv lugs ton
£
monopoly of steamboat trade on the Mississippi Hirer* This 
m s  seven years prior to the famous case of Gibbons vs, Ogden * 
On account of this decision steamboat traffic brought a rapid 
increase in New Orleans comneree* From 1821 to 1825 commer­
cial exports for the State had increased from 17,272,172 to
^There were in Louisiana by 1620 some 153,407 inhab­
itants, of which 6,251 were engaged In commerce* (V* Debouchel f 
o p * olt*. p. 139.
Z
The Hon. J. Fair Hardin discusses this decision of 
Judge Hall on the case of Heirs of Fulton and Livingston, cit­
izens of New York vs* Henry Shreve, citizen of Kentucky, In 
an article in the Louisiana Historic© 1 Quarterly (October,
1935, pp. 822—829) •
3
S. A* Caldwell, "The New Orleans Trade Area," Bureau 
of Busjaeas Research, Bulletin No. 1 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
state’ university Press, 1936) , p. 3*
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fl£,S3£,9£4, and to this increased commerce the Bank of 
Louisiana turned most of its attention, thus leaving agricul­
ture without an adequate supply of banking facilities* It was 
ffclt, therefore, that agriculture needed more financial en­
couragement, and that such encouragement would further 
increase exports.
CHART A
EXPORTS FROM HEW QRil ANS, 1821 to 1827
Tears Domestic Foreign Total
1821 4 6,907,599 $ 364,573 i 7,272,172
1822 7,303,461 675,184 7,978,645
less 6,769,410 1,009,662 7,779,072
1824 6,442,946 1,483,874 7,920,820
1825 10,965,234 1,617,690 12,582,924
1826 9,048,506 1,235,874 10,284,380
1B27 10,602,832 1,126,165 11,728,997
4
Alexander Trotter, Observations in the Financial Posi­
tion and Credit of Such of the States of the North American 
Union as have C on tracts d~Pubiio Debts TNew Yoikand London: 
Longman, Orss, Brown, Green, and Longmans* 1839), p. 393.
SIbld.
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Sugar had been introduced In Louisiana as early as 1744
by the Jesuits from St. Domingo, and it had been manufac-
7tured as early as 1794 by Etienne de Bore. Nevertheless, 
sugar had not come to be of* great importance in Louisiana 
until after the introduction of steam power to operate the 
sugar mills, the first of which was introduced by Mr* Coiron 
in 13££* The early engines for the manufacture of sugar, how­
ever, were very expensive* They had to be imported (through 
A. Gordon, S* J. Forstall and Company) from England at a cost
of about f IB,000 per engine. Later they were manufactured in
9
this country at from 45,000 to &6,000. Not many planters,
therefore, could afford to make such heavy expenditures; but
those that could did, and soon they were reaping handsome 
10
profits, which motivated a financial plan. The scheme called 
for State assistance*
A
Joseph Y*allace, The History of 111inois and Louisiana 
Under the french Rule (Cincinnati: R. C. Glarke, 1893), p. 
£97; Alcee Fortier, op* clt* * Vol. Ill, p. 228.
7
Albert Phelps, Louisiana, a^ Record of Expansion (Bos­
ton and New York: Houghton-Miff lin, 1905), pp~ 199-200; W* C.
Stubbs, "Sugar Products in the South,” in The South in the 
Building of a^ Na tl on, op * cit *, pp. 184-197.
Rightor, op* cit. » p. 668.
9ibia.
10Cf. Niles Weekly Register» Vol. XXXV, p. 355.
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CHART B
PRODUCTION OF SUGAR CANS IN LOUISIANA
18 S3-1836
Year Tons Year Tons
1823 17,249 1830 42,700
1824 13,223 1831 42,000
1825 17,249 1632 40,243
1626 25,873 1833 41,980
1827 40,824 1834 57,500
1828 50,599 1835 17,249
1829 27,599 1836 40,24911
Cotton did not yield as high profits to Louisiana plant­
ers as did sugar, but the profits from the sale of ootton were 
substantial, especially with the ever-increasing demand for 
eotton by the manufacturers,***2 The cotton crop of Louisiana 
exceeded 100,000 bales for the first time in 1824; cotton 
sold for 23 to 25 cents a pound in New Orleans during 1825^3 
a proof that cotton had profitable prospects.
^ Louisiana Sugar Cane Industry Year Book. 1929, p. 97.
Humphrey, An Economic History of the United 
States (New York: MoGraw-Hi 11, 19 £7), p. 201.
L. Watkins, King Cotton, A H is tori oal and Statis- 
tical Review. 1790-1908 (New York: I. L. Watkins ani Sons, 
1908), p. 192.
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CHART 0
COMMERCIAL COTTON CR01S OF LOUISIANA, 1820-1837
Tear Bales Year Bales
1630-1 54,500 1829-0 106,207
1831-3 69,221 1830-1 117,743
1822-3 55,000 1831-2 89,062
1623-4 60,159 1832-3 121,580
1824-5 101,133 1833-4 156,857
1825-6 138,777 1834-5 186,238
1826-7 121,795 1Q35-6 164,617
1827-8 100,748 1836-7 243,77414
1828-9 95,000
Both sugar and ootton oould be grown throughout a 
large portion of the State. Still more advantageous was the 
fact that these two crops oould be grown interchangeably. 
Furthermore, the cotton ginning mills could be turned into
15Sugar mills without the need of incurring excessive costs ♦ 
Both sugar and cotton planters* therefore, strove to 
obtain State assistance for the purpose of getting the cap­
ital deemed necessary to develop their plantations. Late in 
1836, the farmers presented to the State Legislature a peti­
tion, asking for relief from, the oppressive interest rates 
charged for funds and from the shortage of available capital; 
and this petition the Legislature presented to a committee
l^Xbld.. pp# 191, 194, and 195.
C. Stubbs, op. cit*, P* 190; and 1 • L. Watkins, 
Op.pit., p. 193.
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for study. The findings presented were in the form of a hill
16
proposing that a Planters* bank be chartered*
A bill with the title wAn act to incorporate the sub­
scribers to the Consolidated Association of the Planter® of
Louisiana" was passed by both houses of the Legislature,
17
Sfereh 16, 1827. The declared purpose of the act was specif­
ically to help and protect the hard-pressed agricultural 
groups, reduce the excessive burden of high interact rates on 
money, and remedy unforeseen accidents which might cause ex­
cessive suffering to these laborious and re commendable plant- 
13
ers.
Organization of the Bank
According to the Act of 1827, the Consolidated Asso­
ciation of the Planters of Louisiana was to be capitalized at 
$2,000,000 to be raised by mean® of a bond loan. The stock­
holders were to be planter® exclusively in need of capital, 
and they were to be permitted to subscribe to uha brink*® 
stock to a total of £2,500,000, each aha re being of $500 de­
nomination. The shares were payable in mortgages on immovable
16
House Jour., 1827 {Fr.}, p. 28; and Sen. Jour. 1827, 
p. 69. Mr. Pierre Landreaux guided the bill through the House 
and Hr. Charles Berbigny through the Senate. Both these men 
later took an active part in the af faira of the bank*
17lM. A.ota , 1827, pp. 96-lie.
CABfef, "Project of the letter to be sent to Stephen 
Girard of iiiiladelphia" (Fr.).
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property, provided the lead wee in the state of cultivation* 
fhe mortgages held by the bank, in turn, were to serve as ae- 
eurity for the bonds to be Issued* The bonds were to bear 
five per sent Interest per year payable semiannually, and 
they were to be Issued la equal series of 5, 10, and 10 years, 
respectively* The sale of the bonds was to be limited in price 
to not less than 05 per cent of par payable In New Orleans, 
where the interest and principal were to be paid* After the 
sale of these bonds the stockholding planters were to be en­
titled to a loan, or credit account, on their stock up to 
one-half the face value of the certificates*^
the name of the bank as incorporated was "The Pres­
ident, Directors and Company of the Consolidated Association 
of the Planters of Louisiana,** and its charter was to be ef­
fective until April 30, 1343* Under that name it could buy, 
receive, and possess all kinds of property, either movable or 
inevable; and it could loan, negotiate, sell, grant, alien­
ate, demise, and dispose of the same* It was permitted, also, 
to take mortgages and pledges, and to discount, according to 
accepted banking principles on such credit and on such secu­
rity as might be deemed advisable, providing the discounted 
paper did not exceed in value the double of the capital*
The administration of the bank was to be conducted by
IS
■■dwr Aot£, 1087, Pp • 96—116
80
Ibid** section 7.
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seven directors elected yearly by the stockholders of the 
institution* No stockholder, however, could become a director 
without being exclusively a planter, a citizen of the United 
States, and an owner of a least ten shares bought on mort­
gages Intended as a guarantee for the reimbursenebt of the 
bonds * ^
Dividends to the extent of the profits could be declared 
by the company and deposited in the name of the stockholders. 
Before any dividend oould be declared, however, yearly reports 
showing a detailed statement of affairs had to be made to the 
government; and, furthermore, no dividends were to be paid 
out until the expiration of the charter* This provision was 
intended to act as an added protection for the bondholders.22
The firm was not to charge more than eight per cent 
per year on notes discounted or money lent out. No more than 
six per cent was to be charged on any loans or discount made 
on notes at order, payable within four months after the date 
of making. These provisions were to guard the clients of the 
bank against any unduly high interest charges.23
In order that the State Government might have some con­
trol over the bank, it was provided in the law that a comptrol­
ler for the institution be appointed by the Governor with the
^ljbld* * sections 6 and 12.
22Ibid* , sections 12 and 13-
23Ibid* * section 12.
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advice and consent of the Senate, and his term of office was
for two years* His duties were: to submit to the firm any
legal adtiee necessary to guide its operations, to report to
the Legislature from time to time on the state of affairs of
the bank, and to propose any legislation, if needed, to enable
24
the tetter end more efficient operation of the company.
Subscription in the bank’s stocks started on Ifey 1,
1827, and as soon as a thousand shares were subscribed an
£5election for directors was held. The directors then pro­
ceeded immediately to undertake plans for negotiating a loan 
through a sale of bonds, and they selected a committee to 
prescribe ordinances and regulations for the institution.
The coKfiittee, appointed to advise on the means to ne­
gotiate a loan, recommended the nomination of one or more 
agents to act for the bank. The loan, they suggested, could
24Ibid.. section 18.
2b
GAHM, June 21, 1827 {Fr.}. The election of directors
was held June 18, end Manuel Andry, Hon ore Landreau, Louis A l­
lard, Zenon Roman, Manuel Alls© Jhsoalas, Trancois Insealas, 
Xaeestlere Volant Labarrcmet were elected. They met in 
the presence of Hughes L^vergne, comptroller who was appointed 
by the Governor, on the 21st. They were sworn into office by 
Judge Bermudez.
28
Ibid., June 25, 1827 (Fr.) The committee in charge of 
ordinances and regulations did not present any rules until De­
cember 16, 1828. Only a brief plan was offered by the committee 
in charge of hegotiating a loan. And after their June 3C meet­
ing, the directors did not assemble at a meeting, outside of
a single brief meeting in January, 1828, until March 3, 1Q28.
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be obtained in the North of the United States, In England, 
or elsewhere, but they indicated preference for the United 
States if it was possible* The comptroller and the attorney 
were to prescribe the exact terms of the loan project*27
The project that was presented by H. Lavergne, comp­
troller, and C* Derbigny, attorney9 contained two vague 
plans: one was to authorise the agents to negotiate a loan 
at par with five per cent interest, the other was that the 
commissioners negotiate the loan at as low as ninety-five per 
cent of par* In either case, they were to attempt to obtain 
the loan at less than five per cent if possible*
Obviously, if the loan was to be obtained in the United 
States, the two plans were not too difficult to understand. 
Selling the bonds at par with five per cent Interest would 
naan, most likely, that the bonds would be sold at their face 
value, or, as it was, $1,000 each, the bank paying interest 
of $50*00 theron* A sale of bonds at ninety-five per cent of 
par would mean a sale at a discount of five per cent, or at 
$950 for each $1,000 bond* In both cases, the sale would be 
at $950 per security*
On the other hand, if the bonds were to be sold abroad, 
there arose another problem* The question is, what did the 
comptroller and attorney mean by parv That question cannot be
27Ibld.. June 27, 1827 (Fr.).
so
answered at this point, but evidently the intention wee to 
leave vague the terms that would be acceptable by the bank 
lu order that the agents might have a freer hand when they ne­
gotiated with the purchasers of the bonds*
Accompanying the two plans were further instructions: 
the payment for the bonds was to be mode in New Orleans at the 
expense of the house or houses entering; into tlio contract; if 
this payment was to be made in bills of exchange, the bonds 
were not to be delivered until after the bills were converted 
into redeemable money; and, furthermore, $ 50,000 in drafts 
were to be demanded, if practical, for surety of the fulfill­
ment of the contract or contracts entered into with the com-
gQ
pany for the purchase of the bonds.
Messrs. Lavergne and Landreaux were appointed agents 
for the company to negotiate the £2,000,000 loan, and they at­
tempted to obtain said loan In the various parts of the United 
States and Surope without success.
According to E# S* Sparks, "The Private company was un­
able to sell its bends probably because of the Lack of local 
capital and foreign credit." A more probable reason for the 
failure of a negotiation, however, was that the bonds of the 
institution lacked the appeal to entice capital.
£aibld■■ "Project of Instruction for the Negotiation 
of the Loan^ {Fr.) .
Loc* cit *. p. 84.
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Tke Consolidated Assoc let Ion m s  of ferine for sale 
bonds which had maturity dates not very distant from the time 
of issuance* Those of the first series, for instance, were to 
mature within five years frost the date they were to be issued. 
They were act the kind of investments to attract Investors 
who looked for an assured Iseosse over a relatively long period 
of tine; and they were not the kind of instruments that would 
arouse the Interest of speculators who looked for a substan­
tial profit from their investments in a relatively short time, 
simply because the nature of the business did not land itself 
to quick profits* Furthermore, neither the investors not the 
speculators could be convinced of the institutionfa ability 
to obtain enough revenue from the loaned funds to effect pay­
ment of the bonds at maturity*
Mortgages presented by the Stockholders served as the 
sole security for the bonds. Such collateral trust certificates 
could not instill confidence with those investors beyond the 
political entity where the bonds were issued* These mortgages 
did not appeal to the foreign creditors and Investors beenuse 
the laws under which the mortgages were granted were different 
from their own. Furthermore, the creditors were not in a posi­
tion to ascertain the value of the lands offered on mortgage 
or the Integrity of the would-be borrowers. Foreign creditors, 
naturally, would insist upon a pledge from a better-known entity, 
one they could more easily and less expensively call upon in
52
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ease or default.
Pressure, therefore, was brought to bear In the Legis­
lature by those Interested In the bank to hare the State 
assist the bank by Issuing bonds In Its favor. The State 
was asked to pledge Its faith to redeem and pay interest on 
the bonds in the event that the private concern should fall 
to do so*
Strong protests arose on such a proposal in both Houses* 
however* In the House of Representatives a minority group 
opposed the move and gave for its reasons:
1 • That the subject natter and provisions of the said 
act, are not within the legitimate scope of legisla­
tion; inasmuch as it is a mere contract by which the 
State Is bound as security for a certain class or 
description of citizens, to enable them to borrow 
money for their exclusive use and benefit, without 
any corresponding advantage to tha public, or ad­
equate security against loss*
Zm Because it is a useless -nd prodigal use of the name 
end credit of the State, for particular advantage, 
which name and credit might be more beneficially em­
ployed, in procuring funds for general improvement,
In which all portions and classes of the community 
might partake.
3. Bees use by thus pledging the faith of the 3tate for 
so large a sum., in the manner and for objects afore- 
said, its means are diminished, and its credits are 
exhausted for objects not public.
30Had the bonds been bought, in case of default, the 
bondholders would have found It necessary to take action 
against the bank and force liquidation and collection on the 
individual mortgages* 3uoh a procedure would have been 
lengthy and expensive, wit:-out too great assurance that 
their claims would be recognized and honored by the courts 
and the laws of the borrcaver’s country and state.
4. Because 'the Institution created by the Act* to 
which the act aforesaid, la a supplements ry, doea 
sot In its nature, and the means provided for Its 
administration * afford a sufficient guarantee for 
its ultimate compliance with the contracts it is 
authorized to make, or the acoampllshmant of the 
ends proposed by it; and in oase of failure or 
misfortune, the State will, in consequence of the 
act, aforesaid, be oompromitted to an extent, much 
beyond its means to meet; and the citizens in gen­
eral, involved in great distress, and exposed to 
great and heavy burdens, by reasons of an cot,in 
the anticipated benefits of which they are not to 
partake.
5* Because the passage of said Act has in the opinion 
of these protestants, a direct tendency to infuse 
r .. . d to embarrass it
The minority group in the State Senate expressed its op­
position to the measure in similar terms, they voted against 
the bill, they said:
1. Because we do believe it highly improper for this 
body to pledge the eredit of the State to any body 
of individuals whatever, it being out of the range 
of Legislation, except especially required and di­
rected by the people.
2. Because we believe that the security is insuffi­
cient to protect the State in case of loss.
5, Because some of those who voted for the bill are 
signers, and belong to the Association, and we con­
ceive are interested, when our rules forbid any 
person to vote oa any question in which he Is im­
mediately interested.
4. Because the State has already borrowed two millions 
of dollars, and the above act adds two millions five 
hundred thousand dollars more, which win ga against 
securing the credit of the State, and may put itgOut 
of their power to borrow money in case of need.
Baton Rouge Gazette. February 16, 1828, and House 
Jour.. j^ g&8, p.
Sen. Jour., 1828, p. 28.
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Bespit* these protests, however, and despite the refusal by
the Governor to affix his signature to the bill, an act to
amend the charter and to assist the Consolidated Aeaocia*
35
tlcn passed, February 19, 18S8.
The amended charter increased the bank's capital from 
$1,000,000 to $2,500,000 and increased the stock authoriza- 
ties from $£,500,000 to $3,000,000, and the corporate life of 
the bank was extended from June 30, 1842, to June 30, 1843. 
According to this bill, the State agreed to issue its own 
bends for the property bank, and the pledge on these bonds 
engaged the faith of the State for the reimbursement end for 
the payment of interest In the event the bank failed to do so. 
The bonds were Louisiana State Bends in favor of the Consoli­
dated Ass Delation and they were secured by mortgages held by 
the hank. All the State guaranteed was payment on the claims; 
it acted as e co-signer; end its liability was contingent.
Stipulation was made in the act, however, that all sums
34
be paid and received in Hew Orleans.
For the privileges granted the State vm& given bonus
stocks in the institution to the amount of >1,000,000, on
which it could be granted a credit of $250,000 at the regular
rate of interest* Furthermore, the State was to appoint six
35
of the twelve directors*
33La* Acts. 1828. Ho. 19. on. 20-36.
•KA--------    '
Ibid.
35
Under the original charter the corporation elected 
seven directors and the Governor appointed tho comptroller.
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The new directors held their first meeting, March 11 , 
182S, and again resumed plans to negotiate a loan and form­
ulate ordinances and regulations for tbe administration and 
operation of the business affairs.**6 Mr. Felix de Armoa, 
spokesman for the committee appointed to formulate plans for 
the negotiation of a loan, presented two plans for the pro­
curement of a loan, both similar to the first two plans pre­
sented a year earlier, and he proposed secret instructions 
and letters of credentials for the agent to represent the 
Institutions In the sale of the bonds.
The ordinances and regulations adopted for the con­
duct of the affairs of the bank were specific and rigid. Only 
the more Important rules are given at this instance, and in 
an abridged form. The major ordinances establishing the 
rules for the administration of the bank were:
1« Three stockholders, other than directors, were 
to be selected each year to act as judges over 
the election of directors.
2. Notices of the elections were to be sent out thirty 
days prior to the election and were to be published 
weekly in two New Orleans papers for the month pro- 
ceding the election.
CA3?T, ztitrch 11, 1828 ( i T r . ) .  The six directors ap­
pointed by the State were: Messrs. Villere, An&ry, Kaucher,
Bronaxd, Dupl&ntier, and (record destroyed}. The six
elected by the stockholders were: Messrs. Lsndroaux,
Allard, Zeriegne, 1. Pascal©, Labarre, end Peschapelle.
37Ibid.t and of. . supra , p. 49.
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5* The Judges were to report the results of the 
elsetions to the president who was to a&tify 
eaoh elected director to meet at the hanking 
house the following February 1, at 11 A. M. 
for the purpose of selecting a president•
Am The President, Directors and Company were to 
have charge of all monies* notes, *md other mo­
bile or Immobile properties.
5* Money and notes were to be received without retribu­
tion and all deposits were to be remitted on de­
mand*
6* The properties offered for mortgage by subscribers 
or others were to be evaluated by appraisers se­
lected by the Direction. Each parish was to have 
three such ap; raisers selected flora stockholders 
or other planters within the parish. Their duties 
required specific and detailed reports. They had to 
submit the certificate of estimation as follows:
re the undersigned____________ and stockliold
ere of the Consolidated Association of the Planters
of Louisiana , residing in the Parish of ________
and being Commissioners named by the President, Direc­
tors* and Company of said Association for the purpose 
of apprsising the properties of said parish* do swear 
and affirm to the best of our ability and conscience
that we estimate the property of ___________________
inhabitant residing in this parish at the aura of 
& conforming to the detailed informa-
tion following, viz.:
_______ _ _  Arpens of land facing the Mississippi
Hiver with a depth of ___  arpens, of which_____ _
only are today under cultivation in »
the surplus being standing timber or brush. The quan­
tity or arpens we estimate in total to be _________
worth  ....... ......... ........ . $►___________
  ______  Slaves of both sexes* named
{name and ago) estimated In total at. _______ _
_________ Horses and _ _  mules at ... * y____________
Pairs of oxen a t ...........i __________ _
Buildings estime ted in total at ....... 4 I ~ ^ __
Total of our appraisal........ * ___________
We further declare that our above appraisal was 
made In full to the best of our ability and knowl­
edge.
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In faith of all the above , we have sworn anti af­
firmed our ordinary signature in the presence of the
honorable   , Judge of this parish, the
. day of the montk' of    , in the year
(signed)  ___________, commissioner
  . c o m  is si oner
(Judges * signiture)
7. 5a oh year the president was to transmit to the commis­
sioners in the parishes th© total of the profits and 
the percentage of increase in dividends for each 
stockholder* The commissioner was to transmit the In­
formation to the stockholders*
8* The method of transferring the stocks was to be ac­
cording to specification. Ihen a stockholder wished to 
transfer his stocks, or part of them, he was to present 
to the Direction the titles of the properties of the 
plantation owner whom he wished to have replace him 
for the total or part of his stocks. If the Direction 
judged the securities offered In exchange to b© equal 
in all respects to those of the stockholder wishing to 
seke the transfer, It was to accept the mortgage pre­
sented and free the former or part of It. In the case 
of dividends under such a transfer the transactors 
were to roach an agreement between thence Ives if pos­
sible, in order that the Direction might make the 
transfer of a h  dividends to the new stockholder. If 
such were not done, however, the old stockholder was 
to be credited on the books for the dividends declared 
up to that time, and h© was to be paid these dividends 
at the time of the expiration of the charter.
9. If a stockholder were to find it necessary to suspend 
payments cm a loon obtained the Direction was to ad­
vise a means of assistance if possible. If such were 
not possible the Direction was to obtain a reim­
bursement of the funds by means oompatable with the 
interests of the stockholder. The dividends due the 
stockholder until the time of the suspension, If any 
should have been declared, were to remain on deposit 
with the bank of the Association until the expiration 
of the charter to be paid then to the rightful owner 
of the stocks after the Institution had been paid all 
due it on such stocks. The Cashier was to announce in 
the newspapers the number of stocks to be tran®fared 
by roe eon of default, avoiding, If possible , to men­
tion the name the Individual Involved.
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10* Proper precautions e w e  to be t&kea in the printing 
and issuance of paper notes In order to avoid 
fraud and counterfeiting.
11. In vice of the fact that the bonds ware to be reim­
bursed in three equal payments, maturing June 30,
1853, 1838, and 1843, it was to follow that the loans 
osstde to the stockholders were to be repaid in yearly 
instalments of such portions to effect the full pay­
ment within the maturity limit of the bonds. For In­
stance, a loan and® prior to June 30, 1829, would be 
payable in 14 instalments, one priox' to June 30, 1Q30, 
but after June 30, 1829, in 13 payments, etc. “
The regulations for the cenduet of the affairs of the Consol­
idated Association dealt with: officers, elections of officers, 
and the duties of officers; hours of business, method of busi­
ness activity, and the terms fear engaging in business transac­
tions; discounts, terms of discount, and tho types of paper 
acceptable on discount; credit, procedure for obtaining 
credit, and the collateral acceptable for credit, et cetera.
A few Important rules rerc;
1. Kach subscriber had to be a planter ana had to fur­
nish mortgages on plantations in the state of cul­
tivation and producing revenues, slaves and animals 
attached thereto, and the buildings that were part 
of the estate* /s soon as he was directed by the 
Direction the subscriber was to furnish; the title 
of properties, the certificates declaring already 
existing mortgages, privileges, or other incum­
brances, the certificate of estimation, and an 
affidavit declaring:
(1) if he was e curator or executor,
{£) if he was or had been married,
(3) If he had wedded a widow having one. or more 
children,
GASB, December 16, 1828 (hr.).
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(4) if he was or had bean a curator or executor 
for a minor,
(5) if ha had bean a curator Interdict or absentee,
(4) if, without being a curator or executor* he had
taken part in the administration Of the affairs 
of a minor, either interdict or absentee,
(?) if he was or had been a witness of some executor,
curator, or other administrator appointed by law,
(8) If an inheritor, if he had been given charge by
inventory of the affairs of some succession,
(9) if the property he wished to mortage came from 
a succession partition,
(10) if the property carra from a succession where the 
legacies have not been paid,
(11) if he was a creditor or debtor of the State, 
a company, or corporation,
(IB) if he was or had been guar&ien ox' the acquired 
properties by legal authority.
B. When the subscriber had fulfilled all the require­
ments specified and had met the approval of the Direc­
tion he was to receive stock certificates properly 
endorsed by the officials, and immediately a credit 
account was opened for him, equal to one-half the 
total face value of the certificates in his name.
This credit he could make use of at will.
3. Wcn-subsorlbers wishing to obtain a mortgage loan
from the bank had to follow the same rules and pro­
cedure pertaining to mortgages as a subscriber
desiring to purchase stocks.
4« Payments on mortgage loans by non-stockholding 
planters or other individuals was to be by fifths 
from year to year until the end of the fifth year,
when the mortgage would be cleared.
4* The Association was not to charge more than eight 
per cent per year on loans and discounts, not more
than six per cent on any loan or discount made as
a pay-to-order note payable in four months from 
the date the loan or discount was made, and no 
simple note payable or mortgage note oould be dis­
counted without the concurrence of three-fourths of 
the Directors present. Interest was to be deducted 
an all loans and discounts accorded to stockholders, 
plantation owners, or other individuals.
6* The total of notes discounted to effect payment of 
notes or other obligations due the Association was 
never to be applied for other uses.
7* All negotiable instruments offered for loan or dis­
count and drawn by individuals residing outside the
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limits of Mew Orleans were to be mad© payable to 
the Consolidated Association, or to some domicile 
within tixe limits of the city corporation*3®
negotiations with Baring Brothers
After receiving instructions frooi the new Board of
Directors and with new facilitating provisions for effecting
a lean, Mr* lavergne once more set out on his mission to sell
40beads* He spent a few months in the financial centers of the 
Berth— New York and Philadelphia**but his attempts to 3ell 
the bonds were unsuccessful* Xhus, upon advice from Mr* Stephen 
Girard, a Philadelphia financier, he proceeded to England*
In Liverpool, Mr* Lavergne contacted Mr* Alexander Gor­
don, associate of the business firm Gordon and Forsta 11 and
Company of Sew Orleans* The two went to Baring Brothers and
Company of London and had several interviews and conferences 
concerning the loan* At first, Baring Brothers did not sp*
pear to be too Interested, but finally an agreement was
. 41 reached*
A contract for the sale of &he bonds was entered into
42with Messrs. Baring Brothers and Company, September 13, 1826*
M Ibid.... — ...
From April to August, 1828*
41Consolidated Association, Miscellaneous Letter's 
(hereinafter referred to as CABL), La vergne to Andry (Pres* 
ident of the Consolidated Association), Liverpool, August 14, 
1S28, end Lend ox, September 6, 1626 (Fr.).
Ibid* * Load cm, September 14, 1828,
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What tiie exact terms of the contract were cannot be
ascertained definitely because the contract, or its duplicate,
has not been found amongst the records and manuscripts of the
43
Consolidated Association. Nevertheless, there is enough 
supplementary information available to enable one to formu­
late the approximate terras of the contract.
From all appearances the stipulations of the contract 
entered Into between Baring Brothers and the Consolidated As­
sociation were not unfavorable to Baring Brothers. They, Baring 
Brothers, were to buy outright in their name 750 bonds of 
£1,000 each at the rate of ninety-five per cent of par; pay­
ment was to be made in London after delivery of the bonds pur- 
44chased. The remainder - 1,750 bonds - wus to be consigned
to this same firm in sum of 50,000 pounds sterling or in
amounts of 250 bonds - from time tc bine after March 1, 1829.
3seh consignment, however, was to require the consent of this
London house. The payments of interest and the principal on
all bonds were to be at the sterling rate of exchange, 4
shillings 3 pence on the dollar, the American mint ret© of ©x-
4 5
under the bimetallic standard established in 1791.
43In the "Report*1 rendered by Alexander Cordon and 
Hughes Lavergne to the Consolidated Association, September 23, 
1326, it is stated that a duplicate copy of the contract is 
ettached. Ho such copy was found, however, while conducting 
the research. The re may be a copy among the papers of the 
Bering Brothers Collection deposited at the Federal Archives 
of Canada, Ottawa, but the writer did not go there to inves-
It was later agreed to make payment In Hew Orleans 
as specified by the charter.
4^The current rat© of exchange was 4a. 6d.
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All l&jnats by the C one oXldated Ass oo let ion were to be made
effective at the counting house of Baring Brothers In London.
Itar selling the bonds of the Consolidated Association* Baring
Broths re were to receive a oossalsslon of two per cent. For
handling the affairs of the bank, Baring Brothers were to
collect a fee of one-half of one per cent, that is, the fee
was to be charged on the sterling amount of die interest paid
and the reimbursements made* By the terms of the contract
Bering Brothers did not bind themselves to sell the Louisiana
bonds of the Consolidated Association at a specified rate;
they reserved for themselves the right to sell the bonds at
any price they deemed proper in order t o protect themselves
46
froa possible loss. Furthermore, they woulu not agree to
have their name included on the Louisiana bonds %as de-
47sired by the bank.
The fhTorableneas of the contract for the Consolidated
Association is not quite evident. The Comraisaloners, however,
attempted to make it appear advantageous in their letter and
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report of the negotiation. When they first notified the
46CAJCL, Lavergne to Andry, London, September 6, 14, and 
23, 1838 (7r.).
^ Xbld.. Baring Brothers to Hughes Lavergne, London,
September 15, 1828, viz.: take this ojport unity of repeat­
ing that in declining to adopt the form or endorsement sug­
gested by you for the security of the Association we were in- 
financed by the absolute necessity which wo felt imperative 
wader any novel mode of introducing our names on the certif­
icate likely to attract notice as contrary to the usages to 
which mercantile people are accustomed.
vergne to Andry, London, September 14,
1828, and September 23, 1828 (Fr.j.
Association concerning the contractual agreement, they 
stated that the organisation would receive $235,000 on Decem­
ber 51, 1328, upon remittance of $500,000 of bonds, $427,500 
an February 15, 1329, tapes another $450,000, and roughly 
$$22,000 a®. March l, 1829, from the consignment of $250,000 
Mere bonds. That was a lose of $65,500 on a million dollars, 
bat the Cornells si oners felt that the amount would be less 
because part of tbs payment by Baring Brothers was to be in 
the f e n  of credit upon which the beak could draw bills of 
esrehange, and bills of exchange were then sell lag at eight 
per cent premium. Bills of exchange would give the bank a 
profit of $17,760, according to the calculations presented, 
and that would reduce the loss to $47,740; a million dollars
of bends would, therefore, yield 1952,260, a sale at above
4995 per cent of par. Unfortunately, however, the Commis­
sioner misrepresented the contractual terms and reported 
antieipated returns not borne out by the contract. Had they 
reported properly, the results might have been more favorable.
The detailed report on the oontraot Indicates still 
more favorable c end it ions for the bank. Through dubious 
means the Commissioners made it appear that tie bonds sold 
at better than 97 per cent of par and that the consignments 
were at above par. First, they established the results of 
their negotiation* on the assumption that the average
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pLbld.. September 14, 1828 (Fr.)*
maturity period for the bcnAs was a Ins and a bftlf year a be- 
w w  « * -third of the hoods matured In June, 1833, one-third 
JUae, 1858t and one-third, Jims, 1643, or four end a half, 
miss and a half, and fourteen and a half years, respectively. 
3ecoedf they based t heir calculations on the assumption that 
the differanee between the contract rate of exchange and the 
current waxiest rate of exchange wan in the favor of the bank 
Third, they included in their calculations fictitious profits 
arising oat of losses.
On the sale of $730,000 of bonds to Baring Brothers, 
the net loss reported was $33,313, and the general reasoning 
employed to get this figure was:
(1) To sell $750,000 of bonds at a five-per-cent dis­
count is to incur a loss of 137,500*
(3) This loss of $57,500 is insaediate; therefore, the 
bank is deprived of its use for nine and a half 
years. If the bank had this sura at its disposal, it 
could earn six per cent compound interest for nine 
and a half years. Thus, the loss is really $65,£52*
(3) To pay for the $750,000 will require only $708,333, 
because the rate of exchange is 4s* 3d, and not 
4s. 6d.
(4) To pay $703,333, however, will require the purchase 
of bills of exchange and these sell at eight per 
cent premium, a cost of $56,667 ( slo. $54,666.64 }•
(5) This cost of $56,667 for the purchase of drafts, 
nevertheless, occurs only in nine and a half years; 
in the meantime, that sum can be used by the bank
to yield a revenue at six per cent compound interest, 
thus giving a sim of $98,604.
(6) From this $98,604 revenue mu3t be deducted the cost 
of purchasing drafts. The net revenue, therefore, 
is $41,937.
«’ W  tl» t m i «  at $41,987 and the „
lee a et $66,888, the final net loss is #85,316.80
that loss on #760,000 neast a sale at about 97 per eent of per, 
interest payable in Fngland.
Qa the consignment of the $ 1,750,000 of bond a, the cal­
culations were ssore weird and were made to show the sale et 
per. the Commissioners deolded that £1,750,000 la beads sold 
et 95 would yield |l,662f500. Since in all proba bllity, the 
eeialgned bonds would be M i d  in fourteen or fifteen mouthe 
after March 1, 1829, the period in between would permit the 
last 1 tut 1m . to gain $133,000 on the $1,662*500 in bills of 
exchange which it could drew against Baring Brothers and 
could sell on the market at eight per cent premium* This 
profit would reduce the loss Incurred from the sale of the 
consigned bonds, figured In the same manner as for the £750,
000 sold outright, to sale the final net loss negligible,
51or what would amount to a sale of bonds at about par*
The distortion of facts and figures presented by the 
Concessioners on the results of the negotiations are obvious, 
first, the basic assusptlon of an arithmetic mean feu* pur­
poses of computing compound interest is a serious error; it 
docs not give the seme result as compound Interest computed 
on the separate series of bonds as would be done on an
9° m &  *, September 23, 1828 (Fr.)
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52actuarial derivation* Second, the a asuiapt ion that the 
ooatxact rate of exchange of 4 shillings 3 pence in compar­
ison with the current ®  rket rate of exchange of 4 shillings 
6 pence gave the institution a 3 pence advantage is a mis­
statement • t!hlle It may appear that there is an advantage.
It must be remembered that the British were buying the bonds 
in t e n s  of the sterling, not dollars, and the Interest and 
reimbursement was to be paid in England in sterling, not 
dollars* Talcing a contract rate of 4 shillings 3 pence in­
stead of 4 shillings 6 pence meant that the Baring Brothers 
were overvalueing the sterling and not the United States 
money: they were taking the value of the American monetary
38
The mathematical difference can be illustrated as
follows:
Compound interest on the three separate series on
the $1 basis:
compounded at 6# for 4| years =  1.3048
$1 compounded at 6$ for years as 1*7535
jl compounded at 6% for 14% years »  2*3565
$3 on the three series totals 5*4148
Compound interest on an arithmetic mean on the &i basis:
$3 compounded at for years =  5*2305
The difference amounts to *1543 on the £3*, or *0314 per $1, 
or $5*14 per $100* The error is over 5 Thus, for the 
compound calculation on the £37,500, which is £65,315, 
a sum must be added of £1,927*50*
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unit to bo worth loss than a dollar* not equal to a dol-
§slay. Third* the assumption of profits ho tag realized from 
an eight par cent premium existing on bills of exchange is 
•creating" profits where profits do not exist* Because it 
wee necessary to purchase bills of exchange to effect a re­
imbursement, and because in all probability these bills 
would hare to be acquired at a p rami tan, it did not moan that 
the bank could enjoy an income from the expense in the mean­
time*
The calculation of a loss of $37,500 on the $750,000 
bead sale was correct because the contract price was spec­
ified at 95 per cent of par* Unfortunately, however, par did
53Tbs British monetary system is:
the pound sterling (£stg) ~  so shillings (s)
4 the shilling (s) =  12 pence (d)
• • the pound sterling =  240 pence (d)
Most likely the Commissioners presented their argument by the 
following method:
Under a ratio of |1 =  4s 3d ■  51d .".
the pound sterling, or 240d ~  $4,70588
Ohder a ratio of $1 =  4s 6d »  54d - * *
the pound sterling,or 240d =  $4,44444
But the above calculation is cm the assumption the $1 =  $1,
The case in question is different in that it takes the ster­
ling as fixed instead of the dollar: the dollar is the variable. 
Thus, if they say that their pence is worth $.01960 in American 
aoney { $l*51d) when it is known to be worth $,01337 on the 
market, { $l*54d) they are overvalueing their pence by $.00123. 
The way to find the value of the dollar under such conditions 
is to find the cost of the three additional peace® required, 
figured at the current price (3d x $.01337), and it is $.05511. 
The dollar, then, is worth in terms of the sterling $, 94489—  
94/ cents*
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aot mean tha face value of the bonds. Par meant the oonver-
aim rate of money be tween the two countries based on the 
defined legal metallic contents of each standard monetary 
salt. Therefore, a conversion of English sterling Into Amer­
ican dollars meant another loss of approxImtely ■£ 39 ,569, 
despite the Casenlaslcnera* calculations. Thus, the immediate 
lose suffered was more nearly $77,069. This loss can be in­
creased by figuring that the bank had to forego the opportu­
nity of reaping a revenue on the sum at the rate of six per 
oent compound interest during the period the bands were out­
standing, but it must be calculated an an actuarial basis. 
Nevertheless, to take the $56,667 draft purchase expense 
that occurs at the time of the maturity of the bonds and to 
figure that that amount was earning the bank a six per cent 
compound interest for the entire period prior to the pur­
chase was a misleading and erroneous profit fabrication, 
which should not be considered as reducing the loss incurred 
from the sale. Furthermore, to say that the bank would have 
to reimburse but $706,533 on the $750,000 was a reversal of 
the facts. According to the terms of the contract Baring
Brother* were loaning $708,333 and were being repaid 
$750,000.54
The calculations pertaining to the results to be ob­
tained from the consignments of bends are erroneous and false 
also. The Ccommissioners employed the same methods as was em­
ployed in the sale in order to obtain favorable results* More 
over, they added a profit to be realized on the consignment 
because the payment by Baring Brothers for the bonds was to 
be in drafts, and drafts sold at a premium. The fl ,750*000 
consigned bonds at 95 per cent of par would yield #1,662,500
S4Tbe computation of the Commissioners, evidently, was 
The market rate of exchange of the dollar in 
terms of sterling was 4 shillings .6 pence* 
Therefore: #750*000 at 4s 6d (54d) is equal to 
40,500,000d*
Hie contract rata of exohang© was 4 shillings 
3 pence. Therefore: #750,000 at 4s 3d (51d) 
is equal to 38,250,000d*
The difference is 2,250,000 d. Therefor©:
2,250,OOGd c on vert ©d into dollars on the basis 
of the current rate of 4s 6d is equal to #41,667*
Therefore, if the bank sells #750,000 of bonds 
and is paid in sterling, the bank receives 
40,500,G00d. On the other hand, th© bank will 
pay back this loan in dollars converted Into 
sterling at the rate of 4s 3d, or at #41,66? 
less than the amount received (#750,000 - 
£41,667 «  1708,333)*
The actual terms of the contract did not state anything of 
that nature. Instead it 3aid that the dollar was worth 4a 3d 
and, therefore, only 4s 3d would b© given on each dollar of 
tbs bond loan* Further, it said that the loan would have to 
be repaid in sterling, and for each dollar of debt 4s 6d 
would be required.
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pimm eight per cent on the letter suoif or $133,000, and by 
figuring the compound Interest as was don© for th© sal© of 
bonds* the net loss would be reduced to almost zero—  a con­
signment sale at par.
Without going into the details and the false calcula­
tions pursued by th© Commissioners, however, it is possible 
to approximate the eost of the sale and consignment of the 
bonds. First* there was the discount of five per cent on 
$2,500,000, say #125,000. Second, there was the loss result­
ing from the differences in the rates of exchange, say 
$150,000. Third, there was the two per cent commission charg­
ed sat the negotiation, say $50,000* Those three items alone 
amount to $325,000, and a loss of $325,000 on $2,500,000 is 
thirteen per cent, or a negotiation at 8? cents on the dollar. 
This, however, does not Include the interest lost while the 
funds were in transit; it does not include the eost of pur­
chasing bills of exchange; and it does not include the nu­
merous other items which could be brought into the picture.
Before going farther with the negotiations, the theory 
concerning monetary standards should be examined in order to 
get a fuller understanding of th© terms of th© contract.
Boom might say that Baring Brothers were very exacting in 
their terms, that they were taking advantage of th© borrower* 
Close analysis, however, will show that they ware not to be 
blamed for the position they took, and that they could have 
had the same terms in effect without having a c on tract with
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specifications thereof. The American monetary standard 
entitled and g&ve them those terms.
England was on a gold standard* Th© emit of mousy w s  
the pound sterling (fc stg.) and it contained 113*0015 grains 
of pare gold.
The lilted states had a double standard, gold and sil­
ver* or shat Is eoamoaly called a bimetallic standard, That, 
a l t  of money was the dollar, which contained either 24.75 
groins of pure gold, or 371,25 grains of pure silver; and 
that ratio m s  decided upon after a close observation of the 
relationship of the prices of the metals on the market: their 
relative values as ccemodities in the state of the arts. Based 
on the existing market ratio,* therefore, the mint ratio m s  
established by law at 1 to 15.
On the market, however, the ratio does not remain fixed 
because prices are not fixed. Without government or other in­
terference prices fluctuate freely to adjust theus elves to the 
supply and demand, Soae times the individual prices move har­
moniously when general prices fluctuate as a whole; sometimes 
the prices of individual commodities fluctuate without an ap­
preciable fluctuation In the general price level; and some­
times individual prices fluctuate at the same tin© that the 
general prices fluctuate. To the advocate of bimetallism, 
however, the prices of gold and silver were not viewed from all 
those angles. If the price of silver Increased, that of gold 
decreased, end vice versa: end the reason was that if there
7Z
was a greater demand Tor silver, for Instance, there would 
he lees of a demand for gold, and the price of silver would 
rise while that of gold would fall* as the price of silver 
Increased, people would be willing to purchase less of th© 
met&l and would look for another metal - gold - which would 
serve the purpose at a lower price, the principle of sub­
stitution* The net effect would be to decrease the price of 
silver and increase the price of gold* ^Compensatory action” 
is the term used to describe th© behavior; and because of 
the compensatory action, the relationship of the two metals
has the tendency— in the long run— to remain th© same, not
only within a nation, but throughout the world*
Thus, when it was found in 1791, that the ratio of
silver to gold was 15 to 1 on the world market, it was thought
that if established by law at the same ratio, both metals 
could be used as a standard, without difficulty arising from 
divergence of the two ratios*
According to the theory, If th© market acute changed 
from that of the mint, compensatory action of the two metals 
would re-a lign ^h© ratios. For Instance, if the market ratio 
went to 16 to 1, gold would leave the mint and go on th© market 
because it was undervalued at the mint* Once on the market, 
however, this gold would increase the supply and thereby reduce 
the price until the market ratio returned to that of the mint* 
Compensatory action would, in the long run, keep both ratio© 
in line; and because of this, a monetary unit based on b.t-
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astalllsm would h&vs a double footing. It would not be a 
monetary unit with one metal as a base at one time and on an­
other one some tine later, depending on the fluctuations in 
the market prices of the metals used as a standard.
There are several hypothetical assumptions and imny 
important emissions to the above theory, but as far as the 
logic is concerned, the conclusions are sound in theory* The 
economic historian, however, sees the flaws* One of the as* 
sumptions is that ell the nations have a bimetallic standard. 
To limit compensatory action to one nation is erroneous.
There is some compensatory action between gold and sil­
ver on the world market and there is a definite ratio between 
gold and silver* Nevertheless, habits and customs change, 
and because of this— among other things— the ratio does not 
remain fixed. There is, also, some compensatory action be­
tween the mint and the irarket operating through the compen­
satory action of gold and silver on the market* But the mere 
fixing of a ratio by a government, even if based on the ex­
isting market ratio, does not force the world market ratio of 
the two metals to remain in harmony with the legal ratio es­
tablished by one nation* That would be possible to a greater 
degree only if all, or a majority of, th® nations adopted a 
bisMBtalllc standard with an identical ratio, or approximately 
so* To repeat again, there is some compensatory action, but 
it is not national in scope. It applies to practically all 
goods for which there are substitutes, end it applies
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everywhere in the world* It Is not necessary to have a legal 
money standard for It to operate* its operation, however, 
does not guarantee a fixed relationship *
Be it as it say, the fact remains that soon after 1791, 
the market ratio ohanged, and the coapersatory action did not 
bring it back in line with the established mint ratio» The 
market xatlo changed from that of the mint; it went to some­
where around 15*5 to 1 and 16 to 1, and remained there for 
forty years or so*
That meant that at the mint you were given 24.75 
grains of gold for every dollar* On the world market, however, 
more than one dollar was offered for the same number of grains 
at gold* SaharaUy,it was profitable to buy gold from the mint 
and sell it on the market.
Let ns see what a Britisher could do* His monetary unit, 
the pound sterling, had 113*0016 grains of pure gold* The ster­
ling rate, or par, of exchange, therefore, with the dollar on 
a mint basis was in terms of the metallic contents of both 
units; that is, the pound sterling eq.ualed $4,444, or to re­
verse it, the dollar equaled 4 shillings Z pence* On the 
market, however, his pound sterling was worth 44.71* or there­
abouts, or the American dollar was equivalent to 4 ah ill ings?
6 pence* That, on the surface, may appear to be to the ad­
vantage of the American, but let us examine closer.
Suppose a Britisher cams here and bought something.
If he obtained JB4 .76 grains of gold fron his bank, or govern-
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meat, and presented It to the American mint In order to get 
dollars to pay Tor the goods, he would lose money because 
1®  could get the same amount of dollars on the market for less 
grains of gold; he could get approximately &1.Q6 on the mar­
ket for the cams amount of gold* Where did he buy the dollars? 
naturally it m e  on the market.
fhe analysis so far, howaier, still leaves a wrong Im­
pression, the impression that gold was flowing into th© coun­
try. Siat was not the case, and soon we shall see why.
Assume that the 'Englishman has a choice of paying sil­
ver or gold aad hie choice was silver. If he took 371.£5
grains of pure silver to the mint, he received one dollar;
*
but If he took the same grains of silver to th© market to ac­
quire dollars, he could not get one dollar for that number 
of silver grains; he would receive about 94 cents for his 
571.25 grains of silver. Naturally, his choice was to get the 
dollar at the mint. Nevertheless, that was not th© roost prof­
itable thing he could do.
Suppose that he goes to the mint with his silver as Il­
lustrated above, but instead of getting dollars he obtains 
gold. He would be given 24.75 grains of gold for 371.25 grains 
of silver, and he could take the gold to the market and get 
about 11.06 for It. As far as the Englishman was concerned, 
such an undertaking was the best of the choices If he had to 
use metals to effect his payments. Nevertheless, It was not 
necessary for him to use metal, or to go through the process, 
to get the same results*
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Th* British buyer had starling notes backed by gold 
"England m s  can a gold standard— and anyone who possessed 
the money could get gold for it as defined by law. Therefore, 
he did not hare to gat gold to buy dollars, but he received 
more than $4*44 for it. If the Americans did not grant him 
approximately #4*71, he could revert to th© gold transaction 
and gat that mush* The effect, therefore, vm n that th© Eng­
lishman received one dollar*s worth of goods for 4 shillings 
9 pence.
The question now arises as to what happened to the 
American buying in England; the picture was reversed* If the 
American offered to pay #4*44 for a pound sterling fs worth 
of goods in England, they would not accept it* They would 
demand that he pay them approximately #4.71, or 115*0016 
grains of geld* The American, of course, found it cheaper 
to ship the grains of gold because he could get them at the 
United States mint for #4*44* The effect of this was that 
the American paid 4 shillings 6 pence for on® dollar’s 
worth of goods* If the American owed a dollar debt to Eng­
land, he had to pay 4 shillings 6 pence to cancel It*
Baring Brothers did not have to specify the two rates 
in the contract in order to get them, our monetary standard 
did that* The rates were stated to remove doubt, and to avoid 
possible losses from changes of the market ratio of the two 
metals and the two monies*
The Commissioners who were negotiating with Baring
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Brothers understood th© principles involved— at least in 
part— and showed s<xm of their effects under a camouflage. 
Because it was easy to be misled by the complexity of foreign 
exchange , however, they chose to obtain an erroneous conclu­
sion in an effort to falsely convince "someone” that they had
made a sale of the bonds at a good price, a price that was sd-
5Sventageous to tbs bank.
Th© Board of Directors approved Stir. I.avergne’s negotia­
tion and seemed well pleased.
Several months after the contract was signed the Asso­
ciation attempted to have Baring Brothers revise some of the 
provisions. It asked to eliminate the clause requiring the re­
imbursement of the capital in Ragland. It wanted to eliminate 
the provision whereby Baring Brothers to protect their ad­
vances reserved the right to sell the Louisiana bonds of the
Association at any price. It made known its de&Ire to have
57the funds from the sale of bonds before March 30, 1830.
®®The matter of par and nmrket rate of exchange was a 
serious problem for many States. Some States repudiated their 
debts on the ground that par had been violated by the banks 
and the Xngllsh financiers. Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, 
Michigan, Illinois, etc., had many long and bitter debates in 
their Legislative halls on this very point* The general feel­
ing was that they had been Ttrobbed.” There was some Justifi­
cation for that feeling too because most of their bonds were 
sold after 1834 when the mint ratio was changed from 15 to 1 
to 16 to 1, and because English financier© continued to hold 
to.the 1791 par of exchange after It was changed by law in 
this country. That, however, does not apply in the present 
ease because the date is prior to 1834.
^CABM, December 2, 1828 (Fr.).
®^CABL, Aiidry to Baring Brothers, New Orleans, April 7, 
1889 (fr.}«
Baring Brothers, In answer to the desired changes, re- 
marked that an alteration la the provision for the payment 
of capital and interest in England would take away from the 
bonds their principal merit which gave them an advantage 
over all other American stocks* The con tract rate of exchange 
payable In London made the reimbursement a fixed sum, which 
no variation of the market rate of exchange could effect. Any
50
ohsnge would decrease the price of the bonds on the market* 
They made no comments pertaining to the other desired changes 
but they consented, hcwever, to confirm anything that would 
be agreed upon with Mr. Thomas Baring, their representative, 
while he was in America to complete the minor points that
RQ
had remained unsettled in the September contract.
Learning of the arrival of Mr. Thomas Baring in the
United States, the Directors passed a resolution authorizing
the comptroller (now Mr. Thomas Forstall) to propose to Mr.
Baring to allow a further advance of one hundred thousand
pounds sterling on the consignment of a proportional amount
of bonds and to reiterate the demands already made to Baring
60Brothers and Company.
60 It should be noted that the contract rate of ex­
change was based on the 0,3. monetary law of 1791, where the 
£stg equaled $4,444. The government had undervalued gold, 
therefore, it was on the market at somewhere around &4.8€> to 
the 1sti* but it fluctuated. It was not until 1634 that the 
gold was redefined.
S&CAML, Baring Brothers to An dry» London, toy 29, 1829
6QQ&8M, June 20, 1829 (Fr.).
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Dfoea approaches, however, Mr* Thomas Baring refused 
to consider the proposals on the grounds that he was not ac­
quainted with the mission at Mr* Allard who was than in New 
York trying to negotiate another loan on the American market*
Moreover, he considered the September contract no longer in 
 ^ 61
force because of this attempt* negotiation*
The Directors of the Consolidated Association felt 
rather indignant about Mr* Baring's letter and statement that 
he considered the contract terminated. They challenged his 
contention that the terms of the contract had been violated* 
The President made a strong plea in defense of the "Actions of 
the Association." He even agreed to recall Mr* Allard and re­
voke his powers on August 15 if he had not bean successful in
negotiating a loan by that time. Mr* Baring would not com- 
63promise*
Mr* Thomas Baring would not accept the Association's 
proposal to recall Mr* Allard and to terminate negotiations in 
the United States* He refuted, also, the Directors' arguments 
cm the contract not being abrogated by Mr* Allard's negotia­
tions. Tor him the contract had ceased to operate. He wrote:
... the situation of my house with regard to 
the Association has much to tend with, and it Is in 
my opinion that as long as the idea of a negotiation
61CAML, Thomas Baring to Allard, Saratoga, N* Y* , 
June 8, 1829 It t .FT
®®CA.HL, Andry to I. Baring, Hew Orleans, July 11, 
1829 {7r.).
®®Ibid.. Andry to Allard, Hew Orleans. July 11, 
1829 (FT.?.
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is the United Stated continues to be entertained 
It would be neither prudent* advantageous* nor 
creditable for my house to continue its advances 
on the bonds of the Association* There is* to my 
mind* a thinking difference between the situation 
of agents of the institution with the knew ledge 
that its Interests were Intrusted to us without re 
serve or division and that of supplying its wants 
until others carae forward* and at th© very moment 
when It la in negotiation with other capitalists.
• .
The termination of the contract* however* did not mean 
that Baring Brothers wished to cease all other negotiations 
with the bank. They simply wanted the additional consign­
ments at more favorable terms. Therefore* as a substitute to 
the former contract* Mr* Baring offered a plan for a new ne­
gotiation if the Association wished to cease its negotiations 
with other capitalists* namely:
That Baring Brothers and Company shall buy for 
their account from the Planters Association of Louisi­
ana* a further number of five hundred (500) Bonds of 
tlOOO each* say 168 of the first series* 166 of the 
second series* and 166 of the third series* of the 
seme tenor and f o m  as those already sent to London 
and with the dividend coupons not yet due; to be 
delivered to them in London, and for which they 
shall pay the drafts of th© Association at 60 days 
sight at tie London rate of eighty-eight per cent 
(80$) • Therefore* the Association may draw $19© 
sterling against each Bond and the sum of £
99*000 sterling against the whole. The Association 
shall take proper care that the Bonds corresponding 
to these drafts ar° in th© possession of my house 
at the time of the appearance of these bills. In 
ease the Board of T)1 rectors accepts this offer* I 
authorize the Association to commence their drafts
^ b l d .  . T. Baring to T. Forstall* Montreal* August 3* 
1829 {translation) .
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when they think proper, and to continue them to the 
amount of ninety-nine thousand pounds sterling, upon 
the oompllanoe with the above conditions* Should 
the Board contemplate any change in the date of the 
reimbursement of the first series, it will then 
send to my house, 250 of the second series and 250 
of the third series; but you will see that* should 
that not be the case, I am ready to meet its views 
by taking a full proportion of those of the short 
date. v:hsn you deduct two per cent (2$) commission 
for the sale, which the institution would have to 
pay for consignments, the price of 88> corresponds 
with its limits of 90/6; the only difference being 
that the interest from June thirtieth, Is Included 
in our purchase, whilst, upon the sales from the 
Association, it would not be included in its 
limits, I suppose
Xn the event that the organizatian did not accept his 
offer, Thomas Baring authorized the Direction to draw on con- 
slgmasnt another fifty thousand pounds sterling after they 
had received notice that the previous bonds had been sold* If 
it did accept, however, he expected to be accorded terns 
similar to those of the former contract, in order to dis­
pose of at least part of their existing purchase. Vhat he
meant by this was that the Association not draw on Baring
an
Brothers until January 1, 1630.
This new offer was Iter more unfavorable than the Lon­
don contract in many ways. First, it did not grant any of the 
institutionfs demands, not even the request that all the bonds 
be sold before March 30, 1830. Second, it dia not po Trait the 
Direction to draw on consignments as freely as before. Third,
65
Ibid.. (translation).
ft A
I bid. . Saratoga, N. Y. , August 15, 1829 (Fr.) ,
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It only agreed to taka 500 more of the Associationfs bonds,
and at 88 par cent of par, including interest coupon©— 7 per
cent lass than the London contract• It is evident, therefore,
especially in the light of the analysis of the first contract,
that Baring Brothers had a very profitable affair in the new
contract* For the Association, however, it meant a sale of
bonds at 77 or 78 per cent of their face value.
The Directors of the Consolidated Association met in
an extraordinary session in order to study the offer and they
decided that such a negotiation would cause a loss to the
Association of $12,650 on $500,000 of brads* As they figured
it, it was a loss of 8 and 7/10 per cent from the former price*
nevertheless, they felt it necessary to accept the offer in
order to satisfy the stockholders*
The first sale on the bonds consigned March 1, 1829,
took place November 15, 1829, the date when Be ring Brothers
68
announced the disposal of ^64,000 worth of bonds, the price
they claimed to be at about 97 per cent of par. Five days
later, November 20, they sold & 156,000 of bonds. By November
28 they reported that they had sold the entire amount of th©
69
$234,000 of bonds that had been consigned to them; their re­
port shows the sale in 21 days. The 234 brads yielded a cred­
it for the Association ox M9,673* 9. 3., ox* approximately
67CABii, September 17, 1820 (Fr.).
bjbl
GAML, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Asaociation, 
London, Novemoer 20, xt*29.
69Ibid* * November 20, 1629.
83
#280,771, the interest coupons being included as part of the 
sale.
The question arises, naturally, Why did the bonds not
sell until November and why were they sold so rapidly when
they did start selling? The answer, most likely, is that
bonds were not offered for resale until after the details of
the eon tract formulated by Thomas Baring were completed, and
70then only to chosen clients• That, however, was not the 
only answer. A letter on December 11, 1889, gave the clue:
The present time appears indeed so favorable 
for the realization of the remainder of your stock, 
that we eezmot but feel stronger regret than ever 
that your charter should have prevented your trans­
mitting your Bonds without previous payment in ?Iew 
Orleans, and should thus, perhaps, from unavoidable 
delay, prevent your profiting of these advantageous 
circumstances. If, however, we understand the acts 
of your legislature rightly, the Association has 
new completed the security required by the State 
and is at liberty to send its bonds forward without 
previous payment, and in such a case we should reo- 
cssnend the board of directors to transmit the re­
mainder as soon as possible for sale here
Innocent as their stateaaent may appear, it is of great signif­
icance. Baring Brothers, by selling the £34 bonds were meeting 
the eharter requirements of the Association. As a result they
70The reason for making such a statement is that Bar­
ings wrote, saying, ’This stock does not take well with the 
public, and It is only among our immediate friends that w© 
have been able to place any...." (CkiuL, Baring Brothers to 
Consolidated Association, London, October 20, 1829).
71
G&ML, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association, 
London, December 11, 1889.
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would not have to mate Immediate payment for the 500 bonds
they were about to receive as agreed to in the August c m -
traet • Furthermore, if this token sale met with the security
required by the Association, th® entire amount of the bonds
could be shipped to them without immediate payment being
necessary• It would be nice to receive interest on bonds
without having to pay anything until they were sold*
the London ~oaey market, which Baring Brothers claimed
so active in November to permit the sale of bonds, continued
to be very active throughout the winter months. After the
rapid November sale, however, no bonds were sold until March 
7282, 1850* Thereafter, there was a regular market for the 
bonds at a good rate until July. In April the Louisiana bonds 
were at 102* By May the bonds were up to 103 and 1/2* And 
in June they reached the peak of 104*
An explanation Is necessary, however, on the hifh price 
of the Louisiana bonds of the Association* Some indications 
have already been given in the discussion of the contracts, 
but there remain a few points to be cleared* The simplest 
problem to be cleared in an attempt to understand per as in­
terpreted is that the quotations at above or below par in­
cluded the accrued Interest on the bonds from the dote of 
issue* Thus if customer B bought a bond In June , 1850, he 
bought the bond with all the Interest coupons attached* On
72
Ibid** March 22, 1830
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the coupons from th© date of issuance, January, 1829, to 
X\m&, 1830, interest was eollectable even though B was not 
the comer of the bond before June, 1830* Naturally B would 
be willing to pay more for the bond if it included the inter­
est due. The price he paid for it should not be understood, 
however, as the price from part the amount paid for interest 
should be deducted from the price to ascertain the variation 
froci par.
A solution of what constitutes par is not too satis­
factory. Par, you will say, is th© face or stated value of 
the bond* In other wards, #1,000 must be received for every 
11,000 bond sold to he repaid at #1,000 in order to have a 
par sale* Thus, if the bonds had sold in this country, par 
would have been relatively simple to ascertain; the currency 
received would have been the same as the currency paid* Ne­
gotiations, however, were with a foreign country. Two dif­
ferent currencies were Involved* Furthermore, to complicate 
matters more, the United States had a legal currency system 
which was not In harmony with the existing state of affairs 
in monetary exchanges* On a gold and silver basis as defined 
by the Banking and Currency System, the British pound ster­
ling was equivalent to #4.44, but on the current market rate 
of exchange there was an advantage in London4s favor of as 
much as 10 to 14 per cent; the pound sterling sold at some­
where around #4*86. Under such condition, was the mint rate 
of exchange or the market rate of exchange parV
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What constitutes par is discussed in the Reports of
03
the Illinois General Assembly, 1839*1840. That body gave 
the different interpretations of par as viewed by the Amer­
icans and the rnglish. In the United States the argument fol­
lowed Albert Gallatin in his "Considerations on the Currency 
and the Banking System of the United States” i
Being obliged to refer to the rate of exchange, 
it must be recollected that what Is universally 
meant by par is the promise to pay, in another 
plaoe, a quantity of pure silver or gold equal In 
weight to the quantity of pure silver or gold con­
tained in th© coins with which the drawer of th© 
bill of exchange is paid*7*
In England they followed a somewhat different reasoning. For- 
ttms’s Epitome of the Stocks and Public Funds „ the stand­
ard of the London Stock Exchange, considers par as "the equiv­
alence of a certain amount of standard currency of the one 
eoimtry In the standard currency of another. 1 That was differ­
ent, however, from th© course of exchange. Course of exchange 
"is the current price between two places ... which is always 
fluctuating, being sometimes above, and sometimes below p&r, 
according to the circumstances of trad®, and the consequent
ty e.i
debt due to or from one country, from or to the other.*
The Americans were talking of a difference in the metal con­
tents of the currency. ¥hat they considered a difference of
exchange the British conoid©rod a course of exchange. To 
_
E. Adams, (ad) Th© Writing of Albert Gallatin, Vol.
Ill, p.. 270.
75Cited in R. 0 . licGrone, pp. olt,. , pp. 7-8 (footnote).
a?
til* British th* par was th* practice that evaluated the
pound to he worth $4*44 in American money* Actually, it was
worth 8,73 per oent more under coinage laws he for© 1630,
and 9,46 end 5/8 per cent more after 1830, because of the
change in the iaarket ratio. The American interpretation gave
76
way, however, to that of the British* Both sides contin­
ued to argue, but "per*1 resained a question, with tbs Eng­
lish imposing their interpretation.
The Consolidated Association Louisiana Bonds continued 
to be sold by Baring Brothers throughout 1830, although with
less activity because, as they claimed, there was a deprea-
7?
sion in the London money market. May, 1831, however,
waited the end of sales by Baring Brothers of the consigned
bonds of the Association* It appears from the records that,
from 1329 to 1831, Baring Brothers and Company sold a total
of f1,882,000 of bonds consigned to them by the Consolidated 
78Association*
It will be remembered that Baring Brothers had agreed
to purchase on their account a total of 750 bonds by their
79first contract and 500 bonds by their second. Had such 
6* Myers, The Hew York Money Market» Vol. I,
p. 72.
The t, stg* was approximately $4.71 prior to 1830 
end |4.86 afterwards*
^CSAML, Bering Brothers to Consolidated Association, 
August 6, October 6, and 30, November 6, 13, t«n& 29, Eeoeia- 
ber * and 14, 1650.
78
Ibid* * and reports on sales from November 28, 1829,
to Mhy 30 " 1851.
79Supra, pp. 61 and 80.
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n  agreement been fulfilled and had Baring Brothers resold 
$1,882,000 or consigned bonds, the sum of bonds outstanding 
would haws been over $2,500,000. It must be assumed, there­
fore, that Baring Brothers purchased less bonds for resale 
than they tad agreed to and accepted more on consignment 
than was specified in the contracts.
From the date of the contract until May, 1831, the Con 
solids ted Association paid $62,500 ( % 14, 132 stg*) every 
June 30 and December 31* That meant that it was paying the 
semiannual interest on the entire $2,500,000. Not all the 
bends were outstanding, however, during the period from Jan­
uary, 1829, and May, 1831. Bonds were oassigned to Baring 
Brothers from time to time after notice was given by Baring 
Brothers that the previously consigned bonds had been sold; 
the Consolidated Association did not have use of the funds 
from the sale of bonds during the entire period* Baring 
Brothers were receiving, therefore, the accrued interest on 
the bonds it had in its possession for sale plus the interest 
on the bonds which tad not yet been delivered by the Consol­
idated Association; it was receiving interest on instruments 
which tad required no disbursement whatsoever*
It is conclusive, therefore, that the bonds sold at s 
discount which exceeded the legal limits specified by the
80This conclusion is derived from the letters and doc­
uments . Cf * * CABL, GABM, CAML.
mState Legislature. The actual lose sustained by the sale 
and consignment of beads m s  sot revealed in the bank's rec­
ords, but it appears that the loss m s  as high as twenty 
per sect,if not more. It m s  very difficult to ia&ke a profit 
fro* capital the eost of which was so excessive*
Sarly Operations of the Bank
The Consolidated Association opened for business in
January, 1629, two years after the original charter was grant- 
_ m
ed. The sale of BOO bonds to Baring Brothers, effective 
December 30, 1828, gave the bank a credit account with the 
London house upon which it could grant loans to its custom-
fhe first stock-lean was granted on February 19, 1329; 
end during the several ensuing days, a number of loans were 
unde. It appears, however, according to the records, that the 
majority of the early loans were granted to the directors,
61The original charter was granted March 16, 1827, 
and provided that it was subject to change by Legislature 
if the bank did not commence operation by January, 1828.
Thus, the charter ceased to be effective when the bank 
failed in its first bond negotiations. The Act of February
19, 1628, however, revived the charter with the repeated 
stipulation that the bank open for business by January, 1829.
( 5 la. A m , 44. Consolidated Bank vs. The State of Louisiana.)
eltSSSSL. p . 61.
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State officials, and others Influential In getting the in­
stitution organized,83
The funds for the sale or consignment of bonds were not 
too plentiful and quick in becoming a w  liable for credit and 
discount purposes* The contracts with Baring Brothers did not 
enable the Consolidated Association to build an adequate 
credit account with this London firm. The terras of the con­
tracts did not provide for large enough consl^ments at any 
one time to permit the Consolidated Association to draw large 
amounts of drafts cm Baring Brothers, For example, besides 
the £300,000 of bonds sold, December 31, 1828, and besides 
the aale of 450 bonds more, February 15, 1329, there was the 
consignment of approximately 250 bonds, effective March 1,
1329» That meant that the New Orleans firm had but $1,000,000 
available for loans and discounts until Baring Brothers fur­
ther consented to accept additional consignments from the Asso­
ciation* Really, the amount available was less than 41,000,000 
because the bonds were taken at a large discount. That was a 
paltry sum when there were stockholders in the amount of 
§2,000,000 calling for credit, not to mention the innumerable 
amount of commercial paper that was offered for discount, nor 
the numerous other property ovmers desiring mortgage loans.
BS'phe first loan was to J* B. Moussior who read th© 
first project of a loan and who was influential in the rela­
tions with Baring Brothers. Th© second loan was to 0. P©»- 
ohapelles, a director of the bank and a member of the Legis­
lature, et caters. (Of. GAML, February 19, 20, etc. 1829).
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Sons idea of the early operations of the bank Is 
available from the first financial report compiled by the 
officials, a so-called "Statement of Affairs . was drawn 
as of June 16, 1829, five months after commencing operations, 
and it £1*08, or claims to give, the sources of funds and 
their application, viz.:
84Statement of affairs of the Association as of June 16, 1829 
Basel*e
Loans an Mortgages 4754,000.00
Bills discounted:
to tbs State of In. $55,000*00
to H. Landman 15,000.00
to the stockholders an 
credit:
to Mr* Le Bret an $1,500
to Mr. Herrang 6,900
to Ur* Vi H e  re 6,000
to Mr* Reman 10,200 24,600.00
Bill disc ora tod to Mr.
Allard, eomimioner of 
the Association now
absent. 2,200.00
Bills discounted to
various small deraanders 90,554.22 187,154.22
Discount on the 4750,000 of Bonds 37,500.00
Balance in the hands of Baring Brothers 
and Company to meet the payment of the 
expenses of discount on the remittance 
of 234 bonds, and on the Interest due
on the remittances 53,866.72
General Expenses 25,393.41
(continued an next page)
® * ( m ,  June 16, 1629.
11,037,694.36
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A e U w
Capital: 984 bonds of $1,000 
Discounts
$984
64,683.98
13,634.75
7.25
000.00
Jwsiwtt oft letters of exchange on B.B
Surplus In the Bank
to deduct the passive account
11,062, 268.96
1.037.896.33
24,371.61
add Notes discounted to be 
collected* 90.334.22
Total at the disposal of the
Asa Delation $114,705.03
*Thic la the amount of Bills discounted to the various small 
dsraanden Included In the pass Ire account.
Statement of Income and 'Expense (for period ending June 16, 
1829)
General Sxpanse $25,393.41
Interest on 964 bonds 22,166.72
Gross loss $47,560.13
Deduct Premium an letters of ex change 13.634.75
*ffce discrepancy Is the difference between the passive and 
the active In the Stateioent of Affairs.
Add Discrepancy*
33,925.40
24,371.61
Total loss $ 58,297.01
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Loans on stocks and mortgages, according to the re­
port, amounted to $754,000; discounts granted totaled 
$167,154*22--an extension of loans and discounts to the 
s*ss of $941,154.22. This extension of credit was rendered 
possible through the bank’s acquisition of capital funds; 
end the report states that IL& Institution obtained the 
funds by the sale of 964 bonds of $1,000 eaoh, the dis­
counting of notes with other institutions to the amount of 
$64 ,623.98, and the sale of bills of exchange on Baring 
Brothers at a premium amounting to $13,634.73. The loss 
sustained during the period u r s calculated to be $58,297.01.
A simple glance at the report, however, suffices to 
convince one that the procedure of calculation employed m s  
erroneous and somewhat fictitious. An analysis based on the 
report at its fee© figures would be in error and of little 
practical use. About the only things obtained from the finan­
cial statement are: some vague idea of what transactions 
took place during the Interim mentioned; and a strong im­
pression that the officials of the firm desired to con­
ceal true facts.
It would be best to ignore the financial statement 
entirely If a more reliable source of information could be 
found, but the other records of the company do not afford 
more reliable information, especially during the early
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85aenttis or the bank's existence* It will be necessary, 
therefore, to accept, in part, the Information presented in 
the so-called "Statement of / ffairs*" From this statement 
It may be possiible to ascertain more factual data upon 
which to base a more accurate analysis*
The first thing to consider is the title: "A Statement 
of the Affairs of the Association as of Juno 16, 1829*1 is 
misleading* The report resembles more statement of funds 
derived and applied"; and we shall review it as such*
The purpose of the statement of funds— sources and ap­
plications—  is to analyze the changes which took place in 
the business during the accounting period* It is to study the 
changes that took place in the assets and liabilities during 
the interim in order to trace the sources and application 
of funds*
The value of the statement lies in the analysis* The 
increases and decreases of specific items, when considered as 
a whole, give o picture of the state of affairs* It is quit® 
vo 1 u r ble in indicating the amount and nature ol* the working 
capital and the cash on hand or In the banks, as differentiated 
from the profit or loss realized during the period.
The basis of a statement of funds is the comparative
ft K
The accounting employed by the company v;aa very 
crude and incoraplete* For example, the entries for early 
loans were made on the letters of application, not on any 
particular set of books*
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balance afewt. The information necessary to make the anal­
ysis of Tends received and applied is obtained by first pre­
paring a comparative balance sheet. Otherwise, it is very 
likely that there will be no statement of funds.
The company officials did not derive th©ir data from 
a comparative balance sheet, howovor; instead, they pre­
sented their ”fabricated statement” with the appearance of 
a balance sheet.
The 984 bonds that were sold or consigned to Baring 
Brothers did not yield $984,000, but considerably loss. Be­
sides the deduction for the discount of five per cent, there 
should have been the deduction of the loss suffered by the 
c cm tract rate of exchange. Under the contract terms with 
Baring Brothers it was agreed to aocept the dollar as being 
worth 4 shillings 3 pence, instead of the current rate of 
4 shillings 6 pence; that neant a loss of approximately six 
cents on every dollar. The total loss on account of exchange 
cm the 904 bonds was about 4 59,000.
When the Association discounted #54,523.98 of Its 
notes with other institutions, it had to sustain a loss of 
three or four thousand dollars since the current discount 
rate was approximately six per cent. That should have been 
included in the statement.
*
Q^Cf.. J. B. Taylor and H. 0. Miller, Intermediate 
Accounting (New York; McGraw-Hill, 1933), VolT Tf, pF* 75-85.
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Incomes derived from operation should have been added 
to the funds derived section of the statement. Earned interest 
and earned discount are funds received, and if they had been 
so included the picture of the bank’s situation would have been 
improved* Even then the funds at the bank’s disposal would not 
have been $114,705.83 as claimed*
Some very dubltable accounting Is found in the "State­
ment of Income and Expense." Under the assumption that the 
so-called "Statement of Affairs" was a balance sheet, the 
officers figured that the excess of credits over debits meant 
a deficit and, therefore, they added it to the net loss; that, 
however, was not the serious deficiency of the income and ex­
pense statement. The real trouble was that only a fev; of the 
expense Items were included* If all items were included, the 
expense account would total approximately $17 5,000 to $176,000, 
if not aore.^ The income items, on the other hand, would be 
rare than the inclusion of the profit made from selling bills
Q?The records are not complete enough to permit a con­
struction of a statement of Income and expense, but a few 
additional facts serve to show that the loss was greater 
than given by the officials:
For example, some of the expenses were:
General Expense $25,393.41
Interest 22,166.72
Discount on 750 bonds 37,500.00
Discount on 234 bonds 11,700.00
Loss on par of exchange 59,040.00 (approximately) 
Commissions on interest 110.83 "
Commissions on bonds 19.680*00 "
Total expenses 3175,590.96
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ef w t o i g n  at a premium, W m b  kooaa would not be large
to M m  the expense amount to site the reported 
Imam of $&8»£97.01. It is safe to say that the income 
afeauld hare teen approximately |8$t0C0, An accurate profit 
aad loss statement, therefore, should indicate a lose at so w  
figure a bore one hundred thousand dollars, not $58, £97 *01. 
as reported.
Why should the of fleers of the Consolidated Associa­
tion m a t  to present such misleading information'? It may be 
that the officials were ettempting to create credit under the 
guise of transferring credit• It may be, also, that they were 
attempting to conceal the heavy losses sustained by the com­
pany, especially in the sale of bonds.
During the year 1850, the funds from England were slow 
in being made available to the bank, and the demands for cred­
it by the people were great, therefore, the Consolidated Asso­
ciation sought a loan from s o w  domestic money center. The 
direct ore resolved at their meeting of December 1, 1850, to 
negotiate a loan of £800 ,000, reimbursable in one to two
years* This sum,they claimed, would partially satisfy the
36demands made cm the Association up to June, 1650.
A New fork bank supplied the Association with the loan 
desired, but tbs extra 4E00,00C received for purposes of grant- 
la, credit m s  soon depleted. Tha directors, therefore, seeing
®®afcIIK, December 1, 1330 (Fr.).
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ft shortage in funds and reeling that the tank was approach-
lag rapidly the #2,000,000 limit specified in the charter
re let Its to mortgage loans, appointed a comnittae to inves-
@9tigate the advisability of stopping loans on mortgages.
HT« Lavergne, the spokesman of the committee, reported that:
(1) The institution had a balance of *14,800 left 
from the #200,000 loan procured on drafts accord­
ing to the December 1, 1830* resolution.
(2) The loans on mortgages and credit to other borrow­
ers amounted to #2,118,395, or 4118,395 above the 
limit specified la the charter.
(3) On the #213,626.11 owed the Association by Baring 
Brothers there was coming due interest of 1176,700, 
leaving a net of 136,926.17 owed the institution by 
Baring Brothers.90
The directors, therefore, decided to order a suspension on new
91mortgage loans until a new order be issued.
As an additional restriction, they passed a resolution 
requiring all borrowers on mortgage to pay interest from the 
first day their credit was opened instead of at the end of 
the period, that is, interest payable in advance. The direc­
tors claimed that this would be a means of preventing the loss 
of interest that resulted in the lapse of time which generally 
flowed between the day credit was granted on the mortgage and 
the time at which the horrowert’ paid interest. To the borrow­
ers, however, the policy meant that they had to pay Interest
s®Ibidt, February 7, 1831 (Fr.).
*u'lbld.~. Februery B, 1831 (Fr.).
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AO
before they had had the use of the credit.
Interest payments an bonds had been met regularly up 
to 1831. During the latter part or 1631, however, the Associa­
tion had difficulty in meeting the interest. The company 
could not obtain drafts because of their scarcity and It 
claimed that it could not ship on account of atoms.
The President, therefore, asked Baring Brothers to grant the 
Consolidated Association an "open-credit" account of twelve 
to fifteen thousand pounds sterling. This credit, he stated,
mas to be used in the case of absolute necessity for the pay-
93
ment of interest. Baring Brothers refused the request and 
reprimanded the officers for not being able to prepare ade­
quately to meet foreseen obligations. They agreed, however, 
to be of service in the event of unexpected disaster.94 To 
make matters worse for the bank, the sugar planters wore 
unable to pay the interest on their loans on account of a 
crop failure* In spite of these adversities, however, the 
Association was able to meet its payment on time.
In 1832 conditions were even more acute. Postpone­
ment on stock and mortgage loans increased considerably over 
those of the latter rart of 1831. Many of the discounted
92
Ibid.. February 19, 1831 (Fr.).
93
GAHL, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
Hew Orleans, September 3, 1831 ( Fr.).
94
CA24L, Bering Brothers to Consolidated Association, 
London, October 22, 1Q31 (Fr.).
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Botes had to be extended* Letters of ©xchane were scarcer 
than ever. The June Interest payment to Baring Brothers had 
to be made in specie, and at quite an expense to the company.®*5 
The matter of reimbursement of the five year bonds 
was a vexing problem which the directors had to face in 1852* 
The maturity date of these bonds was June 50, 1833. With the 
bills of credit scarce, the shipment of specie expensive, and 
the planters unable for the most part to meet the interest 
and installments on their loans, something had to be done to 
avoid default* The President of the Association, therefore, 
asked Baring Brothers for edvice and offered a moans of re­
imbursement, which was to make payment through drafts drawn 
by the Union Bank against the Baring Brothers.®6
The London bankers at first accepted the proposal, but 
a short time later rejected it* Nevertheless, the Association 
proceeded to acquire drafts on Baring Brothers from the Union 
Bank and they delivered them to the London house as means of 
effecting the reimbursement of the maturing five-year bonds. 
Baring Brothers,notwithstanding their rejection,accepted the 
drafts for the purpose of retiring the company’s obligations.
9&CA3L, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
New Orleans, April 6 and 15, 1832 (Fr*).
96lbid., April 15. The Union Bank vms another prop­
erty bank then in the process of organization, end it was sell­
ing bonds to Baring Brothers. (Infra* Chapter IV, 192-222).
97ca~L, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association, 
London, June 8, 1032, February 3, and April 13 through June 
29, 1833.
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flkMtt dmffca ob daring Brothers, however, were not sufficient
to effect the complete retirement of bonds. It was necessary
90to Ship $40,000 in specie to make up the deficiency.
By 1834 the financial situation of the bank was ftp- 
proaching & critical stage • The sugar crop of 1333 was almost 
e complete failure, furthermore , there was a shortage of 
specie, or rather a flight of specie as soon as It was acquir­
ed, and a scarcity of commercial paper except at high premi­
ums. A.U the basics of Hew Orleans felt the pressure. The Con­
solidated Association along with other banks decided, there­
fore, to relieve the pressure through cooperative action.
It was resolved and voted by the Association of Bank 
Presidents in Hew Orleans that notes discounted could be ex­
tended with the sense security at a reduction of ten per cent 
every sixty days until December, 1834; they jointly requested 
the Bank of the United states to have the New Orleans branch 
extend Its discounts on il,000,000 of local banks* commer­
cial paper to expire February 1, 1834, or to grant loans not
99exceeding five per cent of the capital of the banks*
98GAUL, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
Hew Orleans, itoy IB, 1833 (Fr»).
99
GAHL, J. 3. Hulin (Mechanics ana Traders* Bonk) to 
Consolidated Ass oc let I on, N*ev Orleans, February 24 and May 26, 
1834; H. Lavergae (then cashier of City Bank) to Consolidated 
Association, Hew Orleans, Hay 26, 1034.
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f N  Consolidated Association's l o m s  resulting from
the adverse economic conditions were considerable. Furthermore,
the reimbursement of bonds, which Alexander Trotter claims
100
eould not be absolved by profit, did not permit recupera­
tion from previous losses. Also, there was the $100,000 loss
101
from osbezslesient by Mr. Provost, cashier. The "Statement
Of Affairs of the Association as of September 9, 1834,” gives
10®
an estimate of the loss, and possibly an underestiraate, vis.: 
See next page for Statement.
100Alexander Trotter, Observations in the Financial 
Position and Credit of Such"of the 3tates of the' ¥ortii Amer- 
lean Union as have~Centreeted Public PebtsTKew York and 
London; Longraan, Orxae, Brown, Groen, nnd Longmans, 1839), 
p. 283*
101
GA2L, Hugh Xavergne (new cashier of Consolidated 
Association) to Baring Brothers, Hew Orleans, June &4,
1834.
10fi
GAML, September 9, 1834.
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Oaaasal fltatMasi tf GoaaoliteteA Association
September 9, 1654
Profit teas $118,260.72
Metes and Bills discounted #426,360.66 
Steak Leans 1,133,038*61
Leans on Mortgage 378,565.75
Bill* Resolvable 60,500.00 2,COE,530.08
Foreign Bills of Exchange 51,202.93
State of Louisiana 5,036.85
Motes and Bills discounted, protested 129,768.33
Protest Account 179.50
Baring Brothers, London 52,600.57
CseBdLasioB of Interest, London 3,178.65
P real urn on Letters of isxehaiige 3,437.13
Suspense Account 50,264.77
Expense Account 2,081.33
Reel Estate 65,413.00
D a  by Local Banks 8,200.50
Cash:
Specie 67,764.87
Loeel Bank Motes 460.00 67,764.87
2.559.979*17
>1**1 (bonds outstanding} ” ~2700£7655700
tcount Account 95,119*17
Dividends los. 1 end 2 160,000.00
Circulation 75,550.00
Due to Local Banka 145,000.79
Deposits 80,309•21
The profit and loss item of #118,260.72 appears to hare 
been attained by simply subtracting the total considered as 
assets from the liabilities; there was no statement of profit 
and loss to substantiate the amount claimed as loss. The as* 
seta must also be looked at with scrutiny; it is permissible 
to capitalize certain costs, but not operating expenses. By 
removing the "water" there would have been a far greater loss 
than reported* Bad the officers arrived at a loss of approx*
104
la»t«ly two oar three hundred thousand dollars, they would
IQS
have been more ace urate*
With these losses being evident, the officers, never­
theless , declared two dividends, amounting to #160,000. It is 
difficult to see how the bank had ever really earned uny 
profits.
Financial conditions improved somewhat in 1835. From
Mexico, silver dollars had been reoelved through the sale of
drafts on London, end the cotton crops for the year had been 
104good. Furthermore, the Consolidated Association had been 
able to obtain some relief from the shortage of conirerclai 
paper by obtaining $50,000 in credit from the Union Bank of 
BTew Tort: and $50,000 from Messrs. Prum, Olard, King and Compa­
ny of Mew Tort to operate on the domestic exchange. From 
Thomas ftiIson and Company of London it was granted a running 
credit of SO,000 pounds sterling uncovered for n?'n©ty days, 
or approximately $100,000 on which the bank probably received
105
#89 ,000 in bills of exchange at the rate of 4 shillings 3 pence*
at #300,000, the lose would have been an under­
estimate* For fnstance, the cashier, Mr. Lavergn©, admitted _ 
to to ring Brother* that the Ass eolation did not expect to real 
iz© anywhere near the full value on the #139,768.553 of protest ©d notes ana bills discounted, nor did it anticipate a full 
payment of principal and interest In arrears by the mortgage 
owners. G&HL, August 7, 1834, and February 31, 1835 .(Fr.).
10w . ,  Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers,
Hew Orleans, February 21, 1835. The letter states that sugar
prices were 5 end 1/4 cent a a pound and th t cotton was con­
sidered almost as good as coined money. (Fr.)
105Ibid.
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A *  Stat* « a  gtttreoa toward tha Association, too. Seeing
the difficulty the institution had faced in meeting tha five-
year beads, the Legislature passed an Act on March Si, 1835,
to extend the maturity dates of the 1838 and 1843 bonds until
106
Fwne, 1848, or to a nearer date if convenient.
The 3tate was still more generous In 1836. On March 7
the Legislature provided for the issuance of another #1,000,000
in bonds to be secured by mortgages or ixrssiovable property sit-
107
uated in Mew Orleans and suburbs, Lafayette, and Carrol ton.
The ml 11 ion. dollars of the "1048 bonds was issued May 
1, 1336, and the Consolidated Association entered into a con­
tract with Francois dailzardi and Company of London for the 
sale of bonds. Once the contract was signed, however, the Gov­
ernor refused to deliver the bonds Issued by the State in the 
bank93 favor. He interpreted the Law of 1836 to require an 
equivalent retirement of the old bonds of the State for the 
new. In spite of the strong pleas by the directors of the 
Association for a change of attitude, the Governor refused 
to alter his opinion— old bonds had to be retired before an 
equivalent amount of new bonds could be relinquished by the 
State.108
106La. Acta. 1855, p. 123.
107Ibld.. 1836, p. 95.
^■®®CAHL , Consolidated Assoofntlon to /. deLlzardl, Hew 
Orleans, June S3, 1836 and Consolidated Association to Gov­
ernor White, Hew Orleans, August 18, 1836 (Fr.).
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In May, 1637, the Consolidated Association felt the
oriels* A series of events had occurred previous to that time,
however, to give warning that serious difficulties were close
at hand. The uptrend of the Association’s business activity
In 1635 was short-lived, Y»ith all the relief obtained the hank
was not able to fh re any too well; the institution was not able
109to profit from the substantial credit extended to it. By
1836 it suffered the effects of overex pans Ion, and in that re­
spect it was witnessing the same effects as were all the other 
banks of New Orleans*
Perhaps the major reason why the New Orleans banks felt 
the pressure from overexpsnsion la 1836 was con account of the 
situation in Sagland* Toward the end of 1836 the Bank of Eng­
land was experiencing a shortage of specie and to remedy the 
situation it began rejecting all Amerio&n bills not drawn at 
short date or eight and not predicated on effects in the hands 
of agents in London* Furthermore, it prohibited any English 
Wftnkring house from offering or extending uncovered credits.
That radically curbed the credit facilities of the local banks* 
Their "open credit" accounts with Anglo-A uorl can bankers were
closed; Xharaas »I1boii was forced to close the Consolidated Asso-
110
elation9s |5u,00G "open credit*" Bills of exchange which
were so essential in the rapidly expanding trade became extreme­
ly scarce and specie liad to be employed.
^^Ibid** Consolidated Association to T# Wilson, New 
Orleans, February 3, 1636 (fr*), and Consolidated Association 
to Bering Brothers, New Orleans, February 4, 1836 (Fr.).
1J-0Ibld.. January 28, 1837 {I'r.) .
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The continuous rise in the price of cotton throughout 
1336, however, was a major factor which enabled the New 
Orleans banks to remain open during that year and the early 
part of 1837.^*^ Another reason why there was not a precip­
itous downfall as might have been expected was that the 
local banks, Including the Consolidated Association, were 
heavily Indebted to the New Orleans branch of the second 
Bank of the United States and later to the United States 
Bank of Pennsylvania and other Eastern banks, which were 
actively engaged in maintaining high prices in cotton*
The debt of the New Orleans banks with the branch of 
the Bank of the United States placed them under the power of 
the second Bank of the United States at Philadelphia* Mr* 
Biddle, president of the Philadelphia bank, placed Southern 
banks under its control in order to control the cotton market. 
This second Bank of the United States had invested heavily in 
cotton and Mr* Biddle wished to maintain the price of cotton 
stable.112
When the charter of the second Bank of the United States 
expired toward the end of 1836, Mr. Biddle took over much of 
the assets and control of this firm, into his State bank, 
the United States Bank of Pennsylvania. Besides, the Louisiana 
bftnk-a had entered into contracts with some of the Eastern 
banking institutions which were largely under the power of
UlCotton prices rose from 6 3/4 pence per pound in 1833 
to 10 to 12 1/2 in 1836. CAML, Hobson and Son to Consolidated 
Association, Liverpool, March 31, 1836; CABL, Consolidated 
Association to Baring Brothers, New Orleans, March 30, 1Q37.
112Cf., R. C. McGrane, Th© Panic of 1837 (Chicago: The 
Ufolversity of Chicago Press, 1924).
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Up* M U l i  and which were Interested In oottoa, and thane 
leeal tanks permitted large aeetronilatlon of balances with 
these "Eastern firms, giving them and Mr* Biddle the addition­
al poser which had not existed under the second Bank of the 
Bolted States*
Thzliks the second Bonk of the United States, however, 
#r. Biddle and other Eastern hankers exerted more pressure 
Ob  the local hanks and they were not as cautious as th©
-V'
Bank of the Ohited States had been* Therefore, large drains
on specie reserves resulted, and this was weakening the New
115Orleans hanks*
fortunately, through the combined efforts of these 
local banks more specie was secured and a restricted dis­
count policy was put into effect In order to check th©
114strain on the reserves.
The high price of cotton, the 3astern support, and 
the importation of specie, however, did not keop the local 
banks in a state of apparent soundness for too long* The 
Bank of England was even inore stringent during 1837 than It
113Ibid!.
i**Of.. CAUL, Citizens Bank to Consolidated Association, 
Hew Orleans, October 11, 25, 1836, March 25 and May 18, 1837; 
Louisiana Senate to Consolidated Association, New Orleans,
Say IS, 1837; City Bank to Consolidated Association, New Or­
leans, April 1 and El, 1837; Carrollton Bank to Consolidated 
Association, New orleane, May 6 and 19, 1837; Bank of Orleans, 
te Consolidated Association, £©w Orleans, Ap^ll 21, 1837.
109
Im m  la 1836. lb* 1836 wtton crop failure throughout
MUili of th« South had la ft m y  cotton factora with heavy
•ivaaew. yaekson'i "Specie Circular" of 1336 was rapidly
115waking Itself felt through a deflation in land values.
Specie continued being drained out of the banks ©a soon as
115
It was acquired. liny 16, 1837, therefore, fourteen of the
Hew Orleans banks closed. '»YltvIn a few days the regaining
hanks suspended specie payments. The Consolidated Association
117
was in this latter group.
Business During the Depression, 1337-1343
Louisiana laws required & bank to forfeit its charter 
after ninety continuous days of suspension, but the laws were 
not enforced. The Consolidated Association was permitted to 
restm operations after the May crisis , and it was not until 
November 12, 1342, that any decree of forfeiture was rendered 
at the instance of the State. At that time the bank was re­
quested to transmit its assets to a board of i^anagers ap­
pointed by the State, which request the institution compiled
115CAHL, Consolidated Association to Baring Brothers, 
New Orleans, March 30, 1837 t ?r.).
116
A. Fortier, qpA clt.. p. 226.
117GfcML, John Barnett to Consolidated Association, Hew 
Orleans, May 22, 1837 (rr.) . Right or. Gavarre, Martin For­
tier, and Debouchel include the Consolidated Association as 
one of the two Hew Orleans banks that did not suspend specie 
payments. Barnett lettex*, h w ^ e r ,  giws the impression 
that the beak did suspend.
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with February 17* 1843. Thus* from 1837 to 1843 the man­
agement of the affaire of the Consolidated Association pro­
ceeded as it had previous to May* 1837. Nevertheless * what 
took place with respect to the business activities of the 
bank during the depression period is difficult to decipher 
and analyse* The reoords are not complete and the information 
is often evasive* conflicting* and confusing. For that reason, 
only the more revealing data are cited in giving a general 
picture of the affairs of the concern*
The sale of *1840w bonds* authorized by the Legislature 
in 1836* was begun by Francois deLizardl a short time before 
the erlsis occurred in May* 1837* but this London house did 
not terminate its efforts of sale because of the panic* 
Throughout the depression years from 1837 to the middle of 
1848 It was selling the Association*a Louisiana bonds on the 
SuropeaLh markets* and the amount It had to sell was $2*000*000* 
not $1*000*000 as provided by the 1836 Law. Of that amount it 
sold fl*617*000* there being 383 bonds still unsold when the 
bank was ordered into a state of liquidation* November 12*
1848* Ho semblance of agreement* however* seems to appear rel­
ative to the exact terms and results of the transactions
Francois deLizardl* Baring Brothers* and the Consolidated 
Association pertaining to the new bonds sold and the old bonds 
retired as provided by law.
H^CABM* February 17* 1843 (Fr.)
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Bohl4s oat standing in 1837 amounted to $8,004,000: 
the original inane had been for $8,500,000, but tbe first 
serins amounting to $496,000 was retired in 1633. Of the 
$8,004,000, there were $1,170,666.6ft of the "1833" bonds
11Q
#833,333.34 of the "104$*®."
By 1842 the records indleute that the amount or the 
original toads had been reduced to $762,000, and th&t these 
were *1845* bonds. The conclusion, therefore, is that 
|1,170,666.66 of ”1858” bonds and #70,353.34 of the 1843#s, 
or a total of 1,341 bonds, bad been redeemed between 1837 
and 1643.
On the other hand the ”184QTf bonds totaled #1,617,000. 
If the provision was that these bonds were to redeem a like 
amount of old bonds, there appears a glaring Inconsistency 
In the analysis thus far; 1,617 bonds to redeem 1,341 bonds 
Is not logical. The report made by the board of managers, 
however, when they took over the affairs of the bank gives 
a clue to the solution# The report stated that a total of 
3,074 bonds, each of #1,000, had been redeemed by the corpo­
ration during its entire active existence. By deduction, 
therefore, it is found that the 1,617 new bonds served to 
retire 1,578 old bonds, in so far as 496 bonds were retired
According to the provisions of the charter, the 
bank was to issue the bonds In three equal series. That 
should have meant #833,333.33 of each series# Th© bank, 
however, chose to issue the bonds In amounts cited above.
112
before 183? . It follows that 337 State bonds had been re­
deemed whIch were not Issued for and In favor of th© Consol­
idated Association. It follows, also, that the oost of re­
tiring 1,578 bonds was at least $39,000.**20
In the way of a summary, the debt was ^2,000,000 in 1837. 
A sum of $1,617,000 of bonds was sold between 1937 and 1843.
From this sale, $1,241,000 of the company*s State bonds were 
retired, along with $537,000 of other State bonds. The bank*a 
bonded debt stood at $2,380,000 in 1643.
Interest payments on the bonds were met by the Consol­
idated Association from 1837 through June 30, 1842. The first 
default occurred December 30, lQ42.i2i Interest payments, 
however, were not always made In drafts as was formerly the 
general practice. Until the latter part of 1839 most of the 
payments were met by the shipment of cotton. After 1839 it 
was in specie. The June 30, 1837, interest payment had been 
last when the May crisis occurred, and the banh had recuperated 
enough from the shock by Fall to meet th© December payment,
120n o direct citation Is given for the figures present­
ed because they ere derived figures for the most part* The 
most reliable source is the report presented by the board of 
managers (CABtt, April 26, 1843). The other important sources 
from which the above facts are derived are: pp. 1 and 104, 
CABL, Hovember 5, 1839; CABM, May 29, June 8, June 15, July
27, end August 3, 1839, October 17, 1840, and November 20, 
1841; end CATL, April 26, 1843.
121*fbe December 30, 1842, Interest payment was met by 
Baring Brothers. Infra., p. 128.
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tart la 1838 no specie was available and the drafts were 
too expensive* Cotton was the solution*
Cotton was acceptable in England because there was 
still a great demand for the product by th® manufacturers. 
Payment In cotton was advantageous to the Consolidated Asso­
ciation for several reasons: It had not th© necessary specie 
and could not afford to purchase drafts at a high premium; 
it dealt In cotton and cotton tracts in Its regular business; 
Its stockholders were in part cotton planters; and it had 
several notes on hand secured by cotton* Furthermore, pay­
ment in cotton was looked upon as a means of stimulating the
export of cotton, which at the time had reached a very low 
123ebb.
Specie was needed to pay interest after 1839, however, 
because of the policy of the Bank of England; that is, by 
the rad of 1839, London was Buffering from a money panic* 
Considerable stubs of specie had been drained from England, 
enough to place her In a very unhealthy situation* According 
to the theory adhered to by the Bank of England since 1827 - 
the Palmer Sole - a drain of specie which reduced the re­
serve of gold and silver below the minimum required, or deem­
ed as necessary to secure th© bank notes meant that the quan­
tity of notes and credit was too large. The refox*©, th© Bank 
of England proceeded to contract credit facilities and fol-
122 Cf.. CABL, August 3, 1837; CAi.lt> August 3, 1837; 
GABM, October 30, 1839, November 6 and 16, 1839 (Fr*) •
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lowed policies which would replenish the supply of specie* 
Jirst, this had the effect of increasing the scarcity of 
London drafts and it forced debtor nations like the United 
States to deplete their supply of specie in order to effect 
payment on their fixed obligations to England, Secondly, 
the curtailment of credit restricted the possibilities of
lor*
shipping cotton to England. Circumstances forced the Con­
solidated Association to make a choice between devising a 
plan to acquire specie for shipment to England and facing de­
fault on interest and principal* The bank chose the former* 
How it went about to obtain the necessary specie is most 
interesting*
Louisiana banks and other hanks throughout this 
country suffered from a shortage of gold and silver. It was 
not an easy matter to obtain a specie loan from domestic banks* 
Thus, on Hovemher 6, 1839, the directors of the Association 
devised a plan whereby the institution was to obtain specie 
for ltseld and other banks in New Orleans* It was decided 
that, in order to get specie, London drafts ammounting to 
a sum of $250,000 were to be sold to the New Orleans house of
123cf a, R. c* *icGrane, op* clt* * pp. 14-15; L* H*
Jenks, op* clt*. p. 86; Viner, Theory of International
Price* pp. 224—225*
The demand for cotton had also decreased, and It 
might have been that Britain was boycotting American cotton 
because there were so many defaults by American corporations 
on their Interest payments*
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Francois deLizardl and Company of London (Manuel I • de 
Llzardl and Company of New Orleans) . The sale of the drafts 
was to he at par— par meaning #4*44 to the pound sterling 
and 5 franos 25 centimes on the dollar in ffcvor of France,
The Association was to he paid for the drafts in Mexican 
eolns In terms of American dollars. Following is a detailed 
process of the roundabout and complicated sale procedure:
For the drafts on London drawn by the Consolidated 
Association, the house of deLizardl in New Orleans was t o 
issue Its own drafts or notes, payable in ninety days from 
date, Mr, Bauduoin, cashier of the Consolidated Association, 
was to act as agent for deLizardl of New Orleans and go to 
Mmcleo in order to exchange the deLizardl drafts or notes for 
Mas lean specie. The coins were to be shipped to New Orleans 
la the name and title of the Consolidated Association, The 
insurance cost in the shipment of the specie was to be borne 
by Francois deLizardl of London (not New Orleans) • Other 
costs end losses were to be divided equally between the bank 
and deLizardl of New Orleans, If there were any profits re­
sulting from the sale, both were to share equally. Further­
more, if it happened that not all the drafts could be sold 
for Mexican coins, deLizardl of New Orleans was to furnish the 
Association with the kind of drafts that the New Orleans house 
was in the custom of purchasing for Itself, Also, the Consoli­
dated Association reserved the right to terminate such opera-
124tlons after a fifteen days' notice,
BovttJBber 6, 1839 (Fr.).
lie
The transaction «as executed according to the terms
and specie was secured by the Consolidated Association. No
profits were realized from the negotiation, however. Instead,
there evolved an expense, not including the loss incurred
from the par of exchange, of somewhere over twenty thousand
dollars. As stated above the house of d©Lizard! was to bear
half of the expense under the terms of the contract. Vhen it
came to the payment of its share, however, deLizardi refused
to pay certain interest charges included by the bank on the
importation of specie. The amount of deLlzardl’s portion of
the loss was figured at $11,504.11. Of this portion,
$7,991.95 was interest. Final settlement was reached in June
of 1845, whereby it was agreed by the Association that de~
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Lizardl would be held for the balance only, or $3,512.17.
The above is an illustration of one incident. There 
were several others. From 1840 through June 30, 1842, it ap­
pears that the payments of Interest by the Association were 
sade in specie.126 Default occurred in December, 1842, 
after a decree of forfeiture had been rendered at the 
instance of the State.
The third interesting phase of the Bank9s operations 
during the depression years is that of loans and discounts.
At the very outset the policies followed relative to loans
125~_
CASH, June 23, July 3 and 17, 1841, and June
7, 1843 (Fr.).
136ibld.. April 15, 1840, November 6, 1840, November 
10, 1841, November 13, 1841, and April 16, 1842 (Fr.}«
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and diaeounta was not what might have been expected* The de­
pression and the difficult times did not cause the bank to be 
prudent* Despite the economic conditions, the bank considered 
itself sound, and it was too lavish with its credit, Irre­
spective of the soundness of the creditor, because it felt 
that more credit was needed to cope with the distressing 
circumstances•
At the time the Crisis occurred the bank held a large 
amount of discounted notes, and many were on protest* Payment 
on these notes could not be met at maturity date; therefore, 
the notes were renewed and there was no set policy at first 
cm the renewals* The bank simply operated under a makeshift 
arrangement, trying to cope with individual cases as the Imme­
diate circumstances seemed to dictate* For the most part the 
commercial paper held was extended in maturity, provided addi­
tional security was given and/or the paper was reaocepted at a 
lower percentage than previously discounted* Ho new paper was 
discounted during 1837 and 1838, however, simply because the 
bank did not possess the adequate means to extend new credit.
In June, 1839, the policy adopted on discounts was that 
notes discounted subject to renewal could be renewed to six 
months from maturity date and at twenty per cent less,
127
provided they were paid in full at the end of the period.
—
CASH, June 1, 1839* 3ee also the credit policies 
adopted April 11 and September 5, 1838*
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At that time the bank also ventured in the discounting of 
new paper. The provision was that new notes not exceeding 
$300,000 could be discounted if their maturity dates did not 
exceed January 10, 1840. In July, 1840, a motion was presented 
before the Board of Directors to end all renewals on dis­
counted notes after January 1, 1941, but it failed to be 
adopted.^ 29 Instead, it was decided to continue the past 
policy; and it was not until after the passage of the Banking 
Act of 1843, that restrictive measures were undertaken. On 
February 23, 1842, it was voted to renew discounted notes at
a reduction of ten per cent until April 5, and after that date
129there were to be no renewals.
The 1837 Crisis forced the stock and mortgage borrowers 
to suspend, or continue to suspend, their interest and 
Instalment payments to the bank, and about all the bank could 
do was to increase its suspense account. It could not force 
payment because the planters did not have the means to pay.
That left two choices: one was foreclosure, the other the 
extension of credit.
Foreclosure was employed sparingly by the bank because 
a foreclosure could not reimburse the bank, and it would result 
only in a substantial loss. The "bottom" had fallen out on 
land values. The extravagance of the Legislature In granting
iaalbia.. July 11 and 15, 1840 (Fr.).
129Ibld., February 83, 1842 (Fr.).
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charters for hanks had contributed substantially to the ex­
isting inflation. The increase of credit and currency and 
the rise in optimism throughout the Nation had caused the 
price of land to spiral upward. During the period after 1825 
land around New Orleans, for instance, had risen several 
times above the 1825 value.130 It was at those highly in­
flated prices upon which the bank had granted loans. The 
deflation in land prices after the crisis made it impossible 
ofr the institution to recover even as much as one half of the 
amount loaned. Foreclosure, therefore, was emplyed only 
when there was no other alternative and when there was no fu­
ture hope of recuperating a fair amount of the loan. Fore­
closures were used as a weapon— a weapon to intimidate those
131who suggested reform. The alternative for settlement,
or postponing of settlement, was credit. What the planter 
did was to give the ban a note in payment for the interest 
and principal due on his loan and almost always this note 
was a mortgage on future crops. The bank then used
these mortgage notes as collateral or security for the
130F. X. Martin, op. cit.. p. 436.
131Cf.. S. A. Caldwell, op. cit.. p. 61.
The records of the bak show that there were sev­
eral foreclosures and that there was much litigation during 
the period. That, however, does not invalidate the above 
statements. The cases on foreclosure seem to indicate pres­
sure on the part of the bank to enforce Its will.
132qaML, various letters from loaners asking to mort­
gage their future crops In payment of the Interest and install­
ments due on their loans (Fr.).
120
Issuance of post-notes, or what might be called oue- or two- 
jeax mortgage bonds* The post-notes bore interest, and the 
tank Issued them in son 11 denominations for circulation pur- 
poses* Moreover, these post-notes gars the bank a means of 
extending credit further to the same debtors as well as 
to others.
By giving the bank mortgages the stockholders were 
meeting their obligations on their loans with the bank* The 
mortgages in the bank*s possession entitled it to issue cer­
tificates of indebtedness with the mortgages acting as securi­
ty* In so Hblt as the stockholders met their obligations and 
thereby reduced their loans below fifty per cent of the thee 
value of their stocks held as collateral, they were entitled 
to an additional credit up to fifty per cent of the value of 
the collateral, provided, they would accept the loan in the 
fozm of post-notes* These post notes could then be used as 
circulation; also, they could be used to cancel debts with 
the bank* Almost always, however, these post-110tea were re­
acquired by the bank in order to sell them on the European
market, and in Europe they could be employed to purchase the
133
*1846* bonds being sold through Francois deLlzardi*
Credit script flooded the state during the depres­
sion years* Safety and solvency did not enter into the tainds 
of the bank directors* They were concerned with relieving
133Cf * * GABM* April 11, September 5 and 19, 1858, and 
March 14, 1840 (Fr*).
mdistress* The financial status of the borrower mattered 
little. They gees o red it freely to anyone who could furnish 
the hank with a piece of paper stating it was a mortgage of 
seme sort* The bank operated under the false illusion that 
security, irrespective of its source, was all that was neces­
sary for soundness• Its officers persisted in believing that 
the security could not depreciate because the value was 
written on the face• Loans and discounts, on the other hand, 
did not relieve the planters* They served, among other causes, 
to build the Consolidated Association into an unsound institu­
tion*
A fourth phase of activity between 1627 and 1842 which 
was of considerable importance was the inter-bank cooperation 
in Hew Orleans• Kven prior to 1337 the banks of Hew Orleans 
had acted jointly to solve problems of specie-shortages*
After the Crisis they acted jointly to issue post-notes ac­
cording to agreements. Ha eh bank was allocated Its proportion­
ate share in the privilege of Issuing notes or granting loans 
to depressed "sister" Institutions* Agreements were also 
reached for the purpose of acquiring specie end resuming 
specie puyments* Joint action was taken, furthermore, to oir- 
cum vent legislative bank reforms* It may be said, however, 
that this inter-bank cooperation was on the whole fairly 
send* Xt kept the Consolidated Association and other banks 
adhering to similar practices from creating utter chaos—
122
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op rather accentuating the obaos.
liquidation
Cm November 12, 1842, the Fifth District Court of 
Louisiana in Kew Orleans handed a judicial decree of forfeit­
ure to the Consolidated Association of the Planters of 
Louisiana* This decree was rendered at the instance of the
State in conformity with the Law of March 14, 1842, providing
135
for the liquidation of certain hanks of the State of Louisiana.
This Law of March 14, 1843, specified the method of
liquidation to he pursued by those hanks unable to comply with
135
the provisions of Act £3, passed February 5, 1842.
The Intent of Act £2, entitled "An act to revive the 
charters of the several banks in the city of Hew Orleans, 
sad for other purposes’1 was to put an end to the financial 
embarrassment existing in the State, especially with respect 
to beaks. The purpose of the law was to establish sound bank* 
lag practices• Horace White has concisely sumsaa rised the 
main features of the "Banking Act of 1842" as follows;
15i4Th. bank did not cease to exist after the reform 
was introduced. Far from it— the corporation continued to 
exist for forty years or more.
More about this bank cooperation in Chapter VI, 
after the other property banks have been studied.
^35Cf.. 35 La. Ann. 425; and La. Acts. 1642, Mo. 98, 
pp. 234*254.
X56Ibld.. and Ho. 28, pp. 34-68.
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.«.the requirements (1) of a specie reserve 
equal to one-thirl of all its liabilities to the 
publlo; {£) the other two-thirds of Its liabil­
ities to be represented by eoimerolal paper having 
not more than ninety days to run; (3)all commercial 
paper to be paid at maturity, and if not paid, or 
if an extension were asked for, the account of the 
party to be closed and his name to be sent to the 
other banks as a delinquent; (4) all banks to be ex­
amined by a board of State officers quarterly or of- 
tener; (5) bank directors to be individually liable 
for all loans or investments made in violation of 
the law, unless they could show that they had voted 
against the same if present; (6) no bank to have 
less than fifty share holders, having at least thirty 
shares each; (7) any director going out of the State 
for more than thirty days, or absenting himself from 
five successive meetings of the board, to be deemed 
to have resigned, and his vacancy to be filled at 
once; (8) no bank to pay out any notes but its own; 
(9) all banks topay“their balance to eaoh other in 
specie every Saturday, under the penalty of being 
immediately put in liquidation; (10) no bank to ptar» 
chase its own shares or lend on its own shares more 
than thirty per cent of the market value*13”
Any bank not conforming with the above sumsarized meas­
ures of the Act of February 5, was subject to a forfeiture 
of its charter. The Act of March 14 specified the method of 
liquidation for any bank incurring a forfeiture of its charter, 
The general provision of the Act was:
... that whenever any bank of this state, 
located in the city of New Orleans, by any act, 
omission, or violation of law shall have incurred 
the forfeiture of Its charter, the Attorney General 
or the District Attorney shall present a petition 
in the name of the State to a court of competent 
jurisdiction, setting forth such acts, omissions, 
or violations, and praying that the charter of said 
bank be declared null and void, and the corporation
137Horace £rhlte, "National and State Banks" in Bound 
Currency. Vol. H ,  1694, pp. 209-210.
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dissolved, Th© Court shall try such case sum- 
^arlly, and without intervention of a jury; 
and if, on th© trial thereof it shall appear to 
th© Court that th© said bank has incurred a for 
feiture of its charter, it shall declare the 
same null and void, and the corporation 
dissolved .138
Th© law, however, was a^iendod to modify its general 
stand with reference to a forfeiture of charter and dissolu­
tion* Banks in which the State was a stockholder, or for 
which the State had Issued bonds, were not to come under th© 
general provision of the law* Such banks were not to be per­
mitted to go Into liquidation voluntarily, nor could they 
dissolve by reason of a forfeiture of their charters* If the 
said beaks did not abide by the provisions of Act No* 22, or 
other laws, a judicial decree of forfeiture could be rendered 
against them. The decree, however, was not to remove the cor­
porate powers and privileges previously enjoyed by said banks, 
except that of note issue. Definitely, a decree of forfeiture 
was not to permit dissolution. Business was t o continue as 
before with the exception that no notes could be issued. Fur­
ther restriction was to be imposed only if in the opinion of 
the Board of Currency the fixed assets were deemed insuffi­
cient to meet the outstanding obligations. In such an event 
It could be required that a sinking fund be established from 
other assets in sufficient amount to make up for the defi­
ciency of th© fixed assets, and these sinking fund assets
136La. Acts*, 184B, No* 98, liectlon 1, p. 234.
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were not to bo employed Tor any other purpose ©accept to pay
for or purchase bonds of the State issued to or for the ae~
139ooait of said banks individually.
According to the law of March 14 any bank in which the 
State had an interest that refused to couqply with the above 
provisions— refused to relinquish the note Issue privilege and 
to establish a sinking fund if requested-wae to be liquidated* 
This liquidation was to be carried out by a Board of Managers 
appointed by the Governor, and this board was to take over 
the affairs and conduct business under the corporate name of 
the bank* The management was to be under the direction of the 
Board of Currency, and such management under their supervision 
was to continue until the State was satisfied that all the 
obligations on the bonds issued in the name of said bank had 
been met; afterwards the remaining assets were to be returned 
to the stockholders.140
Thus it was that when the Consolidated Association fail­
ed to comply with the provisions of the laws enacted in 1S42, 
the Court was ordered to render a decree of forfeiture against 
the corporation* This was done November 12, 1842* Th© Governor 
then appointed a Board of Managers to take over the affairs 
of the firm as was specified in section 29 of the March 14 law.
130Ibid.. section 23. The sinking fund was to remain 
in th© possession of the respective banka under th© direction 
of the Board of Currency.
140
Ibid., section 29.
i m
A latter from the Governor to the officials of the
Consolidated Association was read December 7, 1842p Informing
the directors that the selected managers 'were: Hughes Lavsrgne,
Charles Derbigny, P. A* Rost, Alexander Gordon, and A- Lesaeps.
In this same letter he requested that the affairs of th© hank
141he placed In the hands of the above-named administrators•
The officers of the bank, however, refused to remit the 
assets of the bank as requested. They refused to comply with 
the wishes of the Governor until after a vote by the stock-
142
holders and after an absolute order from a competent tribunal.
The stockholdersf meeting was held December 10, and at
the meeting they voiced the opinion that the Act of March 14,
184S, impaired their rights and privileges. Tlxerefore, they
protested against the taking possession of the assets of the
beak by the managers appointed under the provisions of 
143
said Act.
141CABM, December 7, 1342 ( Fi.). Hughes Lavergne was 
president of the bank, Charles Derbigny, the attorney, A. 
Lesseps, a director, and Roth and Gordon, substantial stock­
holders. Besides, A. Gordon was the New Orleans agent for 
Francois de Lizardi of London, _i._e., ho was with the New Or 
leans house of de Lizardi, sometimes known as Manuel de Lizard! 
of Wev Orleans, a successor of Alexander Gordon, and Ldmund 
J. Forestall and Company of New Orleans, de Lizard! of London 
owned a good portion of the bonds of the bank. And M. do 
Lizardi owned a good portion of the stocks in the corporation. 
So did Gordon own stocks personally.
142
Ibid.. December 10, 1842 (Fr.).
143Ibjd.. December 17, 1842- -a copy of th© letter from 
the secretary of the scockholder®, Mr. A. Gaily, New Orleans, 
December 16, 1842 ( Fr. ) .
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The order from a competent tribunal came from the
Attorney General, In his letter of December 13, he ordered
the directors to transmit the active resources of the bank
144to the managers appointed by the Governor. The decision 
of the directors of the bank was, therefore, to recognize 
the managers of the bank, but they agreed to transmit the re­
sources only after an Inventory had been made, terminated,
145and verified by a notary. Thus, an inventory was begun De­
cember S3, 1842, and it was completed by February 16, 1843.
At a meeting of February 16 the directors announced that 
they were ready to relinquish the assets of the bank at 10 
A. H. the next morning.**^
By April 23 the new managers rendered a report of the 
affairs of the Consolidated Association to the Governor. It 
included a statement of Affairs as of April 21, a General Be- 
capitulation of the Assets, and an interpretation of the fi- 
nancl&l status of the bank.
144ibia.. December 17, 1842— a copy of the letter from 
the Attorney General, New Orleans, December 13, 1842 (JTr.).
145
Ibid., December 19, 1842 (Fr.).
146
Ibid. » February 16, 1843. The President and a man­
ager, Mr. Hughes lavergne, died February 16, 1843 (Fr.).
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A State a® at of Affair# of the Consolidated Association 
of the Planters of Louisiana as of April 21, 1845.
Assets:
Notes Discounted 381t876.75
Stock: Loans 1,176,961.27
Mortgage Loans 67,363.51
teal Estate and Buildings 131,244.69
Notes Protested 406,289♦60
Benda of the State 225,000.00
Loan to State 10,072.6 5
Stocks 60,202 • 04
Notes Receive ble 245,909 • 82
Baring Brothers 767.55
Union Bank of New York 92*78
Specie 3,371.67
Citizens Bank Notes 737.50
Protest 960.56
General Expense  3.110.75
Total Assets 2,716,033.14
Liabilities:
Bonds, 1843 763,000.00
Bonds, 1848 1,617,000.00
Notes in Circulation 157,570.00
Interest due Baring Brothers 19,170.37
Interest due on Bonds 38,825.00
Individual Deposits 37,265.58
Notes Payable 22,086.CO
Dus other banks 4,349.58
Duo de Lizardi of London 2,097.20
Diso ounts 42,661.SB
Profit and Loss 12.008.59
147
Total Liabilities 2,716,033.14
147CA3U aiid GAi4L, April 20, 1843 (?r.). This 
statement has been consolidated for tie sfcka of brevity.
The sequence of the items as listed hf«e kept* The gen­
eral headings were translated to conform with current 
terminology.
i m
General Recapitulation of the Ass at s of the Consolidated Asso- 
eletlon on the 2lst April.
Description of Assets Total Amount Estliaated Zatiinsted
value lose
Hates and bills
discounted 381,878.75 272,779.97 109,098.70
Stock Loans 1,178,981.27 1,030,931.27 148,000.00
Loans on Mortgage 67,363.51 25,000.00 42,363.51
Beal Estate 131,244.09 67 , 575.00 63 ,669 . 69
Hotes and bills disc.
end protested 406,289.60 30,000.00 376,289.60
Due by State of La. 235,072.65 235,072.65
Bills Receivable 245,909.82 177,000.00 68,909.83
Stocks and Sundry
claims 60,202.04 28,454.61 31,747.43
Dus by Bankers 860.33 860.33
Specie on hand 3,371.67 3,571.67
Protest Account 960.56 960.56
Hotes of Citizens Bank 787.50 767.50
2,712,922.39 1,871,303.00 841,039.39
Liabilities:
Louisiana State Bonds 2,380,000.00
Baring Brothers, Interest 19,170.37
Balance of interest due 38,825.00
Interest easing due 59,500 *00
Hates in Circulation 157,570.00
Individual Deposits 57,265.58
Bills Payable 22,085.00
Doe local franks 4,349.56
Due Foreign Bankers ____2.097.20
148
2,720,862.73
148Ibid. If th© liabilities ..ere 2,720,862.73 and th© 
estimated value of the assets 1,371,383.00, the deficit was 
848,979.73. In the liabilities seotion the date for the inter­
est cooing due was June 30, 1843, and the practice had been In 
the past to ship specie or bills of exchange as early as in 
April to effect the payrjent of Interest in lune.
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On. the basis of these two reports the iranagers 
©lairaed that the $846,97®,73 deficit included a loss from 
the devaluation of the assets to the amount of $841,039 *39 . 
They figured the net loss to be 35 5/6 per cent when calcu­
lated on the basis of the $6,360,000 of bonds outstanding, 
and 38 1/3 per cent on the basis of the total bonds nego­
tiated*
They further stated that the majority of the borrowing
stockholders were in arrears by at least $3£3,S21*23. These
arrears they attributed to the low prices of agricultural
products during several of the preceding years and to the
great depreciation in property values resulting from the
149
general distress existing since 1637*
The State Legislature, anticipating that the situation 
of the Consolidated Association would not be favorable to 
meet the payments and interest on its bonds pledged by the 
State, and knowing that the borrowing stockholders of the 
property bank were in a distressed situation, acted to re­
lieve the bank. It passed an Act on April 5, 1843, to facil-
150
ltate the liquidation of property banks chartered by the State*
The principal provisions of the act were that:
(1) ... whenever any stockholder in ^ny of the prop -
erty banks in liquidation shall tender to the persons 
superintend lag such liquidation any of the outstand­
ing bonds of the State, issued In favor of auoh Bank,
149GABii, April 26, 1043 (Yr.i .
150La. Aota. 1843. No. 92, pp. 06-59.
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he shall ha entitled to have the property mort­
gage by hint to secure the stock, released from 
each mortgage, for the amount of the capital of 
the bonds so tendered, and of the interest which 
may hare accrued thereon at the time of the tender; 
and in lieu of said bonds, certificates bearing the 
same rate of interest as the bonds shall be Issued 
for the same amount, in favor of such stockholder, 
in each of which certificates it shall be stated 
that it is issued to a stockholder in lieu of a 
bend, and is not secured by mortgages, nor by the 
faith of the State•
(2) whenever any person shall be Indebted to 
any liquidating Bank for any stock loan or other­
wise, and shall tender to such Bank, In offset or 
pert offset of such loan or debt, any of the bonds 
of the State, issued in favor of such Bank, the per- 
sob charged with the liquidation of such Bank shall 
receive such loans in offset, as aforesaid, and 
•hall release in such event, only the mortgage 
granted to secure the stock, up to the amount of the 
capital of the bonds thus received in offset, and of 
the interest already accrued thereon, at the date of 
the tender; Provided, however, such tender shall al­
ways be either an equal number of bonds of each se­
ries, or of bonds belonging to some series already 
due, or to the series next due, and that it shall be 
the duty of each of the Beaks of the State, at all 
times, to receive in offset or part offset of debts 
due it, its own debts, when liquidated and part due, 
whether for circulation, deposits, or arising frcea 
any other source whatever, and whether such Bank be
or be not in liquidation, and without reference to the 
date at which the debtor offering such tender m y  have 
acquired the claim by him offered in offset: Provided, 
that no defaulter to the Bank shall have this right of 
offset for the amount of his defalcation: And provided 
further, that in all the payments thus made as afore­
said by the stockholders, upon stock debts ten per 
cent be paid in specie#1*2
(3) « • • the Property Banks of this State whether in
liquidation or not, through their authorized agents,
ahali be authorized to contract with their stock­
holders for a privilege and mortgage on th© future
151Ibid., section 1.
152Ibid,. section 2.
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crops, revenues and rents of the property mortgaged 
to secure their a took: or stock loan, to an amount 
sufficient to pay and extinguish the annual instal­
ments v as they fall due, by the stockholder on his 
stock loan, as well as the annual interest, in ad~ 
wince, due on the balance of said stock loan, and 
that the privilege shall be paid out of such future 
crops, revenues, or rents, in preference to all 
other claims, except existing privileges accorded 
by law, and the privilege which may be granted to 
the furnisher of all necessary and indispensable 
supplies for the carrying on and maintenance of 
said property;
The Act further provided that the Consolidated Associa­
tion could, with the consent of the bondholders, extend and 
prolong the time of payment of any of th® bonds for a period 
of fifteen years, provided the extension did not exceed ten 
years after 1846, date of expiration of the bankfs charter as 
previously extended by law from the original termination date 
Of 1843.154
This Law of 1643, therefore, did more than merely fa­
cilitate or provide the machinery for liquidation* Xt was 
permitting the debtors to pay off their debts, and it was de­
signed to relieve the State from contingent liability. More­
over, it was aimed at overcoming the handicaps existing in 
the export of American cotton.
Because the English resented the American defaults
and repudiations after 1837, a boycott had been declared on
135
American cotton exports. Furthermore, the policies of
section 4.
154Ibld.. section 10.
156L. H« 1 enks, p • 107, and o * A . 0a 1 dwell,
OP.cit.. p. 37.
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Bank of Borland had continued to make foreign bills of 
exchange scarce, thus curtailing the ease of export of American 
goods, especially cotton.
The provisions of the Act of 1843 helped to break the 
boycott. For instance, Louisiana cotton exporters could ship 
their cotton to Sngl&nd and sell or exchange it for bonds of 
the State of Louisiana; and the transactions did not necessa­
rily require specie or hills of exchange. Since the bonds were 
quoted on the London money market at somewhere about bG or 60, 
the owners were willing, even anxious, to sell or exchange 
the brads for cotton, especially if somswh&t more than the 
market price was offered for the bonds. Furthermore, the ex~ 
change had the effect of raising the market price of the 
Louisiana bonds. The cotton owners, for their part, were anx­
ious to exchange or sell cotton for bonds because they could 
use the bonds obtained at a price below par to extinguish 
their debts on the basis of the face value of the bonds, The 
result was to raise the price of both the bonds and cotton, 
redeem some of the bonds for which the State was contingently 
liable, and increase the volume of cotton exports. "A steady 
stream ox" bonds started from Lngl&nd in payment for cotton
and were automatically retired when American planters used
156
them to pay off their debts."
Impression must not be had, however, that the bond­
holders as a whole welcomed, the Act of April 5, 1843, A
ISg
L. H. Jenks, loc. cit»
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storm of protests arose. Baring Brothers, for instance, 
Issued a Circular to the holders of the Consolidated Associa­
tion bonds stating that neither the State nor the bank had 
provided funds for the purpose of extinguishing bonds or for 
the payment of interest. They decried the liquidation of the 
Consolidated Association because they thought it to be a 
sound institution* The Circular stated:
The recent conduct of the legislature has had 
the effect of embarrassing the banks, of depreciat­
ing the value of their assets, of lowering the credit 
of the state, and by the non-payment of the interest 
or capital of the bonds of greatly depreciating the 
prices of these securities; and as at the same time 
the banks had been compelled to receive in payment 
of debts the bonds issued by the state in their 
favor at par or the nominal value indicated in the 
bond, the result had been that the domestic debtors 
are benefited at the expense of the honor of the
state and of the just claims of its foreign
creditors.
Baring Brothers, therefore, emphatically recommended that the 
Snglish bondholders keep possession of the bonds in order to
better control and direct the price at which they were in
flavor of selling these bonds* Moreover, they maintained that 
the action of the Legislature had made the State directly 
liable for all payments of bonds issued for and in favor of 
the banks of the State.
Many others criticized the Act* Most of them, However, 
did it at the direct or indirect instigation of Baring
^5?Circular of Baring Brothers and Company, July 8, 
1843, as cited by R. C. McCrone, op. cit., pp. 183-184.
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Brothers* The Demoo ratio Rories stated that the law had
1 Rg
brought discredit upon the State* Th© New Orleans Bee
and other Hew Orleans papers contained several paid articles
and editorials expressing th© dissatisfaction of foreign
159bondholders relative to the Act* An article appeared in
the llorth Agaric an Review in Janua ry, 1344, written by B. R. 
m oCurtis* Th© article claimed that the law of 1343 Impaired
the obligations of contract between the State and banks, 
banks and foreign creditors, and the State and foxeign 
creditors, viz.*:
..* No* there is not the smallest doubts 
that this law amounted to a contract made by the 
state and the banks with every bondholder that 
these mortgages should be held by the banks In 
trust to secure the payments of the money loaned 
on the bonds* There is not a court in the country 
which would hesitate so to declare upon these 
facts* And when the state placed these banks in 
liquidation and thus took control of their af­
fairs it was bound to guard this trust strictly 
end faithfully* It had no right to receive depre­
ciated bonds at par In payment for v^ell secured 
debts which It held in trust for third persons* 
v’hat would the law of 'Louisiana, or the courts of 
Louisiana ©ay to a tutor or guardian who should re­
ceive depreciated paper in payment of a debt due to 
his ward secured by mortgage? Undoubtedly, they 
would soy It v;as unfaithful administration; and 
would order him to make good th© difference. And 
may the legislature itself justly do what its own 
laws condemn as unfaithful and unjust? ••• This 
law impairs the obligation of a plain contract be­
tween th© state and th© banks on the one part and
158Democratic Review, vol. 14 (new series), p* 14.
Cf.. K. C* McGrane, op* cit*, p. 104.
R. Curtis was later a Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. (Cf.. 3. A.* Caldwell, o|>» cit*a 
P* ©7*
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the bondholders cm the other; a nd it is there­
fore a conflict not only with the Constitution 
of the United states hut with the fundamental law 
of Louisiana which prohibits the legislature from 
enacting any law impairing the obligations of a 
coatraet.*®*
London newspapers were more rzhazmnt In expressing 
their views and the views of th© bondholders pertaining to 
action of the Louisiana General Assembly. The London Morn­
ing Chronicle held that the Act of 1343 was "a more heinous 
breach of Ihith than repudiation*” The London Times approved 
the advice given in the circular of Baring Brothers.'^*'
There were many, however, who defended the lew, espe­
cially those associated with soma branch of the State, or 
directly connected with Louisiana* The Boa rd of Currency, as
an Illustration, states that the English bondholders were "de­
les
sigaadly mis i n f o r m e d T h e  hew Orleans Boe on its own 
accord took issue with the London newspapers:
'The writer in the London Morning Chronicle 
• •• either did not understand the circumstances 
under which the law was passed or had grossly mis­
represented them. It would be just as well for the 
European Journalists to be chary on their abuse in 
noticing matters of this sort, for the people in 
this section of the Union are Just the very Inst 
men In the world who could be bullied or black-
* ^ jforth American Review, vol. 58 (1844), pp. 137-140.
1
London Morning Chrlnlele. November 3, 1643, and 
London Tlgss* July 19, 1843; cited by K. 0* MoGranc, op. cit„ ,
pp* ise-Tef.
i^Loulslana Legislative Documents, 1844, "Report of 
the Board of Curxenoy ror 1643
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guarded into measures...* Now we would ask t^e 
Morning Chronic* le or the Boston Advertiser. 
if by any convulsion in businese or revolution 
in monetary afihirs, or imprudence if they like, 
either Great Britain or Massachusetts was suddenly 
without previous suspicion of oriels, called upon 
to provide for a debt, the interest of which alone 
required twice as much revenue as the ordinary re­
ceipts of the treasury, would or could either of 
them at once meet itV And if the amount of the 
obligation for which they would have ultimately to 
provide depended upon the value or the assets of in­
solvent corporations which they had indorsed, would 
they not make a schedule of the effects and arrive 
at a reasonable appreciation of the defioit they 
would have to make good before adopting a system of 
taxation for that purposev . vre know of no surer 
way to blunt the sensibilities of a people to the 
obligations of contracts than for the preps and 
more especially for foreign journalists to assail 
their honesty, when they have done the bast thing, 
at the time . in their power to do, for th© public 
creditors »*LOD
Whatever were the merits or demerits of the Act of 
1845, the procedure for meeting payments of debts in bonds at 
per, or nominal face value, was pursued. Unfortunately, how­
ever, the banks did not always benefit from the method of 
liquidation. In the instance of the Consolidated Association 
much of the payment of debt was effected by giving bonds and 
coupons not yet due, instead of the past-due obligations.
This meant that much of the receipts went toward extinguishing 
non-due securities, leaving the bank with insufficient means
Reprints of the articles In the London Morning. 
Chronicle end other London papers were mode at the expense 
of Werds, agents of Baring Brothers, in the Boston Adver­
tiser and other American papers.
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ftew Orleana Bee, December 25, 1B43.
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166to tatee m m  of th© past ana current obligations.
An illustration of how th© 1843 Act functioned may be
given by citing a specific ease: For instance, Mr. J. Host,
a manager appointed by the Governor for the administration
Of the liquidation of the Consolidated Association, informed
the benk that in order to pay the company whet he owed as a
Stockholder, he was sanding 225 bales of cotton to Liverpool
with orders to invest the product in bonds of the State,
167which he expected to receive shortly. Ur. Isaac Thomas of 
Bspldes informed the bank that his daughter was now owner of 
the properties mortgaged to the institution for stocks and 
that she was offering to mortgage 200 hales of cotton of her 
future crop. The first pert of the cotton was to be deliver­
ed November 1, 1843, and the second portion on January 1,
1844. This cotton wee to serve in purchasing Louisiana bonds 
issued for and in favor of the Association and was to off-
w „  V4 168set her debt.
Th© shipment of cotton to England by the debtors inde­
pendently In order to acquire bonds, however, was not th© 
only method employed to pure ha se Louisiana bonds. The man­
agers decided in order to facilitate th© debtors of th© 
Consolidated Association to receive frofri th© said debtors
1**2**.- House J our. , 1846, pp. 120-124.
167Gk3H, April 29, 1343 (Fr.).
TAfl
Ibid.. Jay 13, 1343 (?r.).
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cotton to to transferred in tendon Into bonds of tbs Stats; 
and these bonds would then aerve to cancel the debt® of tbs 
debtors In proportion to the cotton transmitted; that is, 
the institution would take the cotton, ship it to Liverpool, 
esquire the bonds in London then quoted at 50 or 60, a ad 
then cancel debts owed it on the basis of the nominal fee© 
sales of the bonds.
The cotton trade in the United States benefited con­
siderably fro® the Law. From January 1 to April £8, 1845, 
the export of American cotton was 704, 205 boles. For the 
saws period in 1843, the export was 558,3.53 bale a. It wars an 
increase of 546,073 bales, or almost double the amount. In 
spite of the opposition voiced by the British investors,
they wars taking th© cotton In Fug land and Aioerionn exports 
170benefited. The prioe paid in T^ondon, or Liverpool, for
Asarlean cotton was 4 to 6 pence a pound, somewhat low In
comparison with former prices, but better than 1841 end 
171
Utt.
The policy of th© Consolidated Association to facil­
itate liquidation and payment of debt did not limit itself 
to the provisions of the 1843 Law. Bven before the Act of
169CABU, Uay 3, 1043 (Fr.). For London quotations on 
the Louisiana oonds see Circular of Oaring brothers of April 
7 and June 17, 1843, or citation in the New Orleans DaJJly 
Pioayune. July IS, 1843.
i7&gfre x^ally Picayune. July Q, 1843.
171
Ibid.. October 14, 1843.
140
1843 bad bad time to Isa oarrlad Into effect, the eorpora­
tion provided that debts to the bank could be paid with In­
terest eoupoas on the bonds of the Stats* The manager® moved,
April 5, 1843, that Interest coupons would thereafter be ac~
* 172oepted as circulation, Earlier than that, however, it 
bed been moved and voted that spec re would be accepted on the 
basis of the bank's depreciated notes. The firm was In need 
of $20,000 in specie and it arranged to obtain the silver or 
gold by permitting the stockholders and other debtors to pay 
their debts by giving the bank specie equivalent to the cur­
rent depreciated value on the circulation notes end by get­
ting the debt canceled on the basis of the face value of the 
notes. At the time, the notes ware circulating at about 40 
per cent discount which meant that the debtors were paying 
their loans at 60 cents on the dollar* This x-olicy was ex­
tended in May, 1843, to obtain specie to be converted into
bonds of the State in London* To illustrate, when a debtor
173
gave the bank 50 cents in specie, it would purchase bonds
la London and cancel the debt on the bests of the nominal
174face value of the bonds.
The discount policy of the Consolidated Association 
during this period was far too generous. Instead of renewing 
notes discounted at a further reduced rut© as had been the
172
CABM, April b, 1843 (Jr.).
173The amount of specie required depended on the 
market price of the bonds.
i 7^ CABM, inarch 15, 1843 and JAiy 3, 1843 Cffr. )* Tor cir 
eolation discount, see Daily Picayune, July 1, 1843.
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practice In the several years past, the managers decided
In April, 1845, that all notes discounted considered payable
17 5In rail at maturity could be renewed in full.
During 1843 the Consolidated Association continued 
to default on its interest payments. It did not even repay 
Baring Brothers for the part of the interest thay paid on the 
bonds, figuring that they would be reimbursed shortly by the 
Association. letters from Baring Brothers requesting repay­
ment went unheeded. The only set is faction Ur. M. Purton, 
agent of Baring Brothers, received on his request that 
Baring Brothers be repaid was a notice that the bank had no
funds with which to reimburse Baring Brothers for the interest
176
they bad paid for the corporation* ?Then asked to suggest
a plan for payment, the answer given by the managers was that
they could do nothing tintII the Legislature enacted a law to
177
provide for the settlement . Knowing that the Stats had
pledged its faith on the payment of principal and interest 
an the bands, the managers figured that the State would make 
provision for the Interest fjay rents, and the State did pay
lOQ
Baring Brothers for their 1042 interest advance.
The aaount of bonds outstanding was reduced in 1843,
178CABM, March 25 and P.pril 5, 1843 (Fr.).
176
Ibid.. March 4, 1843 (Fr.).
177Ibid.. March 18, 1843 (fr.).
178
House Jour-» 1844, pp* 57-59.
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tat It is impossible to aseertais by how much. The records
©f the bask say that f151,167.55 in bonds and Interest had
been received during the year as result of the provisions of
179
the Law of 1343*
In August, 1844, plans were begun to extend the matu­
rity dates of the bonds outstanding *r*d to enpitallze the 
interest due on these bonds* Arrangements were m d e  to have 
SIT. Idsraad J. Foretell negotiate with the bondholders to have 
the maturity of the bonds delayed 5, 10, 15, and 2 0 years 
froffi January 1, 1B45, and to have the interest rate reduced 
from 5 per cent to 2 1/2 per cent.
Tfhat the bank: officers desired was to have new bonds 
issued to replace the existing bonds. Their plan was to have 
$2,000,000 of bonk bonds issued in equal scries, one-fourth 
watering every five years until 1865, JL± a.:
£500,000 payable January 1, 1050
500.000 payable January 1, 1855
500.000 payable January 1, 1B60
500.000 payable January 1* 1865
The reimbursementv?as to take place In Oon&on with Baring 
Brothers at the exchange rate of 4 shillings Z pence on the 
dollar in favor of Bnglend. The interest was to be 2 1 / 2 per 
eent peyable in I,ondon at the rate of 4 shillings 6 pence,
the current rate of exchange. The State was to be relieved
f^iaroh 13, 1844 (Fr.). According to this re-
Vi n  Tirm t O  1 R A  r V f l A  ViA-n <a a  £  m i a  4  t nn/'irt, there were \ 2 ,150,600 bonds outstanding and j 2.280.82’
was that the obligations outstanding wero ,457,995.39.
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from all and any liabilty on these new bonds , and against 
these bonds the institution was to deposit collateral secu­
rities with other banks in the State in its own name, along 
with the name of the agent representing the bondholders. The
Association was to be permitted to withdraw these securities
ISO
in ascents according to the amounts of the naw bonds retired.
This plan suggested by the Association, however, did 
not appeal to the European bondholder, but they were In vor 
at extending the maturity dates of the existing bonds. Baring 
Brothers and Company In 1045 expressed their desire to form­
ulate a plan for refunding the bonds, end they entered into 
negotiations with air. Morphy, aetlng representative of the
Consolidated in the place of Mr. Foretell, in order to reach 
101an agreement. Tentative plans having been drawn, Baring 
Brothers then attempted to get the bondholdersf consent to 
formulate terms for the liquidation of their claims* Tentative 
terms were reached with the bondholders, but the plans fell 
through * It was not until 1848 that Baring Brothers, Francois
deLizardl, and the Consolidated Association did reach an
 1 8 5agreement.
In 1847 another drastic change was Instituted in the 
management of the affairs of the Consolidated Association.
180CA3M, August 51, 1044 (Fr.).
181
GAKL, Baring Brothers to Morphy, London, 2uly 17,
1845.
* jLa. Acts. 1848 (Extra Session), Nos. 11 and 59,
>* 34
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It was dee ms 4 advisable by the Genera 1 Assembly to free the
esgsalzatlon from the exclusive jstmag© aent of the State , and
permit some control on the part of the stockholder. On April
4, 1847, an Act was passed H..*to protect the State against
lose on account of ita liabilities f b o n d s  Issued for the
183os® of property banks.rt Under Its provisions, the stock*
holders were to elect three .mnagera, the State continuing to
anoint the others. Together, they were to manage the affairs
of the institution and proceed with the liquidation as fur-
184
ther provided by the Act.
The provision to further facilitate the liquidation 
was a permission to extend the maturity dvfces of th© bonds 6, 
9, 12, 15, and 18 years. And in order that the liquidation be 
quicker, the law specified, also, that the bank was author­
ized to raise funds by contributions from, the stockholders. 
These contributions were to be divided Into Instalments 
naming frorc one to seventeen years.
The managers* thereupon by resolutions deter­
mined that under th© above act a contribution of 
six dollars per share shell be paid by each stock­
holder of this Association on June 1st, 1049 and 
on the same day of each succeeding sixteen years; 
and that the sum due on the stock loan by the 
stockholders shall be divided into eighteen annual 
Instalments to be paid on June 1, 184 8, onO. being 
paid for ©very succeeding June for seventeen years.
X^ *Loulalana Acts, 1847, i*o. 100, pp. 76-78. 
XQ4Ibld.
£ 5 ?  t t tper share of stock was needed to retire th# oonas, or *o 
far 17 ;years
ttm sstttsr of oxtoidisg the bonds, however, m s  not 
to be such a simple xaatter* First of ell the extension re­
quired the approml of the creditors; a negotiation had to 
ha wdertatea for the purpose of refunding. While the Legisla­
ture had provided for the extension, it had not specified the 
t o m s of * refunding that Tftould he acceptable. The question was 
introduced several times, hut the 1847 Session ended without 
the problem being settled. Evidently, the idea of the major­
ity of the members of the General Assembly was that the ex­
tension he provided for with the Consolidated Association 
assuming all th© liability. At least, not to increase the 
liability of the State with reference to the bank.
The Idea of the managers of the Consolidated Associa­
tion was to devise a plan which would be agreeable to Baring 
Brothers and Francois deLlserdi* The first proposal of fbred 
was that the extension of bonds be effected by issuing an­
nexes to correspond with the original bonds, and the State 
was to remain a party to the pledge for security as it was 
previously* The Consolidated iissociation offered its own 
bunds, however, for the funding of the accrued Interest on 
the State bonds that had been issued in its favor*
Bering Brothers and Francois daLisardl agreed to the 
proposal, but they asked that the plan of refunding be re­
vised in such a manner as to have the state pledge its faith 
for the reimbursem«at of the bonds to be issued for the pur­
pose of capita 11 xing the accrued interest* Consent was had
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«  f m  the Consolidated Association, asd the teak
attempted to pera\»de the legislature to great the pledge.
Xa the meantime, the Loud cm houses Issued circulars to the 
bondholders of the Consolidated Association and drew terms of 
assent for them to sign. The terms of assent, however, Included 
the provision that the State of Louralana give its pledge on 
the new bonds to be Issued for the purpose of capitalizing 
the accrued Interest cm the existing bonds* The terms of as­
sent majr be Illustrated by the Form of Assent drawn by 
Fransoia deLizardl. It read as follows:
The undersigned Holder of Bonds of the Stats 
of Louisiana, tee ring date Slat December 13D0, 
signed by the Governor and Treasurer of that 
State, and due 30th June, 1343, tearing the fol­
lowing numbers, hereby consents, provided the ex­
isting liability of the State of Louisiana for 
principal and interest remains unimpaired, that 
the said Bonds be endorsed by same legally- 
authorized Agent, in London and that such on 
endorsement engage to repay the principal of ©a oh 
Bond as follows:
200 Dollars on 30th June 1654 In Hew Orleans
200 n *t n tt 2357 at the Office of
200 n " H H 1860 the Treasurer of
200 '■ „ t 2863 the State of
200 n w w r t  1866 Louisiana
and that new Coupons shall be attached to the bond 
payable in the Office of th© Treasurer of the State 
of Louisiana, in Hew Orleans, half-yearly, on the 
50th June and 31st December each year, at the rate 
of five dollars per Annum for every One hundred 
Thousand Dollars due. The first half-yearly divi­
dend to be paid cm the 51st December, 1843.
AIre consents, that tee unpaid arrears of in­
terest, since 31st December, 184L, to 50th June,
1848, amounting to 275 Dollars, upon Bond of 1000 
Dollars, be funded ana a new Bond, with coupons, 
be given by the State of Louisiana, In lieu of such 
arrears for 275 Dollars. Such bonds ate 11 be legal 
Obligations of the said State, and on the Consolidated
*49
Association of the Planters of Louisiana, to 
repay on seek bond in the proportion of:
Dollars 45.85 on 30 June 1849 In >Tcw Orleans 
* 45.83 « e w iaso at the Office of
" 45.35 * n M 1851 th© Treasurer of
" 45.S3 n » * 1852 the State of
" 45.83 '• " •* 1853 Louisiana.
" 45.03 * * 1854
and with reimbursement, Interest, at the rate of flue 
per centum per annum, in IlaIf-yearly Dividends payable 
30th June and 31st December each year, at the afore­
said office, the first dividend to be paid on the 
31st December, 1843. *84
Another tentative agreement was reached between the
bank and Bering Brothers, Deo amber £1, 1847, and Baring
Brothers pronounced that the holders of $208,000 of bonds
189were willing and ready to liquidate. Francois deLizardi 
reported9 December 31, 1847:
Be received in due course your os teemed 
ffevor of the 10th of November and agreeable to 
your wish therein expressed; have since coimm- 
nleated with Bessys. Baring Brothers on the sub­
ject of the bonds of your institution♦ &e have 
caused to be printed th© letter of assent on the 
part of the bondholders to your proposal relating 
te their bonds and funding the arrears of interest 
thereon, to which UP to the present time, we must 
have the pleasure in stating that no dissent ion 
has been shown, but on the contrary, holders 
readily eirn, and we hope by next packet to b© 
enable to. send you letters for the greater part 
of the loan Issued through this house.
Since the Louisiana Legislature terminated Its session
in 1847 without granting tin- pledge included in the assent
London ^BeS^afedr^tS21 f8478S*a^: deLir^irdi and Company,
7CAML. Baring Brothers to Morphy, London, December
8X, 1847.
'^xbid. . F. de Lizard! to Consolidated .Association, 
London, DeeSsber 31, 1847.
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a revision was necessary in the terms accepted. New circu­
lars were Issued a ^ i a  in order to get the bondholders to 
agree la accepting the hank bonds. For instance, Baring 
Brothers published the following circular:
In the circular of assent to tie Flan 
Issued by me, and agreed upon by you, for th© 
sett lament of unpaid arrears of 'Dividends on the 
Bonds of the Consolidated Association of the 
Floaters of Louisiana, the following words were 
inserted by us: —  "Also consents that the unpaid 
arrears of Interest, since 31 December, 1842 to 
30th June, 1348 amounting to £75 Dollars upon each 
bead of 1000 dollars, be funded, end a new Bond with 
coupons, be given by the state of Louisiana, in lieu 
of such arrears for 275 Dollars; such bonds shall be 
legal obligations on th© said State, and on the Con­
solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana.”
The sanction by Act of the Legislature of la, 
was required for the issue of Now Bonds by the 
State; and although no objection was made to the 
proposal by the legislature, yet the limited term 
of session having expired, that body separated with­
out the adoption, of that condition. As by the Con­
stitution, th© Legislature will not again be called 
together for a space of two years, the President, 
Managers, and Directors of the Planter’s Association, 
in order to affect an immediate settlement of the 
arrears, and recommence the regular payment of Inter­
est on their Bonds, propose that the condition of a 
nrsna be given by the State for the arrears of Inter­
est should be omitted, In lieu of which, Bonds of the 
Consolidated Association Bank are to be Issued, and 
they specially pledge the following securities, say—
1. All th© bills receivable, amounting
at date of the above resolution to f298,562.G9
Z. Loans see tired by Mortgage 20,142.98
3. Bills receivable, renewable under
Discount £4,267.23
4. 5550 shares in the Capital Stock
of the Bank of Louisiana 53,000.00
5. Barataria and Lafourche Canal
Company Stock 10,000.00
6. 75 Shares of lave© Stoem Cotton
Press Company 7,500.00
7. 34 Shares of Commercial Banking
Stock 3,400.00
8. Banking House 5,000*00
149
Making a Total, Aocording to the Bank, of #431,872.90 
for the reimbur sement of these bonds, the aggregate 
amount of which would he 384,350 rollers.
The other caudition of the proposed arrangements 
remain unimpaired for the aequital of the original 
hand as a Special Agent Is now in Europe, in order to 
earry into effect the whole settlement, and the ac­
ceptance of th© proposed arrangement seeiiis to us, 
under all the circumstanoes, favourable to your inter­
est, we beg, if you agree with us, that you will, 
without delay, sign and return to us th© accompany­
ing assent, and send your bonds for the requisite 
endorsement, as the stay of the Agents will be of 
short duration
The terms of Ass ant as revised by both Loudon houses 
were accepted by the Consolidated Association and they were 
presented to the Legislature for approval. When an extra ses­
sion was oiled, the General Assembly passed a bill to accept
190the terns end demands of the bondholders.
By the end of 1848, Baring Brothers had secured the
assent of all the bondholders except one on bonds sold
191through their house* Francois deLizardi reported the as­
sent of holders owning 795 bonds*
109Ibid., Circular; Baring Brothers to Holders of 
Louisiana Bonds of the Consolidated ' ssociat ion, 1848.
**°LouAslana Laws, 1848 (extra Session), ho. 59, p. 34*
191CAML, Baring Brothers to A. B. Roman, London, Octo­
ber 5, 1848; Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association, 
Oetober SO, 1846. *. /en after the assents had been signed by 
several of the bondholders Baring Brothers refused to tsk® 
definite action until after bondholders in on aggregate of 
$1,000,000, principal ana interest, agree to the Assent.
Baring Brothers, themselves, had on hand 499 bonds due in 
1643 and 79 5 due in 1348, which, with book Interest, 
amounted to $1,538,525.
ISO
The actual conversion can the refunding started in
January of 1349• To replace the existing bonds the 8t&t«
192
Treasurer issued and delivered #1,376,000 of now bands.
To capitalize the interest due on the old bonds the bank
authorized the Isms of #352,875 in bank bonds, of which
«a«mt #321,400 was actually issued. By April 20, the re-
193
funding was complete. The terms of refunding ax*© enumera­
ted In the Consolidated Association Bond Book, 1850-1867, 
as follows:
1, Bends issued in renewal of the Louisiana Jtate 
Bonds due on the 30th June 1843, Series C,
Five hundred and thirteen (513) Bonds, of 
Series C, of One thousand Dollars each, signed at 
Amsterdam, on the 15 August 1848, by A * B, Jiotmn, 
Agent* To each of these Bonds are attached Five 
Coupons of Capital of Two Hundred Dollars each, 
payable on the 30th June of the years 1854, 1857, 
1830, 1363, and 1366, nmrked C.No. 13, C. Ho* 20,
C. No. 27, C. No. 34, G. Ho. 41, the last Coupon 
being only payable on th© surrender of the Bond to 
which It is attached and also of the Louisiana State 
Bond bearing the same number. .•« Thirty-six Coupons 
representing th© interest at Five per Centum per 
annum due half yearly, are also attached to each 
Bond and are as follows, all bearing the letter C.
No. 1 £25 due 31st December 1843, Mo. 2 etc. ...
No. 40 $5 30th June 1866....
2. Bonds Issued in renewal of th® Louisiana State Bonds 
due 30th June 1848, Series D.
Kight Hundred and Sixty-three (863) Bonds of 
series D, of One thousand dollars each, signed at 
Amsterdam, on the 15th August 1848, by a . B. Homan, 
Agent.... To each of these Bonds are attached Five 
Coupons of Capital of Two Hundred Dollars each,
192
A. Fortier, op* clt>. p* 62.
193CAUL, Baring Brothers to Consolidated Association., 
London, February 23, and April 20, 1849.
payable on the 30th June of the year* 1854, 1857,
1880, 1883, and 1888, marked D. 13, D. No. 37, D.
So* 34, B. No. 41, the last coupon being only pay* 
able on the surrender of the Bond to which it is at­
tached and also of the Louisiana state Bond bearing 
the same number. • •. Thirty-six Coupons representing 
the Interest at Five per Centum per annum due half 
yearly, are also attached to each Bond and are sim­
ilar to those attached to the Bonds of Series C, 
with the exception of the letter.... The payment 
of the Capital and Interest to b© effected in New 
Orleans, at the office of the Bank. The Bonds bear 
the same numbers as the Louisiana State Bonds to 
which they are annexed....
Beside issued in Settlement of Interest and Coupons 
of Interest due on the 30th June 1848, cm th©
Louisiana stats Bonds of 1843, Series a .
Five Hundred and Thirteen Bonds (513) of series 
A, of Two hundred end seventy-five Pollers ($£75) 
each, Signed at New Orleans on the 15th May, 1848, 
by A. Morphy, President, and G. Miltenberger, Cash­
ier, making together t141,075., representing the 
Interest and Coupons of Interest due on the Louisiana 
State Bends of 1843, the Holders of which have consent­
ed to the Settlement offered by this Bank.... To each 
of these Bonds are attached Six Coux>o»s of Capital, 
the first of C45.85© payable on the 30th June 1849, 
and the others of 45.83 payable on the 30th June 
of the years 1850, 1351, 1852, 1853, and 1854, the 
last Coupon being only i^eyable on the surrender of 
the Bond to which it Is attached.— Twelve Coupons, 
representing the Interest at Five per Centum per 
«AaiSB} due half yearly, are also attached to 
each bond....
Bends Issued in Settlement of the Coupons of Interest 
due on the 30th June 184Q, on the Louisiana stats 
Bonds of 1848, Series 3.
Seven Hundred and Six Bonds (706) of Series B, 
of Three hundred Dollars ({'300) each, signed et New 
Orleans on the 15th May 1840, by A. Morphy, Presi­
dent, and G. Miltenberger, Cashier, making together 
{211,800, representing th© Coupons of Interest due 
on th© Louisiana Stats Londs of 1848, the Holders 
of which have consented to the Settlement offered by 
th© Bank. To each of these Bonds are attached Six 
Coupcms of Capital of Fifty Dollars each, payable on 
the 30th June 1849, 1850, 1851, 1352, 1853, and 1854, 
the Inst Coupon b©ing only layable on th© surrender 
of the Bond to which it is attached* Twelve Coupons
x m
representing the interest at Five per Centum per 
annum, due halt yearly, are also attached to 
each bond*..*-194
After the refunding was completed and after the bank 
began receiving the six dollars per share contri but lone from 
the stockholders, the bank's deficit was reduced annually 
until the time of the Civil tar. The deficit was reported
at over $300,000 in 1848 and by 1860 it had been reduced to a 
point where there was a surplus. The War disrupted this sit­
uation, however, and by 1867 when the bonds should have been 
redeemed, there existed a considerable deficit. Below are 
some illustrations of the bank's deficit or surplus during 
the period under cons i derat ion., viz,;
April &9, 1348:
Assets S1,§65,473,76
Liabilities 1,910,526,51 
Deficit 345,047,75
H ovembo r 29, 1848:
Assets ;i,546,486,16
liabilitle S 1,881,295.71 
Deficit 334,827.65
December 15, 1849:
Assets $1,368,265,44
Linbilltie s 1,706,143,39 
Defio it 337,878,45iy °
January 26, 1850:
Assets 1,336,616,22
Liabilities 1,709,140,49 
Deficit 372,524,27
December 28,1850:
Assets 1,290,163*63
Lis bilit ies 1,637,990,9 3 
Deficit 347,822,30
194Consolidated Association Bond Book, 1850-1867,
pp, 1-13,
Doc., 1849, "Report of the Board of Currency, 
January 23, 1350. (derived)
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desember Sf, 18£L:
Assets #1,325,771*70
Liabilities 1,564,368.45.
Deficit 338,596.35195
lifivsy 39, 1859:
Assets 729,819*96
Liabilities 933,541*15
Deficit 102,721.16
July 30, 1859;
Assets 772,009.41
Liabilities 832,526.15
Deficit 60,516.74
December 31, 1869:
Assets 77 7,536.23
Liabilities 826 ,566 •15-m«
Deficit 49,029.92
June 30, 1860:
Assets 809,447.04
Liabilities 784,616.15
Surplus 24,330.89
December 29, 1860:
Assets 598,506.79
Liabilities 554,666.151Qo
Surplus 41,340 .
There are no data pertaining to the affairs of the 
CGmsolidated Association during the period of the War.
7b* <mly fragment of information is that by 1864, the deficit 
was 137,850.199
During the years that followed 1848 most of the stock­
holders pa Id their s ix-dollar-per-share, annual contrlbu-
200tiona, bat these payments were often made under protest.
19gIbld.. 1851.
197Ibid.. 1659 •
196
Ibid.. 1-861.
199Ibid., 1864-1865, Report of the Auditor of Public
Accounts, pp. 125 and 130.
CAML. There are many letters of complaint on file: 
m e  records from 1848 to 1866.
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$6W  Wftiwd to pay and, thus, th® matter of the legality
Of the assessment and of the Aet of 184? were taken to court*
the Supreme Court, however, uphold tho validity of th® Act
and it authorized the hank to enforce the payment of the
SOIecatrlbutl oebb .
By 1853 the Legislature was considering the matter of
relieving itself of debt from the bonds Issued to the Clt~
lzeas Bank by permitting the Citizens Bank then in the process
of liquidation to reinoorpona.to an a stock bank, which would
assume the debts of the property bank. Thot would have meant
that the Consolidated Association alone would have to beer
the expense of the board of managers in charge of the liquids*
202
t i n  of the property banks. It was suggested, therefore, 
that the Consolidated Association be relieved from the man­
agement by a Board of Managers under the supervision of th© 
Board of Currency.
This suggestion presented by the Board of Managers 
m g  accepted, and April 11, 1855, the General Assembly passed 
an Aet to "Provide for the Future Manage!armt of the Affaire
203
of the Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana.” 
the provisions of the Act were that ©very year the Governor, 
with advice end consent of the Senate, appoint three citizens
^^Leg. Doc., 1852, rReport of th© Board of Managers 
Of the Citizensf Bank and Coanolid&ted Association, u p* S»
pp. 3-4.
203-----
La. Acts, 1853, Ho. 113, pp. 70-77*
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mot stookholders or the bank to serve as directors of the 
Institution, and three directors were to be elected by the 
stockholders. These directors were to serve a® a new Board 
of Basic Managers for the Consolidated Association, their ex­
pense to be borne by the firm. As soon as this nee board was 
organized, the existing Board of Managers was to cease to
Tbs affairs of the bank under the new management was 
no improvement over the previous arrangement. If anything.
It wss more extravagant. Furthermore» the State Legislature 
passed smother law, March IS, 1855, which permitted the Asso­
ciation to sink its current funds Into dead weight Invest­
ments* Section 1 of Act Ho.193, nAn act to provide for the 
liquidation of the Consolidated Association of the Planters 
of Louisiana” authorized the bank ”bo invest their assets
at a discount of eight per cent per annum on all loans having
&05
aero than ninety days to run.”
Than came the War which paralyzed the business of the 
nofiSotttli* This war disrupted the liquidation process of the 
company, which technically was to terminate in 1856. As it 
,, the Association was unable to continue payments on the
bonds when they fell due. The stockholders had to cease
207paying their assessments.
^^Ibld.. sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Acta, 1356, So. 193, P. 249.
Fortier, op.olt.. vol. 1, p. 62, 
207S. A. Caldwell, o p . clt.. p. 69.
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Had it not been fop the War, it might have bean that
the Consolidated Association oould have been able to fully
2Q3
liquidate its obligations* The War, however, was making
paupers out of the planters. Property owners were being sup­
pressed by the necessity of making Federal oontribut1ons 
and by the payments of excessive taxes.
Bare Is what Kdmuad Foretell had to say relative to the 
condition of the bank and the situation of the time • First is 
a report en the Consolidated Association:
Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana 
Statement as of 30th June 1063
Liabilities:
Annexes to Bonds #548,000.00
Coupons due 29,541.15
Special Deposits 33,433*66
Total 610,974.81
Assets:
Stock Loans 214,651.40
Bills Receivable 196,320.13
Beal Estate 16,533.10
700 Shares, Bank of Louisiana Stock 70,000.00
34 Shares, Commercial Bank 3,400.00
Contribution yet due 44,646.00
Consolidated City Bonds 23,612.30
Cash on Hand 34,931.57
Carrolton Bank and small debtors 542*33
Total 604,567.03
Deficit 610,974.81
206Of„ t CABL, Forstall to Baring Brothers, New Orleans, 
July 4, 1363; and "Statement of Affairs as of June 30, 1863* 
(English) .
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Th© second part of th© report reflected somewhat th© situation 
at the time:
la this state of things th© Board of Liquida­
tion passed a resolution * * * on th© 30th of jus©
(1633) concerning protest on the annexes due on 
that day, so that interest thereupon may con­
tinue to run taatil paid*
Tor the government of the parties concerned,
I endorse a list of stockholders of th© Association, 
showing the annual average crops of Sugar of the 
country stockholders; X have no means of ascertain­
ing with satisfactory accuracy the income from the 
properties of the city stockholders before th© war, 
hut it is well known here that It was very large*
You will perceive that to secure the payment 
of the annexes yet in circulation amounting to $548,000 
the holders thereof hold mortgages and pro­
ductive property in this eity principally and
At & low estimate th© property thus 
mortgaged produoed per annum, before the war,
fully 1,000,000 
Its condition this day is as follows:
Military necessities have destroyed the crops of 
last year and devastated all the sugar estates within 
the federal Lines, completely disorganizing labor; 
and the work of destruction Is going on— from afflu- 
aaee, the Planters named on the list of stockholders 
have been reduced, for th© time being, with their 
large plantations to absolute poverty and their fine 
mansions and sugar works may at any moment be reduced, 
into ashes as suggested by our only official paper*w w
Despite the fact that 1866 was to mark th© end of the 
liquidstlcm of the bank's obligations, the Consolidated Asso- 
elotion was still faced with a bond and interest debt of
11,351,000
1.384.000
3.636.000
and on productive country property and th© 
slaves thereon to an amount of 
is total
209
Ibid*., July 4, 1363.
i m
$647,702*40. What la more, the firm was insolvent to the ex­
tent of several thousand dollars; its liabilities exceeded
the min e  of the available assets— $647,702.40 of liablli-
210
ties, $609,109.48 of assets— a deficit of |38,59£.V2. 
Another extension, therefore, was necessary* Another as­
sessment ea the stockholders was dee mad essential. The State 
legislature found it necessary to grant an extension not to 
exceed ten years and to provide fear further oontrl but ions 
froe the stockholders• The Aot permitting another funding 
stated, Muring the late war this Institution arid its stock­
holders ... suffered such heavy losses that a further delay 
east he granted fear its final liquidation.n The bonds out­
standing, therefore, were allowed to be postponed on their 
aaturlty, provided the extension was on the same terns that 
already existed on the bonds. To assure the security on the 
tends, the managers and directors had "to require all stock­
holders and debtors to furnish mortgages on property of 
sufficient value, and other undoubted security, in order to 
be able to redeem at the proper time the State bonds and
coupons remaining due, and all Interest arising from
211
the extension of time.” If the opinion of the Louisiana 
Superior Court Is to be accepted, the cause of the prolong­
ed liquidation period was not the War, despite the claims
z*%bid ., Foretell to Consolidated Association,
May 7, 1866.
211la. Acts, 1866, No. 38, p. 66.
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•f th* Legislature. Tim m u m  was mainly the diversion of 
fund* from their purpose to squandering and riotous Urine* 
The funds that should hare gone toward liquidation were di­
re rted to the payment of unwarranted salaries to a hoard of
officers— president, vice-president , cashier®, director®,
SI 2
and the Him* The faet remained, however9 that the hank 
had to fulfill its obligations.
Assent free the bondholders was again required In 
order to extend the maturity date of th© annexes, and the 
bank bends and to capitalize the interest due end the Inter­
est coupons. The Board of liquidation which was In charge of 
the Consolidated Association offered a plan to refund the 
bend annexes due in 1865 and 1866, to refund the bank bonds 
net' yet paid, and to capitalize the Interest by Issuing new 
bank bonds as had been done In 1348.
On the basis of the proposal for refunding by the Con­
solidated Association, Baring Brothers issued a circular to 
tbs bondholders, viz.:
Our Agent in Hew Orleans has had placed in 
his hands by the Board of liquidation of the Con­
solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana 
a statement of their Liabilities and Assets, and 
it shows a present deficit of i? 38,592.92. In 
view of the present prostrate condition of the
£12
55 Is. Ann. 425. Consolidated Association va„
George Lord. For a verification, see the Books of minutes.
The re were several arguments concerning salaries and expenses. 
The matter was taken to the Board of Liquidation and th© Leg­
islature* The salary affair way finally incorporated into 
law.
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sugar Interests in the State which cannot be 
revived before a satis fact cry reorganisation of 
later is attained (which say take several years) 
it is proposed to extend the period of redemption 
of the $400 still unpaid on ths original tend of #1000.
The annexes due 50th June, 1863, amount to #£65,600 
w •* " * » 1866, amount to 275,200
It 1s proposed to exchange these for the follow­
ing annexes to be divided into four equal instal­
ments *
1st Payable, 50th June 1870 .........  155,£00
tod Payable, " " 1878  155,200
3rd Payable, " * 1874   135,200
4th Payable, " * 1876   155,200
(540,800)
To meet the interest on the Annexes due 50th 
tone 1863, say $265,600 a 5>- for 3 years $39,840 
TWO years Interest cm $59,840 3 5> 5.984
43,824,
toe Board would issue annexes payable 30th June 1868, 
with Interest Coupons at 5 per cent payable Annually 
or semi-annually.
Should these proposals be favorably entertained 
an agent will be sent to London to carry the same 
Into executlop with authority to sign the Annexes 
to be issued.-413
The terms were accepted, and Adolph Schreber, a member
of the company of Xdmund J. Forstall and Sons of Hew Orleans,
214
was sent to London as agent for the Consolidated Association.
He left in July and coraaenced in August to negotiate on the
215
exchange of annexes. Hefunding, however, progressed slowly
216sad with difficulty. By the end of 1866, Mr. Schreber re—
^ ( h M L ,  Circular: Baring Brothers, London, June 8, 
1866. 814
CASK, May 11, 1666.
215
CABL, Consolidated Association to A. Schreber,
July 12, 1866.
C&&L, Schreber to Consolidated Association, London, 
August 25, 1866.
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tl»t 775, or about hair, of th© bonds had been ax- 
217
changed. Finally, la February of 1867, the exchange was 
completed and the agent returned to Hew Orleans.218
Whatever might haws been th© expectation of the bond­
holders from the exchange made In 1366, their hopes were not 
fulfilled, because the years that followed were years of 
corruption and economic disorder* Taxes increased tremen­
dously In Louisiana and the bonded Indebtedness rose beyond 
the maano of the State* The affairs of th© Consolidated Asso­
ciation were terribly 'mismanaged *
Xn 1874 the Legislature passed a funding act to consol­
idate the bonds outstanding and the floating debt of the 
218
State* This law and its amendments baffled the courts, 
the people,the State, and the holders of bank bonds for sat- 
eral years* Did the State of Louisiana, through its funding 
law, repudiate the Louisiana bonds issued in favor of the 
Consolidated Association and in favor of the Citizens* Bank? 
•From 1365 to 1877 Louisiana was governed by the
220
carpetbaggers, whose rule was one of great extravagance♦'*
•Of all the rec oast rooted governments in the south, that of
221Louisiana was probably the worst.” Vulgarity, bribery,
217X£2^l, November 14, 1866.
February 33, 1867.
219Ia. Acts, 1874, No. 5, pp. 39—42.
380
3. A. Caldwell, op. olt.. p. 103.
221
K. C. HcGrane, o p . olt.. p. 313; and K. Lonn,
Bee oust ruction in Louisiana. pp, 8, 28 , 68 , 77, and 88.
lea
esrr option, and extravagance ware the vogue of th© period, 
and always the State debt was mounting. To ©heok those un- 
win© a d  unbearable debts9 therefore, the citizens organised 
and passed a e a s  tl tut Iona 1 amendment in 1369 to limit the 
Mate debt to $£5,000,000* Nevertheless, th© debt con tin- 
wed to seat*
By 1S70 there were so many different kinds of bonds 
and other certificates of debt outstanding that the Legisla­
ture attempted to consolidate the debt somewhat. March 16, 
1070, It patted "An act to provide for the paysmat or fund­
ing of the floating debt of the State, by the issue and sale 
or exchange of State beads." To carry out the provisions of 
the funding, a Board of Liquidation (composed of the Govern or s 
H e  Auditor of Public Accounts, and the President of the Git- 
ineas* Bank) was created; and it was to settle and redeem all 
floating debts of the State created by authority of law by 
selling or exchanging new bonds of $1,000 each, payable forty 
years from May, 1870, at the rate of six per cent per year, 
payable semiannually. The bonds could be sold at not less 
than $7B.OO in current money for each $100, and they were to 
be offered in New Tork, London, Baris, Hamburg, and Frank­
fort. That funding aet, and its amendment of 1871, however,
ggg
failed to curb and consolidate the bonded indebtedness*
Iji. Acts, 1870, Wo. 69, pp. 103-154 and 1871,
Ho. 43, p. 134.
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instead, it "created” a new debt*
finally, the opposition to the growing debts was heard 
through an organised group or taxpayers* They formed a tax­
payers association and presented a circular which stated 
that the limit specified by the Constitution had been exceeded 
and which warned all concerned that they, the taxpayers, would 
met pay taxes to discharge obligations in excess of the 
$25,000,000 eonstitutlona 1 limit*g^® The weight of th© cir­
cular persuaded the members of the Legislature to take cog­
nizance of the debt situation and It evoked strong denials 
from certain officials*
- Governor H* C* Warmoth In his annual message of Jan­
uary 1, 1878, branded the findings of the committee "wrong 
in principle and false in fact*” He also voiced his oppo­
sition to the reports of the Auditor of Public Accounts which 
substantiated the findings of the taxpayers* "The State Audit­
or," he said, "persists in publishing to the world that our 
debt Is #41,194,473*91, which he makes up by adding the act­
ual debt of the State, which Is #22,295,790*58, an amount 
which he calls a "contingent debt" of 118,898,683*33,"
Whether or not the constitutional limit was exceeded 
is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, the reports of th© 
Auditor of Public Accounts partly substantiate the conten-
A* Caldwell, op* clt*, p* 104*
S2*Lex. Doc*. 137E: and New Orleans Republican,
January XTf^BT2Z—  -------------
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tlons of the taxpayers. The debts reported, January, 1870f 
war#:
Liabilities for property banks $ 4,858,933
Tbs re la no coma on basis upon which to compare the ro« 
ports for the three years cited because each is different in 
grouping and the groups do not bar© the same inclusion of 
debts. The contingent debt reported in 1875 referred to the 
liabilities for banka; It did not Include all contingent 
debts* The other contingent liabilities on the Statefa 
statue books as of January 1, 1873, were:
y Debts proper, in trust funds 
Debts proper in bonds 
Certificates of Indebtedness
868,195
16,840,685
53,815
m m * *$22,589
The debts reported in January,1872, were:
Debts proper in bonds
Bends loaned to T&rloua banks
Idses 11aneons debts
Authorized for debts prior to 1871
(not issued)
#20,188,800
6,579,683
3,476,269
■4l*"f5Sf^SS®86
The debts reported in January, 1873, were:
Funded debt $21,801,800.00
Unfunded debt 2,291.607.90
Debt proper 
Contingent debt
$24,093,407* 90
Account
if th© Auditor of Public
286Ibld.. 1872.
227
Leg. Doc.» 1873.
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Balance of subscription of State in 1653
to railroads $2,108,000
Bonds of Max loan Gulf Canal Co. (Act
No. 116, 1869)* 120,000
K. O. Mobile and Chattanooga R.R. (Act
Ho* 26, 1869 ) 2,073,000
H. 0. Baton Rou*g* and ¥Ioksburg R. R.
(Act Ho. 143, 1869) 6,230,000
Charity Hospital of Shreveport (Act
HO* 149, 1869) 100,000
Miss. Vhlley navigation Co. (Aot Ho. 84,
1870). 100,000
Arkansas Delta R. R. Co. (Aot Ho. 106,
1870) 375,000
Southeastern R. R. Co.(Aot Ho. 28, 1871) 375,000
Mias• River Navi^tioa Co* (Act Ho. 29,
1871) 250,000
To build a State house (Aet Ho. 31,1871) 1,300,000
Alexandria and Fulton H. R. Co. (Act Ho.
40, 1871) 1,875,000
Louisiana Warehouse Co. (Act Ho. 41,
1871) 1,500,000
H. 0. and Northeastern R* R. Go.. (Act
MO. 106, 1871) 1,212,500
Levee Company (Act No. 43, 1373) 1.000.000^^
Total contingent liabilities #21,090,500
Nevertheless, the Auditor m s  justified in not including these 
contingent liabilities because none of the bonds authorized 
by the above acts were issued and no liabilities had been 
Incurred by the State under any of these acts.
In 1873 a new administration came into office and it 
was under pressure to take action on the debt question.
William P. Kellogg, the new governor, was in favor of adjust- 
IB, the debt situation and he appointed a Citizens1, Comnittee
Dally Picayune, "Annual Message of Gove, nor Wil- 
11am p. Kellogg,* January 6, 1874; Leg. r>oe,, 1874 and 
1876, "Annua 1 Message of Governor Vi. P. Kellogg."
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of w w a  peMone to investi^ate the State debt. This
250
Board of Examiners rendered ita report, December 25, 1875, 
and the Governor included it in hia message of January 1874* 
Xn substance the conclusions were:
(1) Tfeat the contingent debt of the State amounted to 
$21,090,500 and that in some oases the laws which 
had authorized the contingent debt were void* Thus 
it was recommended that a law should be passed to 
remove all these laws from the statutes.
(2) That the debts Incurred in favor of the Citizens'
Bant and the Consolidated Association amounted to 
$4*828,880*55. He vert he less , it was believed that 
the State should not be called upon for this debt*
(5) That the bonds outstanding amounted to $24,283,886*00, 
but that their market price was not more than fifty 
cents on the dollar, or about $12,000,000.
(4) That, as soon as the entire debt was reduced to below 
$25,000,000 by an act to remove the void and lapsed 
contingent debt, the outstanding debt should be con­
solidated on the basis«ef the market price of the 
bonds, or $12,000,000.
The members of the Legislature which met in January, 
1874, had been impressed by their constituents with the neces­
sity of reducing the debts and the heavy tax burdens, but they 
hesitated to accept the recommendations of the Governor's 
Citizens* Committee. Instead they accepted the suggested pro­
posals of the Secretary of State made in his report of 1873*
228Ibl*.. 1374. and Financial Chronicle, January 17,1874
23o‘.. .
A. Fortier, op* oit*, Vol. I, p* 400.
231 — —
The contingent debt was divided into two sections,
the first of 415,003,000, the second of $8,087,500.
^^Tfae Dally Pioayune, January 6, 1874: Leg:* Doc., 1874, 
The "Annual Message of Governor William P» Kellogg. *
_ , The above conclusions differ from those given by W*A.
Scott. (Of*. The Repudiation of State Debts fBoston: Thomas Y. 
Crowell,“T9$5T7’p. 111).
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He ted proposed th© funding of the whole bonded and float- 
1^5 debt Into forty-year consolidated bond© at th© rate of
&55
eixty ee»t8 on the dollar* These debts, however, he fig- 
mod, should first be scaled down to $£8,000,000 as provided 
by oenstltut iona 1 amendment and then reduced to $15,000,000, 
above which they were not to be increased*
The funding aot passed, January 3d, 1374, was entitled 
"An act to provide for the funding obligations of the State 
by exchange of bonds; to provide for principal and interest 
of said bonds; to establish a board of liquidation; to au­
thorize certain judicial proceedings against it; to define 
and punish violations of this act; to prohibit certain offi­
cers free diverting funds except as provided by law, and to 
punish violations therefor; to levy a continuing tax and pro­
vide a continuing appropriation for said bonds; to xoahe a 
contract between the state and holders of said bonds; to pro­
hibit injunctions in certain cases; to limit the indebtedness 
of the State and to limit State taxes; to annul certain 
grants of the State aid; to prohibiVth© modification, nova­
tion or extension of any contract heretofore made for the 
State aid; to provide for the receipt of certain warrants for 
sertain taxes; and to repeal all conflicting laws," This Act 
£©« 2 authorized the State to issue forty-year, seven per 
east, "consolidated bonds,* not exceeding $15,000,000, to be
233
Leg* Poo* * 1©73, "Report of the Secretary of State,"
p» 2*
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exchanged by the Board of Liquidation at the rate of sixty
cents is "consolidated bondsn for one dollar of valid oblige-
tiona* Because of the chaotic state of affairs, and because
of the amorous irregular and fraudulent bonds outstanding,
this Beard of Liquidation, charged with funding the bonds,
m s  prohibited from issuing any bonds in exchange for any
outstanding bonds or other obligations whose legality and
■validity might be questioned until their validity and legal­
ist
ity ess ascertained by a decree of th© courts of Louisiana*
The next year a supplementary act was passed which contained
s list of bonds that were considered "Questioned and doubtful"
and it reversed the duty of the Board on these: "Mono In that
list could be funded until the holders of them had obtained
a final decree of • * * ( the Supreme Court ) attesting them
235
as in that act directed.w
The funding act of 1874 avoided to state which part of 
the debt was considered illegal and it refrained from stating 
whether or not the debt exceeded the constitutional limit* 
Instead, it stated that the outstanding valid and legal bonds 
were to be converted into "cansolsn at sixty cents In the 
dollar with the limit of consols to be $15,000,000, an indi­
rect and obscure way of saying that a debt in excess of 
$25,000,000 should not be considered in the funding. There-
_Ia. Acts, 1874, No* 5, pp. 39-42.g1" ■ ■ — ——
29 La* Ann. 690, The State ox rel o. J « X^orstall 
to* The Board~~oT Haul da ti on * Qf * * 1a . fSE&T, 1TT75, iio. 11,
pp. 110-112.
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fore, inasmuch as th© debt proper was $24,093,407, cons1st- 
i&i of:
Total bonded debt |21,801,805,00
Floating debt:
Certificates of indebtedness 154,108*84
Auditors Warrants 1,987,499*06
Due fiscal agent 150,000.00
there arose in the minds of many the idea that the State was
repudiating its debt incurred in aid of the Consolidated Asso­
ciation and the Citizens* Bank:, and it took several years to 
settle that issue.236
Objections from bondholders against th© funding act of
1874 were numerous. The New York bondholders protested and 
cited proof of the Statefs ability to pay its debts in full* 
The London bondholders refwed to accept the terms of the act 
and considered this ct to be a means to confiscate forty per
S>ot7
cent of their bonds, principal and interest.
Immediately after the supplement to the funding act 
was passed, May 17, 1875, ilr. 0. I* Forstall, representing 
holders of certain enumerated Consolidated Association 
Louisiana bonds, applied to the court for a mandamus to com­
pel the funding of the bonds of the Board of Liquidation* He 
alleged that the Board had refused to fund the bonds as pro­
vided for by the Act of 1874, and he averred that the Act of
1875 was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court declared the act
236There were many, also, who claimed that the State was 
repudiating part of its proper debt because it was redeeming 
its bonds on the basis of the market price of the bonds.
Financial Chronicle* August 15, 1874. It included a 
quotation of the Resolutions-adopted in London, July 29, 1874.
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constitutional and defended the action of the Board of 
refusing to fund the bond© until declared valid* Then it 
fexaaUy declared those particular bonds valid and legal, 
end it restricted its abatement by saying, desire to be 
dietlnetly understood that we are expressing no opinion on 
the validity of any bonds except those before us and in the
o«g
hands of the re la tor. ^
When Lesassier and Binder presented Consolidated Asso­
ciation Louisiana bonds for refunding, the Board of Liquida­
tion refused; it said:
We wish it distinctly understood that we do 
net deny the eventual liability of the State, in 
ease the assets of the bank, end of the stock­
holders prove insufficient, after legal discussion 
according and in conformity to the full measure of 
the obligation contracted, and we fully recognize 
that the faith of the State is pledged to redeem 
ell promises xaede and all liabilities incurred, 
but beyond this we hold that the State has no 1c- 
gitlEKits authority to extend her liabilities, and 
therefore we believe In this instance that the bond­
holders must look to the assets pledged to their re­
imbursement, see that they are properly and legally 
administered and applied, and should those prove in­
adequate, they, in the meantime, having peraued all 
their legal remedies, then apply to th© State for 
the fulfillment and redemption of her promises.
Therefore, they took their case to court, and In 1873 the Su­
preme Coart of Louisiana rendered a decision requiring, not 
only these bonds to be funded, but all Consolidated a esooia-
La* Ana. t>90, The State ex rel <j. J_. ff or stall vs* 
The Boa id of Liquidation«
30 La. Ann* 615, Legassier and Binder vs. The Board 
of Liquidation*
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tioa Louisiana bonds, it said that the bonds were legal
obligatioas of the State issued for a valid consideration
and within the legal limit.
Dissatisfaction with the Court’s decision was great*
Ifeny thought that this debt ordered funded was illegal, un-
240
eoastitutlonal, and unwarranted. The diesatisfaction 
was vnmiaolngly voiced by the press. The New Orleans Times 
s^pressed its views as follows:
The latest and queerest faot in regard to 
the involved, complicated end eternal Consolidated 
Planters’ Association bonds is that the bondholders 
are proceeding to fund their bonds into State Con­
sols, This is queer, but it is lawful. It Is law­
ful because the Supreme Court so declared the other 
day. It decided that the State having gone the secu­
rity of a private bank for certain bonds, and that 
the bank, having failed to pay them when due (al­
though It was and Is abundantly able to do), the 
State, as security, is responsible and must pay 
them. These bondholders were not authorized by the 
Sovereign State to sue it, but they accomplished the 
same object by a mandamus to compel the Funding 
Board to fund their bonds into btate consols....
This is lawful; not because it Is comprehensible, 
but because It is the Supreme Gourt that holds a man­
damus ....to compel the funding board to issue bonds 
for other people’s debts, for which the state is not 
equivalent to sueing the state in law, although It is 
equivalent in faot.
3o much for the law. How for the queerness. It 
ia queer that these bondholders should avail them­
selves of this right to fund their bonds simply be­
cause they can do so much better, unless there Is an 
enormous lie out of somewhere and an undeveloped 
swindle lurking behind it, A §.1,000 Consolidated 
Planters’ Association Bond funded into a State con­
sol at sixty cents on the dollar and that sold on
A # Scott, c i t. . pp• 114, HB.
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the * treat at T5 coats will yield precisely $4BQ*
But if good mortgages oa good plantations which 
secure the bond were foreclosed and sold out, 
the bondholders would get its face value of 
$19GQ0 and costs of a suit besides. Why do short gA1 
financiers prefer $450 to $1,00GV This is queer,
The press and the people thought it ’’queer” that the 
bondholders should want to exchange their thousand dollar 
denselidated Association Louisiana bonds for six hundred dol­
lars of consolidated bonds, but it was not queer or strange. 
The amount of interest collected on the one thousand dollar 
bento wes fifty dollars* The amount of interest on the six 
hradred dollars of consolidated bonds was forty-two dollars* 
Soto a difference in interest return was not great* Further- 
sere, the Association bands were quoted on the market at as 
low as forty or fifty; their security wes the assets of an in- 
sol Tent bank in the process of a prolonged liquidation and 
motor race 1 worship, with a State pledge which was questioned; 
end they had been issued many years previous and had been 
extraded several times* The consolidated bonds, on the other 
hand, had not yet depreciated; they ware outright and un­
questioned obligations of the State; and they were new bonds 
with period of forty years before maturity. Naturally, the 
preference was for "consols.*
Some of the bondholders, however, wanted the state to 
Pay or assume the Association bond debt on the basis of th©
Orleans Times. April 20, 187Q.
face value, one thousand dollars* In 1883, the Court
S48
reaffirmed the decision of 1878, and th© law of 1877, re­
affirming the funding law of 1871, and it settled the Issue
Hot emir was the funding act of 1874 responsible for 
the com fusion of the legality and validity of the Consoli­
dated Association .Louisiana bonds, but because of the uncer­
tainty of the cut the mono,gement of the concern b©c*uae un­
certain, chaotic, and confused* The extension law of 1866 
specified that the bonds could be extended for ten years and no 
more* When 1876 came it was the end of the extension and the 
beads mere due. Ho law was passed to furthur extend the bonds 
be Oft use of the funding act of 1874, and the legality of fh* 
obligations was still unsettled* The way was open, therefore, 
for ifqmffim m  to take advantage of the situation* <Tune 17, 1876, 
* 0 m  Charles Ha than, a bondholder (acting, as is charged, at 
tea instigation of B. Flanders (Pres.)) hunted up the record
of the old suit for forfeiture of the bank, which had been
144
Instituted in 1842, **." lie had it transferred to th© Superior 
District Court and he filed a petition of intervention in the 
afflairs of the bank* Be alleged that the terra of liquidation
on the conversion as provided in th© funding act of 1874* 243
24234 In. Ann. 770, '?orstaIl ana Sons va. The Consolldat-
£*SLa. Acta. 1877, No. 58, pp. 77-84.
2 4 4 ^ ^  pee. , 1877, "Report of the President of the
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was expiring and that there was no new provision of law 
ffr Its future management end liquidation . He, therefore, 
asked that a receiver he appointed.
This proceeding was purely ex parte; nobody 
was notified or asked to be notified* It v/as taken 
in an extinct suit, in which judgment had been ren­
dered thirty-four years previously, which judgment 
had received full execution, and the power of the 
court over it was entirely exhausted *
Mr* B. F. Flanders was appointed receiver and was au­
thorised to take immediate possession of all the hooks, assets, 
esd affairs of the corporation* Mr. Flanders as President of 
the Board of Directors of the Consolidated Association ac­
cepted the order of the court, dissolved his board, abandoned 
M s  of flee as president, and turned the affairs over to him­
self as receiver?47
Subsequently, Mr. Max Orehncr, a foreign bondholder, 
considered Mr. Flanders * receivership position Illegal and 
te started proceedings in the United States Circuit Court to 
«wst Mr. Flanders as receiver. He asked for the appointment 
of a new receiver. Th© strange thing, however, was that Mr. 
Grebner made Mr. Flanders, receiver, a party with himself
end Mr. Flanders as president of the Consolidated Aaaoeia-
£48
t i m  the other party.
tore oner vs, b. F. Flanders.
Doc*. 1877. op. cit
2 4 7 Z T T  -----  -------
7040 United States District Court,
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fl»8« two men obtained a subpcna dlreoted to the Con­
solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana * through 
Its president* Mr* Flanders* That was the only notification 
the corporation and its stockholders received of a court ac­
tion* Moreover* Mr* Foretell had resigned his presidency 
when he had accepted tee position of receiver*
Shea tee ease appeared in court the contest centered 
between Flanders who was attempting to retain his own re­
ceivership and Grebner who was demanding the appointment of 
a new receiver* Because of the improper management of the 
Mat* the Circuit Court ordered the control of the liquidation 
to be placed under the District Court* Then* to solve the con­
test between tee two mem* it appointed Mr* Flanders and Mr.
A3 la in Rustle, who was Mr* Grebner fs choice* Joint receivers.
The State* which had an interest in the bank* was 
nevwr consulted or made a party in the court proceedings* Mr. 
H* R* Steele, Assistant Attorney General* filed a petition 
of intervention in the name of the state in which he waived 
tee rights of the State and asked for the appointment of @ 
receiver* The court accepted his request by appointing Mr* 
Blitz the third receiver* The two other receivers accepted 
the appointment and stated in their minutes ”... by the ap­
pointment of Lieut. Governor fciltz as one of the Receivers 
of the Association* we recognize the intention of the Court
249Ibld.
260Ibld.. aad 7940 United State. District Court.
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to t o w  toft State flair ly represented In toe adminietration 
of toe affairs of the Association.*®5^
Meanwhile the stockholders ofl the Consolidated Associa­
tion were sailed together for the purpose of electing their 
torftft representatives on a new Board of Directors* The dire©- 
tears of the corporation then started judicial proceedings and 
teeftBted that the receivers he -moated and that the affairs of 
toft eonpany to returned to th© proper liquidators.
the State, on its part, also moved for a vacation of 
receivership. Messrs. Baring Brothers of London, however, 
Opposed toe State’s action and, through their representative, 
Fonts 11 and Sims, sent a protest to the honorable P>. P.
Billings of the District Court, asking that the r©celver-
254
Ship to fflalntalned.
The receivers, Messrs. Flanders, Fustis, and Wiltz, 
constituted themselves as a Board in December, 1077. They 
Bond t o  voted to meet one ft a month to take care of the fi- 
B&aaial effairs of the benk, end they ordered the ordinary 
t o  telly business to proceed in the sane manner as hereto­
fore. Their ms joT change was to select the State Nation® 1 
Basic as a depository for the funds of the Association, in-
2aiCABK, D«c«abar 86, .1877.
2 S2X.eg. Doc,. 1077, op. clt.. and CA13U, - t o roll 3, 18S0.
2 8014 United Stetor, Ulntrict Court, The rvtsto of
r». B. g. flfcndera.
2g4
Protest of Edmund Forsts 11 and Sons to th© Hon. B. P.
, Ttoltea States biatrict Court, November 09, ieWT
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stead of the Louisiana National Bank, which had been aeleo-
£55
ted by the previous administrators in May, 1877*
According to their report of April 8, 1878, the receiv­
ers stated the Association^ debt on bonds and accrued interest 
was $559,341. Against this liability they claimed that the 
fixra had $16,516*14 of good bills receivable, $25,134.67 of 
worthless receivables, and some improved and unimproved prop­
erty. Furthermore, they claimed that there was $30,384.30 
which should be forthcoming from the stockholders to help 
liquidate the obligations, $13,188 in contributions not 
yet paid, and $17,148.30 in aocrued interest on these past- 
due contributions.
What assets the bank had and what contributions were 
still due, however, were deemed insufficient to meet the 
olalms against the corporation. The receivers, therefore, 
suggested that another assessment be levied on the stocks to 
complete the full and final liquidation of the affairs of the 
Association. A further suggestion was that all of the proper­
ties held by the bank be sold at once; improved property for 
case-half in cash and one-half in notes to mature in 1, 8, and 
3 years, and with interest at 8 per cent; unimproved real es­
tate at one-fourth in cash and the remainder in notes; doubt­
ful notes held by the bank at the best price possible; and the
857
good bills deemed desirable to discount at the regular rate. 
8550A.BM, December >^6, 1877.
25&I*>ia.. April 8, 1878.
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Before notion could be taken on the suggestion* how- 
•fer. It bad to be presented to the Court which had control 
ever the receivership* Mr* «T* W. Gurley, Jfaater in Chancery, 
appointed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Louisiana for the 
Halted States District Court, reported to the Court on April 
17, 187Q, that he had considered the suggestions made by the 
receivers and he was of the opinion that it was advisable to 
sell the Improved and unimproved properties, except that the 
interest be 5 per cent on the notes accepted instead of 8 
per cent as suggested*
The Master in Chancery was of a different opinion on
the sale of bills receivable* In his way of thinking, the
doubtful bills had long since been placed in the hands of
attorneys for collect ion, and, therefore, were not In the
bankvs possession; nor was the bank aware of what steps, if
any, had been taken to secure their collection* Owing to the
uncertainty as to the whereabouts and status of the bills, he
reeoBi&ended that action regarding the doubtful or worthless
notes be postponed until they were returned to the bank, or
more exact information on them had been secured* The good
bills receivable, he thought, were secured by mortgage and
mere bearing interest* He saw no reason for converting
258
them by discount into non-interest-bearing funds.
It is evident from the suggestions rondcred by th©
358Iblfl. . April 17, 1370.
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l»ealwrat that they were attempting to liquidate the asset a 
of the bank in such a maimer as to reimburse themselves on 
their claims as quickly as possible* Little consideration 
was given to the claims of others* Tor that reason, there­
fore, others who had claims filed intervention, claims against 
the receivers * These complaints asked for judgment by prefer­
ence against the acid receivers on bonds of the State issued 
for and In favor of the Association and on bonds proper of the
bank when It assumed the interest coupons due on the State
asshands above mantiomed*^*^ What ensued was a struggle by the
various interested parties to gain control of the assets of
the bank. Among the groups were: the State, the agents of
£60Baring Brothers, and the stockholders.
The State, not being successful in forcing the Court 
to order a vacation of receivership and to restore the affairs 
of the bank to proper liquidators by judicial proceedings, de­
cided to enact a law to accomplish its aims* Act Ho* £0 of 
Kerch 90, 1378, ordered:
That the honorable judges of the Circuit 
Court of the United States for this district and 
circuit be and they are hereby respectfully re­
quested to cancel and rescind the orders appoint­
ing receivers for this corporation, and to restore 
its assets and affairs to the coutrol and possession 
of the president and directors, as at present organ­
ised under the Act Ho. 113 of 1353, which is declared 
to continue in force, ...
Ibid*. June 6, 1878.
£6001.. Ibid.. July 5, 1878, torch 12, and April 16,
1879.
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ltoU»r it ordered:
That said president and directors be and are 
hereby directed to take such legal proceedings a a 
■ay be necessary to procure the rescinding of all 
orders of court* appointing receivers for this 
corporation, and to recover possession and control 
of Its assets and affairs*261
After the law was passed, the Court continued to main­
tain a state of receivership for the Consolidated Associa­
tion, rad Mr* Huntington and others, holders of Association 
heads, Intervened and appealed the Max Grebner oisso to the 
SBpxws Court of the ttalted States* Apparently, however, all 
fart lea concerned were uncertain of their grounds; after 
April 18, 1879, the Books of Minutes contain no further rec­
ords of the three appointed receivers; the Circuit Court ap­
pelated Mr* John Calhoun, who was acceptable to the Directors 
of the Association, receiver pro tem.; and the Directors and
President of the Consolidated Association pleaded v/ith Hunt-
£62
Ington and others to discontinue the aupre.ae Court appeal,
While the Act of 1878 ordered the j resident and Direc­
tors of the Consolidated Association, who had been duly 
elected and appointed in July, 1877, to take proper measures 
to obtain control of the affairs of the corporation, they did 
set take action until March, 1880* It was not until July that 
they secured possession of the books, asseta, and the affairs
26lj^# Acts, 1378, No* 20, pp. 254-257.
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CAEM, June 5, 1800, ^ueport of the President of th© 
Board of Directors
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£63
•f the teak*
Act Ho* £0 of 1873 did not limit lt^ulf to an order 
that the Consolidated Association b© returned to the proper 
liquidators• It provided, also, for the redemption of bonds 
sad for assessments to redeem the bonds* These provisions 
were to be applied Irrespective of the Court's decision on 
the eoavert&bility of the Association bonds into consol­
idated beads*
In ease It was decided by the Supreme Court that the 
State bonds issued in favor of this corporation were legal 
and valid obligations and fundable, it was to be the duty of 
the Beard of Liquidation to preserve these canceled certlf- 
ieates and to t u n  them to the Auditor of Public Accounts * 
Then, the Auditor was to open an account upon his books with 
the Consolidated Association, which would b© charged v/ith the 
Ka.onnt of consolidated bonds exchanged for the Association 
bonds and interest thereon*
The President and the Directors of the Consolidated 
Association were to convert their assets as speedily as possi­
ble and Invest the funds in consolidated bonds* If there wore 
sufficient funds realised to purchase consolidated bonds in 
am amount sufficient to cancel their credit with the Auditor* 
they were to assess the stockholders with yearly contribu­
tions to moke for th© difference.
263Ibid*, March 3, 1600, July 2, 1380.
If the stockholders failed to pay the assessment 
jnaietuilly, they were to forfeit the privilege of delay on 
their Mortgage loan* and would be forced to pay the entire 
lean immediately, or else oourt action would be taken to 
feme payment*
la the ease It was decided by the court that the bonds 
were not fundable* the liquidation was to take form in the 
earn manner, except that the funds of the Association would 
be invested in outstanding bonds of the State * Instead of 
consolidated bonds.S6*
Sbr the purpose of attaining the amount of contribu­
tions needed from the stockholders, a statement of the condi­
tion of the bank was asked. The following is what th® direc­
tors presented:
Assets
Heal 'Estate 
Gash
Mortgages uaraatured 
Mortgages iaatured 
Outstanding Claims 
Coans on Stock 
Unpaid contxlbutions
30, 000 
12,000 
5,333 
1,900 
2,000 
30,000 
9,000
Estimated value of Aasets $90,233
Tblue of Mortgage Property for Stocks: 
City of Mew Orleans, 1415 shares 
Outside of Hew Orleans, 247 shares 
Estimated value
$235,000
600,000
835VOOO
Me shares 3886
Mo of Stockholders 37
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liabilities
Bends $460,550
IsUreat due Si.156
Total liabilities 511#Vo62e5
estimate of tasMUfimit drawn by the directors m s
as fellows:
Beads outstanding June 17, 1876 f 460,550 
Unpaid Interest thereon 51'156
511,706 or f 512,000 
Conversion Into consols at 60$ 307,200
XA SO ter as the instalments were to he for the years 1873,
1370, end I860, three-tenths of $307,200 of consols if bought
In U M  and turned o e r  to the state at par will require cash,
purchasing bonds at 50$ 46,060
Interest paid and to be paid cm ?307,200 124.496
170,496
This sun divided by 3886 shares equal $43* 87/23 per
Thus they calculated that on the basis of $45 per 
Share, only $5 per share would be required for 1381, $4.90 
for 1888, and so on until 1387 when $4*16 would cancel all 
debts ea ecmsols. (The Mew Orleans weekly Observer stated 
that $40 was the amount of the assessment.)867
Apparently, however, the assessment figured was not 
large enough. The Legislature, In 1882, jmsaed another act to 
further assess the stockholders• This time, the law stated
wra  ---
tJAHK, July 8# 1680.
£C6CABK, Ibid.
267HS£ 2£2£fi£fi» fc-t-y Obgerwr. January 20, 1883
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tliftt the stockholders could fully settle their obligations 
mm stockholders.S6a
A®ftln the Board of Liquidation devised an estimate of 
m m a u t «  The calculated contribution was to be |150, In- 
eluding, of course, the $40-45 levied In 1880* The oantrlbu­
ttes* however, was not to be In cash Inclusively* The Board 
declared that it was prepared "bo settle the debt of the 
ctockhol dare on payment of said asses ament of $150 on each 
fl&are of which ninety-one dollars seventy eight and a half 
easts per share may be paid in bonds of the state leaned under 
the funding not of 1874 and fifty-eight dollars twenty-one 
and a half cents per share is payable in cash at the Institu­
tions office, 66 Toulouse Street.
The stockholders protested against the assessment*
They refused to vote cm any measure or to take any part la the
election of directors* They organised to taka the assessment
270setter to the Courts*
The Supreme Court of Louisiana tried the oases pertain- 
Sac to the legality of th® new assessment request* In November, 
1382, it decided against the Consolidated Association In the 
George Lord ease— a reversal of the decisions rendered in 
the lower court.
26SLouXalane Acts, 1882, Ho. 78.
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Weekly Observer, January 20, 13BE, and GAML, "Publlo 
notice,* December la&d*
*70Of., GA.BU, November 16, 1081.
IBB
Th* Consolidated Association had sued George Joaiet
for payment of ooutrlbuttons, both for the one levied
la W f  and the 1000-1882 assessment. Judgment wna rendered
In favor of the bank an both assessments by the Civil DIs-
ilift Gottrt* The Supreme Court, however, decided that Lord was
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liable for the 1847 assessment, but not for any following levy,. 
In brief, the opinion of the letter court vas that by paying 
the instalments levied under the Act of 1847, the stockholders 
vers ccaplately discharged; but in succeeding acts, the stock- 
holders were not a party In the contractual agreement and 
eotzld not be held liable for the assessments placed.
That decision took away a possible source of funds to 
the amount of 4502,900• It left the bank with a meagre 
source of a few thousands of dollars in property and about 
,000 in uncollected contributions. For once, the directors 
and off leers of the Consolidated Association were without 
revenue with which they could spend lavishly in high sala­
ries end other dubious expenses* V ith the decision rendered, 
the offleers lost Interest in the bank, and the institution 
eeased to exist*
The fracas ended: since the state could not force addi­
tional assessments, and aluce the bonds were convertible, the 
State had to accept and make good the deficiency* The Consol - 
i da ted Association ended as It ha cl started— a generous 8 tat a
^^CABK, December 30, 1882, and Consolidated Associa­
tion vs. Lord* 35 La. Ann. 425.
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warn U r n *  to aet aa a support, an air of conclusion m s  
there to sap away whatever possible, and a sense of false­
hood was there to distort all Informtlon possible.
Xt took forty years to liquidate a bank which was in 
set lee existence by cha rter during fourteen years. Little 
wonder, then, why the Consolidated Association is looked 
upon with disdain.
CHAPTER IV
THE UNION BAUK OF LOUISIANA
Flans for a second property bank, the Union Bank of 
Louisiana, were introduced when the Louisiana State Legisla­
ture convened In January, 1831* The Legislators, however, 
postponed action incorporating the institution until 
January, 1832
The Union Bank was established along the same general 
principles as the Consolidated Association of the Planters 
of Louisiana which preceded it, except that the new firm 
had broader powers. While the Consolidated Association was 
permitted to acoept mortgages only on agricultural proper­
ties, the Union Bank was granted the option of accepting
2
mortgages on any sort of tangible property* To quote 
Henry Right or:
The Planters* Bank ( sic ) would take none 
but Plantation property; th© Union Bank Included 
city as well as country real estate, houses and 
lots, as well as plantations— in fine, any kind 
of real property, not even excluding negro slaves, 
at that time one of the most valuable assets in 
Louisiana.
y
House Jour., 1831, P. 120,
*R. C. McGrane, op. clt.. p. 170.
Rightor, pp. cit., p. 592. By Plantors * Bank was 
meant the Consolidatea Association of the Planters of 
Louisiana.
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- The purpose of the nee canoern was to foster agri­
cultural development; it was designed to help buy real es­
tate end to mate improvements needed thereon* Lite the Con 
selidated Association, the theory behind the organization 
was that:
. . • Agricultural productivity would be 
increased by making it possible for borrowers 
to obtain credit on easy terms* As their lands 
were rendered more productive it would in turn 
become easier for them to meet the interest 
payments*4
Unlike the Consolidated Association, however, the 
tS&lcm Bank proved to be $uite prosperous and successful, 
especially during the first four or five years of its exist­
ence* The institution was known throughout much of the na- 
tic®, the new West in particular* *or that reason, perhaps, 
often goes to it the honor of being the first property baak;^ 
though it was not actually the first, there is no doubt that 
it did serve as a model for similar institutions organized in 
Mississippi, Arkansas, the Jlorida Territory, and in other 
southern States*7
*W. 0* Scroggs, A Century of Banklnn Progress (Carden 
City, Hew York; Doubleday, Page and Company, 1924) p* 105.
Rightor, op* olt * * p. 593*
•ss*. , S. A. Caldwell, op* olt* * p. 46; W. 0. Seroggs, 
QP* olt*. p. 103; K. W. Hidy, rrTh© Onion bank of Louisiana 
Loan: ACase Study in Marketing,n in The Iourrtal of Polit­
ical HeoBoaar. Yol* XLYII, No* 2, Apriiy“T939, pp. £32-253; 
and the Baton Rouge Gazette * July 7, 1832 *
7
X* Q. Hawk, OP* cit* , pp* 361-365*
Organization of the Union Bank
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The Union Bank was Incorporated April 2, 1852, for a 
period of twenty-fire years and was authorized with a bond 
capital of $7,000,000* The bond capital was secured by 
$8,000,000 of mortgages obtained from the subscribers in pay­
ment for the bankfs $8,000,000 of stocks, which were divided 
into shares of $100 each* The stockholders were to be cit­
izens of Louisiana and owners of revenue-producing properties, 
and they could subscribe to the extent of the appraised 
value of the property less double the amount of any encum­
brance on it.
The problem of the sale of stocks for this concern was 
recognized as not being a simple matter. Subscription books 
were to be opened and kept open for five months, after which 
time they were to be closed for a year if the total amount of 
stocks was not subscribed to, though they were to be closed 
permanently if the subscription maximum was to be reached* 
Immediately after the five-months * period the directors were 
charged with evaluating the subscriptions; if there were 
properties dec!?»d Insufficient for mortgage, those subscrib­
ers were to be rejected; and if the tot&l of subscriptions 
exceeded $8,000,000, the officers were to reduce the amount 
of each subscription in such a manner as not to alter th®
eLa. Acte. 1832, pp. 42-72.
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stfitua of th© subscriber in relation to the total.
To make certain that stocks not be held by anyone 
outside of Louisiana, the law, besides specifying that the 
subscribers be none but Louisianians, further provided that 
the stocks could not be transferred until after four years, 
when they were to become transferable to any owner of real 
estate la the State.10
The legislators, having witnessed the difficulty en­
countered with the initial attempt of the Consolidated Asso­
ciation to sell its own bonds, were not willing to see the 
Onion Bank make a similar futile attempt; Immediately they 
pledged the faith of the State for the reimbursement of the 
bonds and for the payment of the interest thereon. Another 
condition whieh they remedied— a definite weakness with the 
Consolidated Association State bonds--was that of the matu­
rity dates an the bonds. The Union Bank State bonds extended 
from twelve to twenty years: 1,750 bonds were payable in 
twelve years; 1,750, in fifteen years; 1,750,in eighteen 
yean; 1,750, in twenty years. The bonds, otherwise, were very 
similar to those of the Consolidated Association. They were 
of 11,000 denomination with the interest et five per cent, 
payable semiannually; and, according to the Act, the bonds 
w e n  to be in the following words:
9
Subscription books were opened in Thlbodeauxvllle, 
Plague mine, Covington, Natchitoches, Marks villa, Ve million- 
villa, St. Martinville, and Clinton.
1QLa. Acts, 185E, sec. 4.
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"One Thousand Dollars'*
Know all men by these presents * that the 
state of Louisiana acknowledges to be Indebted 
to the Union Bank of Louisiana, In the sum of 
one thousand dollars; which sum the said state of 
Louisiana promises to pay in current money of the 
United States to the order of the said President, 
Directors and Company, can the
in the year with interest at the rate of
fire per cent. per annum, payable half yearly, at 
the place named in the endorsement hereto, viz,: 
on the _ _ _  every year, until the pay­
ment of "said principal awn.
In testimony whereof, the governor of the 
state of Louisiana has signed and the treasurer of 
the state has countersigned these presents, and 
caused the seal of the state to be affixed thereto, 
at Sew Orleans, this ________  in the year of our
For the privileges granted and for the pledge given cm
brads the State demanded one sixth of the profits* The only
other request was that the State be entitled to a credit of
five hundred thousand dollars, and for this credit notes or
obligations for such sums as might be required were to be
furnished, and, further, the State was to pay the usual
12annual Interest in advance.
Profits, if and when realized, were not to be declared
as dividends at the will of the directors. Meither were they 
to be held by the bank until the expiration of the bonded 
debts* All profits realized were to be retained os part of
Lord
(signed)
(countersigned)
Governor
Troa surer.11
^ I b l d . , sec. 5.
17 and 31
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capital uatll the first series of bonds we z r®doomed,
M l  ''at that t i n  one fourth of the aet profits was to bo ap-
i s  ~ " ’* ^
j|Mh#SM& h© the stockholders in proportion to their holding* *
‘nre tf-i r> - -
fie reaaei&lag three fourths plus subsequent profits -were to
he ivlftlflsd again as working capital until the second series
was redeemed, when another one fourth of the net profit could
Be i^ertloBtl. This procedure was to he followed until all
heads m i  redeemed, after which time dividends could be
13declared annually*
Bxenehes of the Union Bank were to be established In
eight strategic centers in order to serve the entire State:
the Thibodeauxvi11e, Clinton, and Plaquemine branches were
to have a capital of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars
each; 0 owing ton and i^arkaTille, two hundred and twenty-five
thousand dollsrs each; and Vennillionvllle, St* Martinville,
and Satohitochea, two hundred thousand dollars each— a total
14capital of #1,600,000 for the eight branches*
Begotiations with Baring Brothers and Prime,
Hard, King and Company
Baring Brothers and Company of London heard about the 
proposed organizetIon of the Union Bank during the latter 
months of 1831, prior to the relntroduetion in the Legisla­
ture of the hill to incorporate the bank* Alexander Cordon 
M B  Borate 11 end Company of Hew Orleans wrote to the
Mtttlcm 17.
^Ibld.. seotlon 34.
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London firm for advio© concerning the form of bonds to be
13
issued. The suggestion offered by Baring Brothers was that
i
provision giving holders of bonds the option of receiving in* 
terest payment either in New York or in London should be sub­
stituted instead of in Mew Orleans, as was proposed* Such a 
provision, they thought, would Improve the marketability of 
the bonds.^
When first approached for the purchase of the bonds, 
the London banking house Indies ted an attitude of indifference 
toward the loan* Baring Brothers stated that if the proposed 
Qhion Bask expected a favorable price on their bonds, they 
sight be disappointed: the bank would b© unknown in England, 
there was already a large amount of Louisiana bonds on the 
London market, such a large, new issue of securities would cer 
talnly depress the market, and, furthermore, it would require 
at least three years to sell the entire amount. They could 
not afford to tie up so ranch capital for that length of time.
f^tich of the information and ideas herein included was 
taken from Mr* K. W. HIdyfs paper, "The Union Bank of Louisiana 
Loan, 1832: A Case Study in Marketing," printed in the Journal 
Of Political gooaoBty. Vol• XL VII , No. 2, April, 1939, pp'&3£~" 
35S. The material for Mr. Hidy’s study was derived principally 
from the business correspondence of Baring Brothers and Company 
now deposited in the Public Archives of Canade, Ottawa.
W. Hidy, OP* clt. p. 234; of., V7* G. Sumner, A His- 
torr of Banking in Al^ *ne Leading Nations. Vol. I , The UnTted 
Mia tee (new York: TouraaT of Commerce, 1896), p. 244; aXaSTc £ta ~ 
tion: Baring Brothers and Co. Papers: Books of Official Correa- 
P ^ * i S :i f l 5 r-'i5 r t .~gInF~tnd gS."'teTCi5»n~(lg5IgSt~a ----
union Bank) , Jurrnary 2S, 1833.
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furthermore, they expected the political situation In 
Europe to became settled soon* which would mean a resumption 
of activity in 'European stocks and would "offer more encourage- 
sent to speculators than those of the United states."17
Irrespective of the attitude of Baring Brothers toward 
the prospective large issue of new bonds, the officials of the 
Union Bank proceeded with their grandiose plans* On toy 31, 1832, 
MT* Edmund J. Fore tall proposed at a meeting of directors "that 
a committee of three members be named to take into considera­
tion the negotiation of the bonds to be Issued by the State in
16
favor of this Bank*" The committee was appointed and it ren­
dered its report, a most Interesting document * Mr* Forstall, 
spokesman for the committee, submitted a bond market analysis 
which was a complete denial of the contentions of Baring 
Brothers* His report stated:
That a more favorable moment than the present, 
for the disposal of American stocks in England, has 
perhaps never offered itself; that large portions 
of the public debt of the United states are in the 
course of being paid off; that the first series of 
the Association bonds become redeemable early next 
year, and of the Louisiana bonds the following year; 
that th© holders have only the alternative of letting 
their money be idle, or of buying into the British 
funds, which are barely yielding 3 1/2 pr. ©t• per 
annum, or in the funds of some of the continent#-? 1
Tbid. * p. 236; cf» citation: Baring Papers; Letter 
Book, Baring Brothers to Mollvaine (cashier of Bank of the 
United States at Philadelphia), April 21, 1832*
Extract, of Minutes, toy 31, 1832, p* 2„
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powers, all of which are considered more or less pre­
carious, whilst just the contrary is the case with the 
public funds of America, whether created by particular 
States or by the General Government; that the United 
States are considered as entirely removed from the 
vortex of European politics, and their political 
situation is looked upon as fhr more safe than that of 
any nation in Europe, while the notorious prosperity 
of the country joined to the uadaviating exactitude 
with which the public obligations have been fulfilled, 
has justly given the utmost confidence to the holders 
of the different American Stocks*--That many of the 
mealed men in England look with considerable alarm on 
the present state of matters in that country, as re­
gards its large public debt, and appear desirous to 
remove a portion of their means from the British 
funds, yielding S 1/2 pr. ct. to those of the United 
States yielding 5 pr. ct. per annum.— That as regards 
the State of Louisiana, its wealth and great resources 
begin to be known and appreciated in Ungland, and there 
can be no doubt that if the 7,000,000 of bonds to be 
Issued in fevor of the Union Bank, b© now offered in 
the London market, they will be readily taken,, partic­
ularly if the nature of the institution be explained, 
and the public be made to comprehend that the State will 
hold the most perfect security for the reimbursement 
of the whole amount* The advantages which will arise to 
the State of Louisiana from the addition of 7 to 8 
millions of effective capital, at a moderate rate of 
interest, are too obvious to require much illustration, 
especially the enormous difference which results be­
twixt selling Bazik stock to foreigners and paying 
to them dividends of 8 1/2 to 9 pr. ct. premium and 
borrowing money from them at a fixed interest of 5 
pr. seat. *
It was recommended by the committee that cananiss loners 
proceed to ikiladelphia and New York in order to negotiate 
with American houses dealing In stocks. If they failed to make 
a sale in the United Ststea, one or more of the commissioners 
were to go to Londcaa to ascertain the best price that could be 
bag in London, laris, and Amsterdam. It was suggested that if a
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M l *  could b© made of the entire $7,000,000 of bonds, it 
w e l d  be permissible, seen advantageous, to sell at a sacri­
fice of one half of on© per cent. If the sale proceeded more 
slcwly, it wee thought that it would be better to retain © 
pert lam ©f the bands— -three or four million©— to be sold on 
e consignment basis, that is, on account of the bank or in ad** 
van©©* Warning, however, was given to the commissioners about 
the argis&ents they might receive ©gainst such a large issue of 
bonds; the eosraittee remarked: * * * . they must expect, in the 
first instance to be met with a declaration that the State of 
Louisiana is emitting too many Bonds, and that as soon as 
these ere placed, there may be an emission of as many more*”
To this the committee suggested:
The reply to this Is to be able to ©hew the 
wealth and resources of the state, end the super­
abundant security the state has for every dollar 
for which it 1© bound; It may also be brought into 
consideration, that the sums for which the State of 
Louisiana Issues Bonds are not 3unk in. Canale or 
other public works which, although they may yield 
the Interest, can never repay the principal, but 
fear operatic©© In money, payable, to a xaortal cer­
tainty, by a particular day and that so far from the 
State running any risk, It derives large sums annu­
ally, from the facilities which It has given to the 
monied institutions of the State--and that so long 
as the State requires such complete security for 
every Bond issued, m  extra issue of such paper 
can be apprehended
*^ Ibld* * p * 3. It was also the belief of the legisla­
tors at the time • They felt that the State could not issue too 
many bonds ea long as they were doubly secured by property* 
Furthermore, there would bo always sufficient revenue to meet 
the obligation© on the bond©, if the bonds were used to serve 
as a source of money and credit* In England, on the other hand, 
a bank which had to borrow was considered unsound and insolvent* 
Tbs capitalists were not prompt to understand the American sys­
tem and often they were reluctant to Invest in bank bonds*
19?
In pays»&t for their services the emieeiosers were 
to receive one hair or one per cent cm all sales in Europe, 
cm quarter or one per cent on all sales in the United States, 
five thousand dollars each in the event of failure to effect 
a sale* and one per cent on all sums above the limits ape©-
The instructions regarding the terms that would be ac­
ceptable to the bank were broad* The commissi loners were empow­
ered to receive offers and to contract for sale of the bonds 
cgl any of the following conditions:
1* Principal redeemable and interest payable 
in Hew Orleans; proceeds receivable in Hew 
Orleans at the time the bonds were delivered*
2* Principal redeemable in Hew Orleans, interest 
. payable in Hew York; proceeds receivable at 
either place as bands were delivered*
3* Principal redeemable and interest payable in 
Hew York; proceeds receivable at either New Or­
leans or Hew York*
4« Principal redeemable in Hew Orleans and interest 
payable in London at four shillings and six pence 
(4s-64); proceeds receivable in Hew Orleans as 
bonds were delivered*
5* Principal redeemable and interest payable in London 
at 4s-6d; proceeds receivable in Hew Orleans*
6* Principal redeemable and interest payable in London 
at 4s-6d; proceeds receivable in London at 4s-6d 
as the bonds were delivered there.
7. Principal redeemable at 4s-3d and interest p&yoblo 
at 4s-6d in London; proceeds receivable in Haw 
Orleans as the bonds were delivered*
^Xbia.. p* 4* Fxtract of Minutes, June 27, 1832.
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8+ Frinoipal redeemable at 4s-$d and Interest payable 
at 4s-6d In London; proceeds receivable in London 
at 4s-6d*
If the proceeds were to be received in the United States , 
they were to be paid to the Bank of the United States or Its 
branches* end the bonds were to be delivered through the said 
beak or its branches* If the proceeds* on the other hand* were 
to be received in Europe, such proceeds were to be paid to the
Beak of England or the Bank of Liverpool and the bonds wore
to be delivered through the said banks*
% e  eosB&issloners could negotiate the entire amount or
pert of It according to any of the eight plans, subject to the
following conditions:
1* If the interest were made payable and tho capital 
receivable in the United States, the bonds were not 
to be sold at a premium below one per cent, 1^  e* * 
net less then #70*000 on the whole*
Z» Xf the bonds were made redeemable in New Orleans
and the Interest payable In London at 4s-6d with the 
proceeds to be received in New Orleans, the premium 
was to be at or above three hundred sixty-aovon 
thousand five hundred dolla rs ($ 367 * 500) *
8* If the principal were made redeemable and the Inter­
est payable in London at 4s-6d with the proceeds re­
ceivable in New Orleans, the premium was to be at or 
above five hundred forty-four thousand dollars 
(#544*000)*
4* If the principal were made redeemable and the Inter­
est payable In London with the proceeds also receiv­
able in London at 4s-6d* the premium was to be at or 
above on® hundred twenty-four thousand five hundred 
dollars (#124*500)*
5, If the principal were made redeemable in London at 
4e-3d and the interest payable In London at 4s-6d, 
with the proceeds receivable In New Orleans* the 
premium was to be at or above four hundred twenty-two 
thousand five hundred dollars (44^»500)«
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6? 1f the principal were made redeemable in London 
V 4t 4s-54 and the interest payable in London at 
4s-6d, with the proceeds receivable in London, 
the bends were to s e n  at or above par*
Jfesars S. tFaudon and IS&raund 1* P or stall were appointed 
CQKntsiiofidrs, and with the instructions given them they pro- 
seeded to Philadelphia and Hew York* In Philadelphia they con­
tacted, among others, Mr. Biddle, president, and Mr. W. Me- 
n w i B S , oashlar or the second Bank of the United States at 
Philadelphia, and in New York they saw Mr. Thomas Wren Ward, 
resident agent of Baring Brothers and an associate of Prime, 
Hard, Xing and Company. Xt was through Mr* v?ard, however, that 
mam% of the negotiations took form. This gentleman first tried 
to interest Baring Brothers, *in conjunction with Prime, Ward, 
King and Company, in a loan to the extent of $3,500,000, at a 
pries not above #22.10 per £100." . Later this price offer
was raised to $115, provided the redemption was at 4s~6d on
a®
Ibid.. pp. 4-5.
as
8. W. Hidy, OP. elt.. p. 235.
zoo
£4
the dollar, or at $1X0 If the redemption m b  at 4s-5d*
Baring the early stages of the negotiations , Baring 
Brothers stated that their house was ready to purchase 
$3,500,000-worth of bonds, provided, however, that the re-
These figures cited by Mr* Hidy were obtained 
tTQBk the Miscellaneous Correspondence of Baring Brothers, Cowan 
and ihlt (London bond brokers) to Baring Brothers, June 26 and 
July 81, 163£, and also from. Baring Brothers Letter Book,
Mae 14 and 15, 1832.
In order that the reader be not confused by the above- 
mentioned rate of exchange, it should be stated that the above - 
cited figures are twisted purposely in order to mislead. Viewed 
with a superficial glance, it appears that Baring Brothers pre­
ferred bauds cm the basis of the current rate of exchange over 
bands at the legal fiction of par, that Is, that they preferred 
bonds at 4s-6d to bonds at 4s-3d* Since the Americans were in 
favor of an exchange at 4a-6d, it gave the appearance that the 
figures quoted by Baring Brothers were to the advantage of the 
American house. Such was not the case, however* What Baring 
Brothers scant was that they would give more fox* bonds If these 
bauds wars redeemed by giving Baring Brothers 4s-6d for each 
one dollar of debt, instead of 4s-3d. From the American point 
of view, paying a debt at 4s-&d is equivalent to a rate of ex­
change at 4s-3d. All this is confusing, but it is necessary 
to k**©p it In mind when studying international money*
For those who might have forgotten the previous analysis 
Oft the sate of exchange, It Is repeated. On the basis of market 
conditions, an American dollar could get 4s~6d of English money. 
Oft the basis of the law defining the metallic content of the 
dollar (and this was before 1854) , the American dollar was 
equivalent to 4s-3d of English money. Thus when the British had 
to pay Rnglish money for American dollar values, they preferred 
the rate of 4s-3d* When they received 'English money in terms of 
American dollars, they preferred to receive 4s-6d. When an 
Americas receives 4s-6d for his dollar, he says that the rate 
of exchange is 4s-6d • When the American pays 4s-6d for a dollar 
of obligation, he says that the rate of exchange is 4d«r3d in 
favor of Ragland, or in terms of American raonay the dollar is 
worth 04 cents in exchange. With the British, when they paid 
4s-6d for an American dollar, it meant that they wex*e getting 
in terms of legally defined American money only the equivalent, 
in metallic content, of 4s-3d in terms of the legal metallic 
content of the pound sterling. When they paid 4s-3d, the Brit­
ish were getting a dollar which could buy 4s-6d.
SOI
mainder was not placed on the Knglish anrket before 1834, 
sad provided further that they should ha to the option at that 
tine to purchase the remainder at the sains price they paid for
the 3,500 bonds* Xf the terms did not meet the approval of the
eeamisalonersf Baring Brothers offered to accept 1,000 bonds 
immediately in order that the Union Bank might commence its 
operations* The bank would be given an immediate advance of 
$500,000 on half of the consignment and another f 500,000 ad­
vance as soon as they gnTO the bank notice that the first lot 
of bonds had been sold. This procedure they could continue 
until the entire $7,000,000-worth of bonds w as sol A. ^ 5
Realizing that the hope of receiving an offer outside
of Baring Brothers through Mr* Ward was impossible, the Union 
Bank commissioners concluded their negotiations by signing a 
contract, August 14, 1832, which was in conformity with the 
proposal offered by Baring Brothers and Prime, Ward, king and 
Coapany. Heedless to say, it was favorable to the parties 
purchasing the bonds, viz.:
Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co. of London, and 
Messrs* Prime, ward. King and Co* of New York, each 
far the sum set opposite to their names hereby agree 
to purchase of the Union Bank of Louisiana— which 
also hereby agrees to sell to them--five and a half 
ail lions of dollars of the bonds of the state of 
Louisiana, to be issued in favor of said bank in 
equal series having (12) twelve, (15) fifteen, (IS) 
eighteen, and (20) twenty years to run, payment for
25
Ibid*. PP* 235-236. The information is from Baring 
Brothers Letter Book, Baring Brothers to Ward, June 15, 1832.
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the arae to be mad© on delivery, with (10) ten day© 
notie© at one hundred and six and on©-fourteenth 
dollars (#106*1/14) for ©very one hundred dollars 
(#100) of bonds— to say on the first day of November 
a nt,  one million dollars and the premium thereon—  
on the first day of December next, five hundred 
thousand dollars and the premium thereon— on the 
first day of January next, five hundred thousand 
dollars end the premium thereon, and the balance in 
e©ual sums per month, until the whole sum and the 
premia thereon be paid; with the privilege to the 
purchasers of receiving any amount of the bonds, at 
such time as they may call for them, giving thirty 
days notice, and on due payment therefor; such calls 
mot to be made before the first of January next and 
ell instalments to be paid within twelve months from 
the first payment* Payment to be made in New York, 
Philadelphia, and How Orleans, at the option of the 
purchasers, with o n  month*a notice to the bank, if at 
Haw Orleans* The endorsement on the bonds shall spec­
ify that the principal is to be reimbursed at the 
counting house of Messrs. Baring Brothers and Go. 
London, at the rate of four shillings and three pence 
sterling (4*3) per dollar, and the Interest be paid 
la Load on at the same place, at the rat© of four 
shillings and six pence sterling (4*6) per dollar, 
and that in all other respects the bonds shall be made 
substantially to conform to those negotiated through 
Mbs are. Baring Brothers and Go* for the Consolidated 
Association of the Planters of Louisiana; excepting 
that the interest shall be payable the first day of 
February and the first day of August, in each and 
every year* It Is agreed that the commission of 
Messrs. Baring Brothers end Co. Is to be he If per 
cent* on the sterling amount of the dividends, and 
half per cent, on the amount of principal reimbursed* 
The remaining one and a half millions of bonds shall be 
consigned to Messrs Baring Brothers anu Co. for sale 
on account and risk of the Union Bank of Louisiana—  
and Messrs * Baring Brothers end Co. shall not be 
obliged to offer them lor sale, until the ox pi rat ion 
of the year (1853) eighteen hundred thirty-three, at 
which time, or any time previously thereto, they 
•hall have the option of taking them to thelr own 
account, paying for them on the terms herein before 
mentioned as paid for, the sum of five and a half 
millions of bonds, provided, that If not taken for 
their own account within six months from the first 
day of November next, Messrs. Baring Brothers and Go. 
will advance to the Union Bank of Louisiana five 
hundred thousand dollars, on or before the first day 
of June next, on the security of the above bond®—
zm
end the further sum of five hundred thousand dollars 
at the expiration of the year (1833) eighteen hundred 
and thirty-three, and in ease of the ah o’*© advances 
toeing a a ^ f Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co. shall 
met he restricted as to the price for which they u»y 
sell the bonds for the purpose of their reimbursement, 
after making every effort in their power, to obtain 
M e h  limits as the t a k  may think proper to fir * The 
commission of Messrs. Baring Brothers and Co. is to 
he two par sent* on the sterling amount of the sales. 
The Union Bank of Louisiana will endeavor to obtain 
Chum the proper authority, a renewal of such bonds as 
■ay be lost or destroyed toy accident, upon satisfac­
tory proof thereof and a guaranty against the re­
appearance of the original bonds. . .
laring> Brothers and Co. —  for thirty seven hundred
thousand dollars 
Brine, Ward, King, and Co.— for eighteen hundred
thousand dollars
The Uhlon Bank GouEais si oners did not immediately accept 
Baring Brothersr offer, however; therefore they continued to 
seek other purchasers in the United States, but they found 
the prospective buyers refusing to deal with them Independ­
ently. Accordingly, they said In their letter in regard to the 
centraet, "All the parties from whom we had expectations had
waited with Messrs.Prime, Ward, King and Go. and they with
27
Mr* Them* w. Ward."
Wham they went to London they found a similar situation.
All the investment houses there had agreed to unite with Bar­
ing Brothers and Baring Brothers with Mr. Thomas W. Ward, 
they coaid not even deal with Messrs. Thomas Wilson and Company
84ua?c, pp. 3-9.
E7UBJC, k m  York, August 16, 1838, p. 8.
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©f lABdoii from whom thmy had hoped to receive a compet- 
iUv e  hid.
To illustrate how the competitive bidding for th©
m e n  Baakfs Louisiana State bonds had been eliminated, even
before the contract with Baring Brothers was signed, Gowan
aai Mash of London, bond brokers, "had agreed to subscribe
fear 1,000 bonds at coat— 600 for themselves, 400 for Thomas
Biddle and Company of Philadelphia, 100 for G. Marx and Son 
28of London."
n o  contract needs interpretation; some phases of it 
were left ambiguous— apparently that m s  intentional, too—  
and elarl float ion Is necessary. Of course, the most important 
phase is the matter of the par of exchange. That, however, 
has been explained in the previous chapter in the analysis of 
the Consol Ida ted Association contract. The British investors 
held par to mean the value of American money as defined by the 
law of 1791— that legal fiction in which tbs American dollar 
was equivalent to 4 shillings 3 pence In British sterling—  
while the current xrarkst rate was higher. In other words, 
the American dollar was worth but ninety-four cents or so, 
and not one hundred cents; that was a loss which should be 
taken into consideration in the present analysis.
Brother-   ______    . „ _
Bates, June 14, 1832; and Gowan A Marx'to Baring Brothers, 
June 26, 1832.
citation: Baring
SOS
There were two separate parte to the contract: one 
dealt with the outright sale of 8,500 bonds and the other with 
the consignment of the remaining 1,500 bonds* First, It v«as 
agreed that daring Brothers purchase 5,700 bonds, and Prime, 
fcrd, King and Oo^any, 1,800 bonds, the rate to be f 106 1/14 
per #100 with the par of exchange at 4s, 5d, or what amounted
gg
to about 100 or 101 to the 100 in American terns*
Of these, 1,000 bonds were to be delivered November 1, 
1838, n o  on December 1, 900 on January 1, 1853, and the bal­
ance in equal sums per month until the whole sum and the 
premium thereon be paid*30
Second, the remaining 1,800 bonds were to be consigned 
to Baring Brothers for sale at their terms* Baring Brothers, 
however, reserved the right to withhold this sale of consigned 
beads until January, 1354, if they so desired* At that time, or 
previous thereto if deemed desirable, they could further re­
serve the option of purchasing the bonds at the same rate as for 
the first lot, with one per cent premium more if they did not 
decide to purchase the bonds prior to six months after November 
1* 1852, that is, at 107 1/14 after April 1, 1853. If they did
"rtm* wwe a better price than that offered for the Con­
solidated Association Louisiana bonds; they sold under .con tree t 
at 95 and 87 of par with par being 4s. 3d*, or the equivalent 
of approximately 79 on the 100 in American terms.
*°It is clear that the balance was 3,500 bonds, but it 
is not clear what was meant by "equal sums.” Obviously, that 
part was left to be interpreted as desired by Baring Brothers.
&06
not a g m  to take the bonds, Baring Brother® specified that 
they advance §500,000 to the Union Bank on or before June 1, 
MSB# provided an equal amount of consigned bands served as 
security toar the lean. An additional sum on the same terms 
was to he granted January 1, 1854. After that time, the addi­
tional advances were to be granted only upon a notice that 
Baring Brothers had eisposed of the previous bonds.
Under both phases of the contract Baring Brothers re­
served for themselves the privilege of selling the Union Bank 
Louisiana bends at whatever price they deemed advisable in order 
to pretest and reimburse themselves. "After making every ef­
fort to obtain such limits as the bank may think proper to fix," 
they, of course, diplomatically Inserted.
The Gomel as loners had the following to say to their 
principal, the officers of the Union Bank:
The powers which we held from the bank gave 
us the liberty of accepting this offer. It is 
the exact equivalent for a stock, paying Interest 
and redeemable in the United States, at one per 
cent premium, agreeably to the calculations which 
were originally submitted to the Board of Direc­
tors, and which very fully covered all possible 
as peases • We could not but feel, therefore, very 
sensibly the responsibility which we should assume 
by rejecting this offer, and deciding to take the 
risk of effecting a negotiation at ® better rate 
in Europe. Heavy, however, as this responsibility 
was, we had no wish to shrink from it. V'a had 
undertaken the negotiation, and we therefore con­
scientiously applied our best Judgment, aided by 
much reflection and discussion to the decision 
of these questions:
1* Is the price offered, under all circum­
stance s, a fair price?
E. How much higher can we reasonably expect 
to obtain in Kurope?
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3* Are there any general considerations in 
favor of a negotiation here which would 
counterbalance the chances of obtaining 
a better rate in kuropet31
the report on the contract does not give an adequate 
answer to the questions posed by the coxmissianera; they avoid­
ed answering any of the questions* Nevertheless, the answers 
are Interesting and afford soma statccaents which reveal eco­
nomic eondltions of the time:
In forming a conclusion as to what is a fair 
price, the items which enter into the calculation 
are, the quotations for similar stocks in London, 
and the rate of exchange for sterling bills. The 
bonds of the Bank of Louisiana and of the Consol­
idated Association, were quoted at 4 to 5 per cent. 
FSwIsa at the last advices; ££ per cent, interest 
would be due on them in a few days which reduces the 
fhlr quotations to per cent* at the highest rate. 
Sxohange in London Is now 8 per cent* here, and the 
prevailing opinion among those who are most extensive­
ly engaged In the exchange business, and who have the 
best means of information is, that the rate will rule 
low during the coming year. They insist that the sur­
plus imports of last year are already paid for; that 
the imports of the present year are unusually light, 
and will continue to be so; that the prospects of 
large exports of produce next season are very flatter­
ing; that the Bank of the United States has already 
provided very large funds In London to meet the pay­
ment In October next of that portion of the United 
States 3 per cents which is held by foreigners; and 
that the amount of American stocks, Pennsylvania *s, 
Alabama *s, Indiana’s, Louisianavs, etc. sent and to be 
sent to Surope far sale is extremely large; and that 
of course exchange on London must be very plenty and 
low. If this be true, can the Union Bank hope to 
realize an average price for bills on London to the ex­
tent of 7 millions of dollars within 13 months, at or 
above 6 per cent, premium? We decidedly think it cannot. 
The price then offered for our bonds is at least equal 
to the premium on exchange. Is the premium of BJ- per 
cent, quoted in London, more than sufficient to cover the 
expenses of a negotiation there, such as bankers’ oommis- 
sion, brokerage, loss of interest, risk of loss of bonds
31UBJC, p. 6
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in transit, ate.? To this also we readily answer in 
the negative* The effect which the introduction of 
ee large an amount of mew bonds may produce on the 
sextet has mot yet been brought into the calculation, 
nor have we allowed anything for the profit which 
parties entering into so large an operation have a 
right to expect* 11 we say that these ere compensated 
for by the length of time that our bonds have to run, 
we are still brought to the same result:— and the 
conclusion is, that under all circumstances the 
price offered is a fair one*
What the eozsalssloners noglacted to say was that the 
price was a fair one for Baring Brothers. The logic they use 
leads up to it, but they refrain from stating the met* ?hat 
they actually tried to infer was that the negotiation was not 
worse than ether negotiations entered into with Baring Broth­
ers and ether English brokerage and investment firms by Amer­
ican sellers of state bonds, and that under the circumstances 
the agreement was about as much as could be expected*
What we learn from their answer is that the huge amounts 
of buds being sold in London was making bills of exchange more 
plentiful agd therefore lower in price* This ffe 11 In price was 
use thing Baring Brothers were guarding against, and they did 
all la their power to avoid such a situation; they succeeded, too, 
as far as they were concerned*
Hext,to the second query, How much could they get in Eu­
rope? The answer is of Interest, especially in the light of 
what was claimsd when the coomlssiomers were informed of their 
duties* They now said:
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¥h& chances or u rise In American stooks In 
London, which is almost their only market, it is 
very difficult to oalculat
terest than many of the Continental stocks* If the 
peace of Europe should continue uninterrupted, the 
current of investment will still he directed to 
the latter; for American stocks are chiefly looked to 
in consequence of their supposed greater security* But, 
has noting occurred to impair the confidence of for­
eigners in Amarioan stocks? We fear we cannot answer 
no* At a distance, we all know how rumor magnifies 
the declamations of politicians into movements that 
must shake institutions to their centre. We may not 
dread the issue of the excitement which the term "nul­
lification* produces —  we see and know the ardent at­
tachment of the great mass of our fellow citizens to 
the "Union. w But it is not so abroad* Already we find 
that great anxiety is expressed, and repeated in ©very 
letter on this subject by foreigners who are Interested 
la American securities; and this will continue and in­
crease until "nullification* Is forgotten* Xhe recent 
*¥fct©w too, will no doubt be held up as a proof of the 
instability of our institutions, and we shall be told, 
what if true would be a most serious evil, that with 
the prostration of the national bank will come the de­
rangement of our currency, and a recurrence of the 
state of things that preceded the chartering of that 
hank* What foreigner, believing these things, would 
he willing to purchase a State stock? We hear here, 
and it would be urged upon us in Europe, that the 
legislature of our state has run wild in banking; that 
It is multiplying banks ad libitum» and that no sooner 
will this loan be disposed of, than we shall see proj­
ects for others sev on foot* Altho* these and similar 
arguments might be entirely met and refuted in conversa­
tion with a few, yet it would be difficult to obliterate 
their Impression from the public mind* Jailing in our 
negotiation at home, we should be in some measure in the 
power of European houses who would not fall to turn this 
circumstance to their advantage* Upon the whole then, 
we were forced to conclude, that probably quite as much 
eould be said against the chances of a rise in American 
stocks in Europe as In favor of them; and that if we 
eould reserve a moderate portion of the bonds to be 
sold In Europe, for account of the bank, It would per­
haps be the best mode of settling our difficulties on 
this point* This has been done; and altho* we believe 
that the payments which have been stipulated for will 
give the bank its capital as rapidly as it can advanta­
geously dispose of it, yet we provided that no Inconvan-
and we know that they now
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tense should be felt In ease of a delay in selling 
the hank's portion of the bonds, hut that a large sum 
should he advanced if called for.
Barteps no better price could have been received for the 
heads an the tentinant, but that is not the most striking re­
mark made by the oosnissloners* Their statement revealed fear 
in Europe about the vast amount of American stocks on the 
market — or rather, the vast amount they thought m s  soon to be 
placed os the European market* In that fear they were justified, 
too* Ho sooner was one project undertaken than another was 
"set os foot*1*
The third question, that of whether or not there were 
toy general considerations in favor of a negotiation in London 
uhiah would counterbalance the chances of a better negotiation 
in Europe, was answered In such a manner as to indicate how 
pressing it was thought to hare immediate capital* To the 
query they answered:
• « . we are forcibly struck with the fhct, 
that the contract now nade will enable the bank 
to commence its operations on a large scale, two 
months hence; whereas, if we all era one j^onth fear 
the voyage to Europe, two months for completing the 
negotiations there, and a month and a half for advice 
to Hew Orleans, the bank could not ascertain the re­
sult of our operations before the first of January 
next, and must then submit to a further do lay for 
the purpose of negotiating its bills* The difference 
in time was, therefore, to be estimated at not less 
than four months, and considering the earnest wish of 
the bank, long since expressed, to relieve the money 
market from a pressure which has been Increasing 
rather than otherwise; the importance to many of the 
stockholders of receiving their loans from the bank 
is time to meet engagements which fall due early in 
the season —  and the relief which the whole community
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will fwl, o w n  before the bank commence® lbs opera- 
tioae, from the confidence which will be Inspired by 
the knowledge that this large capital la so soon to 
c o w  into the State, we believed that this differ­
ence of tine, to say nothing of the difference of 
interest that the bank would give, presented a power­
ful argument in fhvor of concluding the negotiations 
here ( London )* To many of our stockholders, the 
result will no doubt be a benefit far greater than 
any advance which the most sanguine calculator could 
have hoped for in Isurope* Our planters, many of them, 
at least, are, in consequence of lev,’ prices and short 
crops fear two or three years past, severely pressed, 
and obliged perhaps to submit to great exactions; 
end there has probably been no period for msny years 
past when our merchants have been bo largely in ad­
vance of their friends and correspondents In the 
country, or when relief could arrive more oppor­
tunely to prevent great distress and heavy 
sacrifices.321
What the Union Bank actually received in American dol­
lars for the #7*000*000-worth of bonds is not ascertainable.
The terms of the contract, however, appear to be less unfavor­
able than those agreed to in the sales of previous Issues of 
E ^ r f bonds* Nevertheless, one thing is certain, and that 
Is that tbs contractors. Baring Brothers and Prime, Ward, King 
sad Company, reaped a considerable profit; the lack of informs -
ties may complicate an attempt to estimate that profit, but
33tbs indications are convincing*
Of the 5,500 bonds purchased, 1,000 were delivered on 
November l, 1632; 500 in December; 500 in January; 1,000 on 
February 1, 1633; 300 in each of the following 7 months; and
32
TJBJC, pp. 8-11.
33The writer owes his information and. ideas to the sale 
of bonds of the Union Bank to Mr* R* W. Hidy in his article 
"The Union Bank of Louisiana Loan, 1832: A Case Study in Mar­
keting,” op, olt.
«Q0 oa 0«feoi>*r 1, lass.34
This sal® of bonds, however, nade it obligatory for the 
WBirftetara to raise funds in the United States to pay the
Broke To do this lnroltsd the sale of bills of exchange 
os Baring Brothers in this country, which, at this tine, were 
selling at eight per cent premium— in itself a rather profit­
able endeavor.
The object of the purchasers was to sell the Union Bank 
Louisiana bonds in London at as high a price as could be ob­
tained above their oontraet price, while at the same time they 
transferred the funds for payment of the bonds to the United 
States at as high a premium on the sterling exchange as possi­
ble— a two-way profit operation at least# For instance, ignor­
ing for the moment the fact that the contractors sold the pur­
chased bonds above the contract prloe, these other profits were 
first, the profit of exchanging sterling for dollars at the 
sate of 4 shillings 3 pence (4s. 3d) Instead of 4 shillings 
6 pence, a profit of 3 pence per dollar acquired; and second, 
the profit of eight per cent on each dollar received In the 
exchange process, the premium, on the sterling bills sold In 
the Ifeited States. Baring Brothers* big worry, however, was 
whether the American market could absorb the bills thus created 
along with the numerous other bills similarly issued for other 
undertakings, without causing an "over-supply" of exchange, an
M B. W. Hidy, 0£a. clt, . p. 237.
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"over-supply* which might lower the lucrative premium on 
Loadoa drafte.
The sale of the bonds was most confusing and quite com­
plicated, and only a partial picture may be described herein* 
Tor instance, there was not only the matter of placing the 
bonds in two categories--those purchased outright and those 
consigned for advances—  but instead they were divided into 
f(»ff categories* Baring Brothers carried part of the bonds in 
an account known as "Account L," one known as "Account S," 
c m  as the W. T* Hard Account, and one as the Union Bank 
Account* ^
"Account L" originally included 4,600 bonds of the 
5,500 purchased— 800 for Prime, Ward, and King and 3,700 for 
themselves. This account was soon changed, however, when it 
was agreed to place £00 bonds in W. T. Ward’s own account* 
"Account S” included the 1,000 shares purchased from Prime, 
Hard, and King by three Hew York firms— J. D. Beers A Co*,
Joini Ward and Co*, and J. L* and S. Joseph A Co*— and con­
signed through Prime, ward, and King to Baring Brothers. The 
T* W* Ward account included 200 bonds allocated to him at his 
zequest* The Union Bank account included the 1,500 bonds con­
signed by the bank for advances to be granted by Baring 
Brothers*
"Aeeeta&t L." —  By the terms of the August 14 contract, 
the 5,500 bonds purchased by the contractors carried with them 
the provision that they could bo sold at any price the con-
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t»ctor» deemed advisable in order to reimburse themselves, 
end* furthermore, it was not obligatory that these bonds be 
sold for ©ash* It was a sale of bonds to the contractors for 
a special sum with the funds made payable in the United 
States, and the contractors could dispose of the bonds in 
a naaner suitable to themselves.
The 5,500 bonds, however, had been reduced to 4,500 by 
a sale of 1,000 to three Sew York firms* when these firms 
consigned the bonds to Baring Brothers for sale, the terms of 
sale were specified, so that the contractors were not at liberty 
to dispose of them in the same fhshlon as the original. Baring 
Brothers had disposed of some of the purchased bonds, even be­
fore the contract had been signed, but apparently this sale 
m s  not like that made by Prime, Ward, ana King. In June, 1632, 
Qovaa and Marx, London bond brokers, had agreed with Baring 
Brothers to subscribe for 1,000 Union Bunk bonds at cost;
500 were for thernselvcs, 400 for Thomas Biddl© arid Company 
of Philadelphia, and 100 for G. Marx &. Son of London. All
the shares were to be sold throu&h Baring Brothers, and thus
35
they were kept in *Acoount L.fT
There was, also, Thomas Goterlll of Birmingham who had
agreed to buy 150,000-worth of the bonds at one per cent above
purchase price stated In Uho contract, and his friend, John.
Ferguson, also, had requested to purchase bo tween i&0,00G-
35
and $25,000-worth of the securities.
SSIbld.. p. 229.
36Ibid.. pp. 245-246.
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Xa October, 1832, Baring Brothers announced a public 
subs erlption sale of the bonds for future delivery. The terms 
of the subscription m r a  that the buyers take equal portions 
of the four series Issued, paying for them in Instalments of
B 40 per bond of f 1,000 on Monday, October 15, 10332
B 40 per bond of f1,000 on Tuesday, January 15, 1833
B 40 per bond of |1,000 on Friday, March 15, 1333
B 44 per bond of |1,000 on Monday, April 15, 1833
fc 50 per bond of $1,000 on Monday, June 17, 1333™
That see at a price of (fc) 234 pounds sterling per bond, or about
33
104 per east, a 440-premium on each $1,000 bond. Then, too,
the subscribers, if they wished, might anticipate payments at
a 4 per cent discount, and receive letters of engagement which
proa 1 wed the delivery of the bonds as soon as possible. All the
securities thus subscribed to were to have attached to them the
Interest coupons dating from February 1, 1833. Thus, in this
aaaasr Baring Brothers effected an advance sale of "Account L."
39
stock to the amount of $1,723,000.
Rot all bends In "Account I .,’7 however, were sold out­
right oar by instalment • Many were exchanged for other American 
securities. Xarly In 1853, Bering Brothers exchanged 346
Bank bonds for lezmsylvanla, Philadelphia, and Baltimore 
bonds.40 Inter they acquired, with the approval of Prime,
57Ibld.. p. 246.
33234 pound sterling equals 36,160 pence and at the 
rats of 4a 6d (54d) the rate is 104.
®*R. W. Hidy, OP. oit., p. 246.
40 ------
Ibid.. p. 248.
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King, shares of tba second Bank of the United 
State* and of the Uhited States 41** for their Union Bank 
heads* In the fell of 1894 they exchanged £0,000 pounds ster­
ling of the Louisiana tends at the rate of 102 for United 
State* 5fs at 93, and in January, 1835, they completed the 
sale of the 4,500 bonds by exchanging $96,QQG-worth of the 
Louisiana bonds for £11,000 in Hew York Life Insurance and
Treat Company certificates with coupons bearing 41 per
41cent interest*
"Account S." —  Of the 1,800 bonds allocated them by the 
contract, Prime, Ward, King and Company sold 1,000 to the 
three Hew York firms at cost* They paid Prime, Ward, King and 
Company approximately £57,142 in cash (a premium of 6 1/14 on 
the bonds) and through them had the bonds consigned to Baring 
Brothers* Xt was specified that the securities "be held at 
Halts not above 104 per cent" for three nionths after the 
maturity of the bills drawn by Prime, Ward, and King upon the 
London firm In transferring funds to the United States • ’ After 
that period, the London house was to accept the market price
/ p
for the consigned bonds* Provision was, however, on this ac-
43const that the bonds sell for cash*
Against this account, Baring Brothers specified that 
Prime, Hard, and King were permitted to draw but h 3133*10 in
41Ibld.. pp. 243-249. 
^Xtoia.. p. 236.
4 1*1*». P*
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blllc «  them per $1,000 bond, not Is 225.10 which was the
4 shilling 5 pence rate on the legal par basis.**
Nevertheless, Prime, Ward , and King did not abide by
the restrictions at first and that violation became a source
of friction be t e e m  the two houses, but not e serious one.
Prior to January 1, 1833, the New York house had drawn on the
Loaislaoa bonds on "Account 3" for more than B 212.10 per
$1,000* The Barings pointed out that violation of their wishes
end the mistake was admitted by Prime, Ward, and King, who
prwlssd to draw less in the future in order to make up
the difference.*5
According to Ur* Hidy, the bonds In "Account Sn did not
sell at first. No cash sale was recorded until April of 18331
and then the market for these was entirely slack, so much so
ttet Bering Brothers suggested a change In the arrangements
by Prime, Ward, and King with the three New York houses, but
46Prise, Hard, and King did not think it necessary.
The sale of the consigned bond a in MAooo\mt S" being so 
poor, Nr. W. T. Ward and Prime, Ward, and King pleaded with 
Baring Brothers to attempt a sale of part of theaa bonds in 
New York. Baring Brothers acquiesced but the plen did not 
succeed. It was not until the summer of 1834 that e good
**Ibld.. p. 241.
***Tbld.. pp. 249-250, of. footnote, Bering Brothers
*lne to ******
H. W. Hidy, op. olt.. p. 246.
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portloa of the heads were being sold and then in Holland
through Hope and Company of Amsterdam* The account was finally
elosed in January, 1835, by the sale in London of the 445 re-
47seining bonds*
V* T • Ward Aooount. —  Mr# Ward’s account for the 200 
shares granted him by Baring Brothers and Prime, Ward, and 
King ues not extremely important. These bonds were to be sold 
by Barings for cash and at a premium* Later, when Ward saw the 
difficulties encountered with the cash sales of the bonds in 
•Account S,* however, he urged that the 200 bonds be sold im­
mediately "at not less than par.” Tet, no me rice t was offered 
for them* They were taken at the desired price by Prime, Ward, 
and King#*®
Onion Bank Account# —  The 1,500 bonds consigned by the 
Onion Bank for advances from Baring Brothers also showed ex­
tras sluggishness * On these bonds, the Union Bank had spec­
ified *99 per eent ex interestas the lowest price aecept-
49
able, and the sales had to be for cash*
By 1835, only 36 of the 1,500 bonds had been sold* In 
January of that year, therefore. Baring Brothers secured an 
agreement from the Union Bank not to seek another advance until
47Ibld.. p. £47•
48
Ibid* # pp* 246-247.
49
Xbid., pp. 247-248, of * footnote Baring Brothers 
Miscellaneous Correspondence, Perrault (caahior of Union Bank) 
to Baring Brothers, November 29, 1832*
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Jfey 1, 1836. As a result | B&riog Brothers rtwir® u&fibls to dis— 
#88# #f 488 bonds at rates that produced the limit of the
50
beak, but only at the sacrifice of & part of their comms issIon." 
Simety-sewen more were sold between May 1 end July l. But on 
Jbly 90, Baring Brothers announced the sale of 424 at 100J, 
ercluding Interest, which meant a loss of one half of one per 
sent on their Qomission to make the desired prloe of 99. 
Finally, by the end of 1835, the London house still had on 
head some 455 bonds consigned to them by the Union Bank 
IB 1838.®
Relations between the Uhion Bank and Baring Brothers 
were not always harmonious, but the disagreements were not 
serious* Kearly always they were straightened without diffi­
culty and by good cooperation on the pert of Baring Brothers.
TBs first friction arose when the Union Bank Directors objected 
to the Barings? assumption that all interest payments were to 
be effected through the London house even if payments were to be 
mads In the United States to other firms. Bering Brothers did 
net uphold Prims, Ward, and King on this demand, and they agreed 
to Include only Interest payinenta actually paid through them, 
if it did reduce their commission somewhat.
W* Eldy, QP« clt«, p. 248, of, citation, Baring 
Brothers Letter Book, Baring Brothers to Morgan (President of 
Obion Bank), January 5, 22, 30, 1835.
¥• Hidy ,op. clt. » p. 548.
Ibid.. p. 250.
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The saoond source of friction was the Baring Brothersf 
to purchase either part, all, or none of the consigned 
bemfts ao cording to the terms or the contract. The Union Bank 
officials Insisted that "the six months which were to elapse 
before Baring Brothers and Company must decide upon the method 
of handling the last 1,500 Bonds should he considered as ended 
on May 1, 1653, in New Orleans rather than in London." To
this the London merchant-banks rs agreed instead of adhering
53
to the position held by Mr. ward.
The third misunderstanding was more serious, and it 
Marly caused severance of relations between Baring Brothers 
and the Chian Bank. It was stated that Baring Brothers were 
under eon tract obligation to advance the Union Bank $1,000,000 
upoB the consigned bonds should they not purchase them out­
right. Furthermore, because the sale of these bonds had been 
slow, an agreement was reached in April, 1834, to reduce the 
advance to #500,000— the reduction in the price limit was 
refused by the Union Bank. To effect this reduction, the bank 
was to remit funds in London. ?then September came, however, 
Baring Brothers stated that they would feel at liberty to sell 
the heeds at the market rate if the advance was not covered.
TO this the officers wrote that they would cover the advance 
am $500,000, end asked that the remaining bonds be held sub­
ject to their order. Because of Baring Brothsrst demand they
ZBX
thought that the London house wished to cancel their previous 
agreement e, and# therefore, the bank proceeded to H a d  pure has- 
M S  for the beads who at the same time would act a a the bankf s 
agents, Seedless to say, Baring Brothers protested the hank,s 
setlem* They wrote that they had no Intention of altering their 
relations with the Louisiana flm. In a conciliatory manner 
they explained their action, and in January they oarae to terms 
s m s  mere; they sold a good portion or the bonds to show their 
good Intentions* As part or this last negotiation, however, the 
Uhlan Bant had asked for a oredit of h 300,000 to be covered 
by remittances should Baring Brothers fall to sell all the 
heads by the end of 1835* The credit was granted, Another de­
mand was that the commission charges upon acceptances be re­
duced, This was refused. All in all the entire affair turned 
Into an amiable solution, and while Buring Brothers were forced
to mate concessions, they saw to it that the operation m s
54going to be profitable.
Operations of the Bank
During the first four or five years of its existence, 
the Uhlan Bank was the most prosperous bank in Nov Orleans, and 
it handled a large part of ths business of the Now Orleans Branch 
Of the second Bank of the United 3tates,&& and why not? After
^Ibld,. pp, 250-251*
high tor, oi>, clt*, p • 592; Aloee Fortier, op* clt« a 
Tol* I, p* 64,
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till, kh* second Bank ot the United States at Philadelphia 
had played an important role la the sale of the Union Bank 
bond*.96
True, the bank, like the Consolidated Association, 
found that the stockholders had difficulty in meeting payments 
because of crop failures and adverse aarket conditions. The 
thloa Bank was In a better situation because it still had ex­
changes to sell and more capital to invest. Nevertheless, it 
ask the name fate the other New Orleans banks faced in May, 
183?, and like the other banka of the city, the Union Bank co­
operated la order to survive during the depression years. Un­
like the two other property banks— the Consolidated. Association 
asd the Gitissue* Bank— however, it was in a fairly sound con­
dition when la 1043 an Act was passed for the liquidation of
57the property bank*• As a matter of Xhot it was one of the
fdv beaks which had issued bonds that actually did not de-
58fault on interest payment*.
in 1043, when the notes of the two other property banks
were on feh* market at a discount, the Union Bank notes were
59being paid in specie• Its current assets were greater than
56Of., a. W. Bldy, os. oit.. p. £42-243.
S. A. Caldwell, op. clt.. p. 48; A. Fortier, op. olt.» 
W «  I, p. 64.
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59The Dally Picayune. July 1, 1843. Union Bank pays
specie, cTETzen*• Bank notes circulate at 31 to 34 discount,
the Consolidated Association at 36 to 38 discount.
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tt* exmrent Xloblllties; according to Board of Currency,
«lw last &88d^3 were }9X9 *X91 &&d the l&tsb H&bjLXi.ttics 
war* #749,782. 53.60
When. the first series of the bonds issued became due In
Xeveoter of 1843, the redemption was met— there was no refuud- 
*1
lug* The Board of Currency stated:
Of the "Property Banks" in vhioh the State 
has a more immediate interest, the Union met the 
series of her bonds that fell due on the first of 
NOTember last, amounting to $1,7&£,000;— the po­
sition of the bank renders it w r y  certain that a 
continuance of past management will secure the same 
punctually in her future, as she has observed in so 
remarkable & manner in her past engagements•
A H  other sources state that the amount redeemed ves 
$1,750,000, The discrepancy arises, apparently, from a differ­
ence in the Interpretation of par. There were 1,750 bonds of 
the first series, and, therefore, it is logics! to say that 
the redemption was $1,750,000.
Because the bank met Its first series, does not mean 
that the bank was anxious to meet ensuing maturity bonds. In 
1044 the officials of the Union Bank started to press the
^gllea Weekly Register, Vol. XIII, p. 340
6*Cf«Y Haw Orleans Bee, August 6, 1844; Leg. Doc,, 1844, 
•Benort of’ the $oard of Currency": lilies Weekly Register, Vol. 
XTX, p. 412; 8. A. Caldwll, 0£. oTETT p  : W :  Ale,. Toriler,
op. pit.» Part 1, p. 04; and v*. o, Scroggs, op. oit., p. 105.
63R, 0. McGrane, op. olt.. p. 188,
£24
Legislature for a new issue of bonds* They claimed that if
M W  bends were issued, the hank could pay on its bonds in the
future* This was not granted*
The 1847 series was also met— if not In full, at least
almost so--for the Louisiana State Auditor reported, January 1,
1848, that the Union Bank bonds had been funded to ths* amount
68
Of fS,834,000. Had both series bean completely redeemed,
the total should have stood at #5,500,000.
Governor Joseph Walker, on January £6, 1858, wrote a 
message to the Senate and House, stating:
X have the honor to inform you that one mil­
lion eight hundred and sixty-four thousand dollars 
of the bonds of the State, issued in fevor of the 
Union Bank of Louisiana, with five hundred and 
forty-two thousand six hundred and fifty dollars of 
interest coupons, and amounting in all to th© sum 
of two nil) Ion four hundred end six thousand six 
hundred and fifty dollars {£2,406,650) were deliv­
ered by Christopher Adams, President of said bank 
on the 25d instant, to the Secretary of State, 
Attorney General and myself, and destroyed by burn­
ing, in conformity with resolution No. 7 approved 
January 85th, 1844, and a record of the proceedings 
made in the State Treasurer’s office in obedience 
to the above stated resolution.64
Thus, seeing tint the Union Bank was liquidating its 
bonded debt successfully, the Legislators proceeded to make pro­
vision for a settlement. On March 6, 1852, the Judiciary Com­
mittee introduced "An Act to induce the State freaaurer to 
settle with the Union Bank of Louisiana.” So ardent were
«SL*g. Doe*, 1849, "Auditor’s Report," January 1, 1848, 
54SBa> a 1852, pp. 38—39.
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the Legislators for the hill* that* on motion* the rules 
were suspended* and the Act was passed.66
What the State wanted as a settlement was to relieve 
Itself of contingent liability and at the same time to give 
up its right to one sixth of the profits, e^, sell its 
stocks for a lump sum.
The State Treasurer approached the bank to effect a 
settlement and the officials offered hi;a but eighteen dollars 
a share for the one-sixth interest. This he refused and he 
was right in refusing.66 In June* 1852, the State received its 
first dividend which amounted to $207*170, and on January 1, 
1653* another £137*396.
Of course* the State did not receive the entire sum for 
its own use • The entire amount of the first dividend and 
$22*866.73 of the second were retained by the bank upon agree­
ment. Part was retained "on account of the liabilities of 
the Bank for Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company;67 
*3 *000 was credited on account of a sight draft on the Treas­
urer* paid by the Bank; and $6,000 to refund a deposit made
65House Deb., 1852, p. 111.
. . 66LS£. Doc., 1052. "Reports of the Standing Committees
ef the Senate and House of Representatives on banks end Bank­
ing." P* 4.
67La. Acts. 1848. No. 190, p. 124. A resolution was 
approved »3arch 16* 1848* whereby the State acquired 217 bonds 
of the State Issued for the Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad 
and Banking Company.
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to represent six State Bonds which the Bank ( was ) ready 
to delirer.w The remaining $105,629,67 was deposited to the 
eredlt or the state on the books or the bank subject to 
tea ft.68
The Committee on Banks and Banking demanded information
fTOBi the Uhion Bank to ascertain the position of the State as
one-sixth owner. The Statement of Affairs presented February
11, 1854, Indicated that the fixed assets were mlued at
$541 ,108,33, while the fixed or long-tern liabilities were
$106,000. The current assets, on the other hand, amounted to
$636,912,85, against which there were current liabilities
69
to the extent of $556,000.56,
In view of this information, therefore, it is simple to 
see -Ay they advised that It was not to the best Interest of 
the State to sell to the bonk Its prospective share of the 
profits— they recommended that the bank be permitted to pro­
ceed in Its regule r course of liquidation and the State re-
70eeive the profits as they were realized.
Bod of the Union Bank us & Fropex*ty Bank
By the end of 1852 not all of the bonds had. been re­
deemed, but the liquidation of the debt was proceeding without 
difficulty. The remaining debt was nominal and provisions
^ L a » Acts, 1048, No. 190, p. 124.
go
Leg. Doc., 1853, T>Report of Joint Commit too upon 
Busks sad mnking,” p. 21.
7QIbld.. 1852, p. 4.
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t a & b M a  made for the payment.*3^  Therefore, the Dank was per-
iHtiil to eentimwe Its operation until the expiration of Its
ahtrfcer* That was in 1857.
When the Union Bank ©eased as a property bank, however,
it did sot go out of existence. Louisiana had passed a ifree
Banking Lew In 1853 and the Union Bank of Louisiana was re-
ineerporated under Its provisions; it became a free stock 
78
bank.
After the Civil V-ar it took the ruuie of Union National
73Bank* which it kept until Its liquidation in 1896.
M o m  will be said about the Union Bank in the conclud­
ing chapter, but a few pertinent remarks can be laed© here.
Me doubt the amount of capital was large— maybe more than was 
needed---but the bank succeeded in meeting its Interest pay* 
Mats* Chet is more, it did not need to refund its debt at 
Cay tins* It nay be that the redemption was not too punctual, 
bat it was effected pretty much according to the charter re- 
gwiXMMBts, end when it was over, there was a profit to be 
Showni The stockholders, instead of being assessed, received 
dividends* Certainly the picture was not as described by Mr.
1* T. In his Soonomic History of the South. It was not
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Of.. Harold Heck. Developing of Banking iri Louisiana,
a M  B *4s§f L . . ,  L . 8 . U. E iS ix * ^ M iS T T 5 3 fe  ru n p S E M e a  
•MMMrlpt), p. so.
S. A. Trufant, "Hevlew of Banking in New Gi’leana,
IMP 16*0," Louisiana Hlatorloal Society, rol. 10, p. 38.
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tew* fete* wThs bank soon tied up its capital in frozen
assets, issued too ja&ny bank notes, and went into liquidation
74
slang with the Planters Bank*" ( sic )
Cf.. pp. 363-364. What Mr* Hawk meant by Planter® 
ftmir the Consolidated Association of the Planters of 
Iddsiana, not the Planters Sank which was incorporated in
m .
CHAPTER V 
TEE CITIZENSf BANK OF LOUISIANA
Perhaps no bank In Louisiana has bad as varied a his­
tory *s the Citizens* Bank; and certainly no bank has had a 
eloser relationship with the economic, agricultural, conraercial, 
and basking development of the State, especially during the 
period frost 1336 to 1642. Its span of life extends from 1833 
to I M S — a hundred year3 of varied, complex, and confusing activ­
ities. From 1833 to 1842 it vms an active property bank. Dur­
ing the next ten years it m s  in a state of liquidation. In 
1853 It was revived as a stock bank with two separate depart­
ments, a banking department and a mortgage stock depnrtoient, 
with the fomer ©ssumlng the obligations of the property bank.
In 1911 It was reorganized again under the name of The Cit­
izens * B+mr and Trust Company. In 1924 it merged with the 
Canal Commercial Bank and became the Citizens* Branch of the 
Canal Bank and Trust Company. The end of its history came with 
the Banking Crisis of 1933.
This chapter, however, does not cover the entire history. 
It takes Into consideration only that portion relating to prop­
erty banking and State bonds issued for the bank and in Its 
Caver. Nevertheless, the analysis covers a period extending
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tram 1635 to 1902, and the story Is a Ions oociplicated 
S M  despite the lack of existing data to accord a complete 
description of the more important phases* To avoid repetition 
sad lengthy discussions, therefore, analyses which pertain to 
this hank hut which were previously stated in farmer chapters 
will be eliminated where possible* The reader, however, Is 
asked to remain aware of the analysis given with respect to 
the ease study on the Consolidated Association Inasmuch as 
there la great similarity between the two in xaany instances*
Organization of the Bank
A bill to Incorporate a third property bank in Louisiana 
was introduced in both Houses of the State Legislature, Febru­
ary 1, 1835* Mr. Grymea, spokesman for the bill in the House 
of kepresentatlves, proposed that this new property bank have 
broad privileges. He advocated that the concern,
• * * in addition to the usual privilege of 
issuing cad discounting notes, receiving deposits, 
aad negotiating exchange, be permitted, to underwrite 
against marine losses and losses by fire; also to 
eantmot for the expenses of any work of internal 
improvement: such as canals, railroads and even 
to the building of & house.1
The charter for such a grandiose scheme was granted 
April 1, and by the term of the Act the Citizens* Bank was 
authorized to issue 112,000,000 of bonds with interest at
^Batou Houge Gazette, February £, 1833.
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fit* per cent, and their maturity dates were to extend from 
14 to 50 yea re. Mortgages on property were to act as security 
for the bonds, and they were to be acquired from the subsorib-
procedure was the same as prescribed for the Consolidated 
Association and the Union Bank; the subscribers of the CIti- 
m r s v Bank stock w. . • mortgaged their lands ana slaves to
the stockholders were to remain in the vaults of the bunk to 
serve as a perpetual pledge nto the holder or holders of said 
beads until the expiration of the charter and the final
la the event of nonpayment of either principal or in­
terest on the bonds by the bank, the bondholders were entitled 
to enforce payment by materializing on the mortgages through 
legal process. Nevertheless, under this original act of in cor­
pora t ion in 1833, the State did not bind Itself in any manner 
for the debts of the bank. The bonds were to be bank bonds 
without the State pledge.
The stockholders on the pledge of their certificates 
cn deposit with the bank, were entitled to a credit from the 
bank equal to m  half the par value of their shares. "On using 
this eredit, the subscriber was required to give his note, r©~
ers in payment for $14,400,000 of the b£mkf£> stock.
secure the shares taken by them and the mortgages given by
liquidation of the affairs of the bank.”4
Citizens Bunk of Louisiana a® cited by H. Heck, op. clt p # 31 
Loo » clt.
La. Acts. 1833, pp. 172-192.
A. A. LeX/ms. Reminiscences Culled from Annals of the
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newable at the end of ©very twelve months, on payment of the 
interest ($i£) annually In advance, and such proportion of the 
eapltel sum in annual Instalments as would extinguish the 
debt at a certain fixed period. "5 recourse the hank had
In case of nonpayment by the stockholders was foreclosure by 
law or by other court action; failure, neglect, or refusal to 
pay Interest or instalment on principal of the loan, gave the 
bank the privilege to enforce payment in accordance with the 
provisions of its charter and the laws of the State.
Albeit that cotton and sugar planters and other proper­
ty owners already had two banks to serve them with a capital 
amounting to nine and a half millions of dollars, and albeit 
that these property owners were already stockholders to the 
amount of eleven millions of dollars, there were still many 
property owners left who were anxious to secure credit and 
willing to become stockholders in a property bank. The terms 
that were offered the subscribers were very attractive and they 
satisfied the property owners. Most any fixed,tangible 
property was accepted. It was not necessary that it be prop­
erty In the state of cultivation and it was not required that 
It be revenue-raising property. Uncleared land and vacant city 
lots met the requirements for mortgage with this bank, because, 
if development were taken into consideration, these too were 
liquid, safe assets. Furthermore, all properties were ac-
Slbid
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cepted at the current valuation* simply because the belief 
was that the value of property and slaves always appreciated 
— never depreciated. The result was that the bank's stocks 
were oversubsox\lbed. Every owner "of a vacant lot, whether dry 
or under water, every proprietor of old ten&ntlesa buildings 
imagined that the millenluni was really approaching,116 end each 
hastened to subscribe., with the result that subscriptions for 
stocks totaled $35,875,600. The stock subscription was lim­
ited by law at $14,400,000, therefore, the applications for 
stocks had to be scaled down* This was accomplished by reject­
ing the non-qualifying applicants and by reducing the amount 
of each subscription without altering its ratio to the entire 
subscription so that the total subscribed did not exceed the 
legal limit.
Attempts to Sell Bank Bonds
Immediately after the chai'ter was granted in 1833, the 
Consaissioners for the Citizens* Bank proceeded to the Northeast 
in an attempt to sell the bonds in this country, but they wore 
not successful in finding e market. Only a sum of $133,333,33 
was borrowed that year through the sale of the bank bonds.7 In 
1334, the Citizens1 Bank directed its Ooiomis si oners to attempt 
negotiations in Burope for a sale of 09,000,000. No one in
Rightor, op. clt., p. 593, and 3. A. Trufant, op. 
clt. . pp. 25-40.
743 Le. Ann. 738. hope & Co. vs. Board of Liquidation;
47 La. Ann."Tg74. D . A. Breard,Jr. vs. Citizens* lank of 
Louisiana. et. al.
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I h S U M  m s  Interested in tho bonds• Tbus, the CdSEBissionsro
tried Amsterdam* Here they entered Into a conditional eon-
taot in February, 1855, whereby the firm, of ¥* willinck was
to tote the entire #9,000,000 issue and offer **he bonds for
al e  on the European market* The Amsterdam banking house then
set days for subscript ion to the bonds, but there were no
takers, mainly because the Louisiana firm failed to transmit
the boids to the Holland company* When the bonds did reach
Amsterdam, however, a new contract was signed— July 5, 1655*
V* H I  lino k Issued a printed circular or a prospectus offering
the bcmde at forty cents to tho guilder, but this second at*
8tempt was unsuccessful*
While these negotiations were going on with W* Willinck, 
other Commissioners were appointed and they too were sent to 
Europe to negotiate the loan, provided their predecessors had 
not completed the sale * They went t o England in an attempt to 
eater negotiations as their predecessors had done* They 
found no interest on the part of Baring Brothers* Mr* ft* T. 
tkrd had warned the Baring concern already. rtI have examined 
the charter of the Citizens Bank,” he wrote on June 28, 1835, 
"and have case to the conclusion to have nothing to do with 
it on this side* * . * Under this charter X do not see but 
that the bank m y  do Just what it pleases and to any extent
8R. 0* McGrane, op* clt** P* 174.
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within the limits of double the amount of it® capital."
Nevertheless, it we a not necessary to warn Baring Brothers;
their negotiations with the Uhlan Bank of Louisiana hed led
them to alter their policy of taking large issue a of bonds fear 
10resale* When It came to the other London bankers and bro­
kers, the Commissioners oould not get their interest either, 
although they had some encouragement from Thomas ftllson and 
Company and a new firm being organized in London by Lizard! 
Harms nos of Paris, which went under the name of Francois de 
Lizard! sad Company.U  They assisted the Commissioners, 
however, in contacting Hope and Company of Amsterdam.
One of the new Comal as loners arrived in Amsterdam in
August, and during September he succeeded in entering into a
12conditional contract with the Holland bankers. Hope and
Company agreed to take 5,750 bonds, which amounted to $3,000,
1$
000 In American money, provided the Citizens Bank obtained
9
Baring Brothers miscellaneous Letters: w. T. Ward to 
Baring Brothers, New York, June 22f 1835,’aif~cited by R. 0. 
MoGrane, o p . olt.» p. 175.
10Cf.. E . W. Hidy, op. olt.. p. 253.
^CHEO, 1830, Ho. 20, p* 15.
M CS1C, 1342, p. 8.
^The Citizens’ Bank bonds were not of $1,000 den online- 
tion. Xach bond had on its face three values; &444.44, 
b 100 sterling, and 1,200 guilders.
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the pledge of the State of Louisiana over and above that of 
14
the bank; provided, toot that the State repeal the power
gives to the bank to purchase stock of the Borgne navigation
15
Company of New Orleans. Following are the terms of that 
contract, vis.:
Conditional Contract between Hope and Company of 
Amsterdam, and Edmund J. Fore tall, acting on behalf 
ot the Citizens Bank of Louisiana , under a power of 
attorney bearing date 9th May, 1635, to wit:
On the first part, and on the conditions herein­
after mentioned, Messrs. Hope and Co. hereby agree to 
purchase of the Citizens Bank of Louisiana who also 
hereby agree to sell them, three millions of dollars, 
M y  6750 bonds, of h 100 sterling each, of the State 
of Louisiana, which may be Issued In favor of said 
bank, in equal series of 14, £3, 41, and 50
years, and bearing an interest of 5 per cent, payable 
sanl-annua lly; payment of the same to be made on deliv­
ery, at the rate of 1,£G0 for every bond of h 100 ster­
ling; binding themselves to remit, if so directed, the 
proceeds of said bonds to London or Paris, on account 
of the bank, free of all charges except the customary 
brokerage of one-tenth of one per cent* The said Hope 
and Co* reserving to themselves the right, until the 
10th of January next, to reduce their said purchase to 
one million of dollars, should any extraordinary change 
have taken place in the European money market; and also 
re serving to themselves the preference of the remain­
ing bonds of the bank, or any portion of them, which 
may be offered for sals in Europe at their current 
value*
On the other part, the Citizens* Bank binds 
Itself to use all its exertions to obtain, on or be­
fore the 1st of February next, the following amend­
ments to its charter, which are hereby made the sine 
qua non of this contract, to wit:
14
Loe* olt*
C. HOG pane, op* clt*. pp. 174-175; and of* 
85 Cong* Z Sees * 7x. Doe* Ho. 79, p* 638*
23?
1st The repeal of the power given to the 
hank to subscribe to the stock of the 
Lake Borgne Navigation Company*
2nd The issuing of the bonds of the State 
of Louisiana, la lieu of tho bank*
The endorseent of the bonds purchased && -above shall 
specify that the principal Is to be reimbursed at the 
counting-house of Hope & Co., Amsterdam, at the rate 
of & 1200 per & 100 sterling, and each bond shall be 
dra w  for i 100 sterling and the interest
be made payable at the same place, on the 1st Febru­
ary and 1st August la each year; and coupons in the 
margin of the bonds, for thirty guilders each, shall 
be thereto attached.
The interest of the two millions in suspense 
shall only be computed (639) from the first day of 
the month of the delivery of the sale bonds in Amster­
dam.
It is agreed that the commission of Hope & Co., 
is to be two per cent, and on© quarter pox cent, 
brokerage, on the amount purchased by them, and half 
per cent, on the dividends and half per ooat on the 
principal reimbursement.
It is also agreed that the Citizens* Bank binds 
itself not to offer for aale in Lurope, without the 
consent of Hope & Co., its remaining bonds, the two 
millions of dollars, if not taken or accepted be­
fore the 1st of January, 1®7; it being understood 
that the bank may dispose of 43,000,000 in the United 
States, provided the interest be made payable and 
the capital reimbursed there.
It is also understood that the two million dol­
lars of bonds, If taken, shall be forwarded, after 
the receipt of Hope & Co* *s notification to that ef­
fect, within the shortest delay, not exceeding thirty 
days •
Executed in triplicate, In the city of Amster­
dam, this first day of September, 1335. ivitness the 
hands of the above parties:
Witnesses &• Sullen• Ro inhold Edmund 3*. Foratall
Hope & Co* 26
^86 Cong. 2 3ess* , Ex. Doo. No* 79, p. 633.
The Act of 1856
z m
Xn order to ooa^ply with the provisions of the condi­
tions 3 contract with Hope and Company an act to engage the 
faith of the State on the bonds was passed in January* 1836* 
This pledge was granted in a peculiar manner, however* By the 
ten* of the Act the State pledged its faith on only £3*000*
000 of bonds* which it authorised the bonk to issue immediate­
ly* end obviously this was to effect the sale with Hope and 
Ompeny. On the remaining £9*000*000, it agreed to pledge its 
fbith by granting the bank the privilege to issue the same
kind of tends up to §12*000*000. Ttaoh issue was to be In five 
1?equal series* One-fifth of the bonds was to uature in each 
of the following years: I960, 1859, 1868, 1877, and 1386,
18that is* 14* 23, 32, 41, and 50 years from February 1, 1836.
for the privilege and pledge granted the State asked 
for one-sixth of the bank's profits* and any sum thus ac­
quired was to be applied to the support of free schools and
19
three colleges. By profits, the state intended to include the 
net Insane from operations and the premiums received from 
the sale of bonds in the negotiations succeeded in obtaining 
a price above that specified by law.
17Lb. Acte. 1836* pp. 16-24.
La. Ann. 286. Citizens Bank vs. Levee Steam Cotton 
Compress Company; In. Acts, iB'gff* pp.“ 16-24.
La. Acts, 1336* pp. 16-24. The profits were to be di­
vided to the free schools on the be.sis of the population of 
eeeb perish* end £5,000 was to be given to each of thro© col­
leges for scholerchips. Tho colleges were: J'efferson College in 
St. y a m s  Parish* College of Franklin in Opelousas, College of 
Fackson in Fast Feliciana.
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Negotiations or the State Fledged Bonds
®ie negotiations of the State bonds issued for and in 
Ihvor of the Citizens9 Bank were extremely complice*ted* Anyone 
net acquainted with some of the entangling relationships among 
the houses and agents involved with the negotiations will be 
faced with utter confusion.
First, there was the Netherlands becking house of Hope 
and Company. The Citizens9 Bank was anxious and willing to 
have this Amsterdam concern sell Louisiana bonds on the Euro­
pean market. The bank, however, had very little relationship 
with Hope and Company otherwise; that is, it was not interest­
ed in maintaining an account with the Dutch bank in order to 
dsmv guilder exchange bills against Hope and Company. On the 
other hand, English sterling bills of exchange and French franc 
drafts did interest the Citizens9 Bank, Therefore, they wanted 
to establish accounts in London and Paris. By having tho 
Dutoh bank sell the bonds and deposit the funds in a French or 
English bank against which the Citizens9 Bank could draw bills 
of exchange, the problem was simplified* This was done by 
selecting the banking firms of Thomas Wil3an and Company and 
Francois dsllzardl as the London agents, and Lizardl Hermanos 
as the Paris agent*
Thomas Wilson noon failed and that left the Llzardis as
21
the exclusive London agent; but the sole agency was not a
20CB10, 1842, p. 2.
2xor.. h. C. Mocrane, o p * clt. * p* 14.
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simple affair. It involved tho Citizens1 Bank later in an 
extremely unusual manner,
In Itself the Lizardi organization was complicated, to 
say the least. Lizardi Kermanos of Paris had established in 
1835 two sister houses. To London went Txancisco deLizardi to 
open the banking firm of Francois deLizardi and Company. To 
New Orleans went ~^iguel and later manuel deLizardi to organ­
ize the house of *1. deLizardi and Company. Actually, the latter 
earned firm bought out the concern of A. Gordon and It. J, For­
etell and Company, the two gentlemen remaining with the New 
Orleans house of deLizardi.
Messrs. a . Gordon and L. J. Forstall, besides being mem­
bers of the New Orleans house, also were the ;merlcen agents 
for the London firm of deLizardi. They were the official rep­
resentatives and the business transactions in this country 
with the English house went through their hands.
Mr. E. J. Forstall was, moreover, president of the 
Citizen*s Bank; in other words, the bank president was the 
agent for the bank’s agent.
With the Act passed In January, 1636, the conditional 
contract with hope and Company became on actual contract. Post 
haste the directors of the Citizens* Bank co^nmenced to draw
og
against the *3,000,000 of bonds; that wao in February, 1856.
No more bonds were sold during 1836. The next news of 
another sale was received February 20, 1827, when Francois
22CBIC, 1842, p. 2.
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dsLisardi advised that Hope and Company had purchased 3,375
a w e  heads, or $1,499,985 at face value* The payments were to
he one-third on February 28, one-third on April 30, and one-
£5
third on Kay 31. This sale brought about a series of 
events which beclouded without end the ensuing transactions 
between the Citizens* Bank and the English banking houses*
Then, too, It brought no small amount of friction and dis­
harmony among the directors and officers of the Citizens*
Bank.
What the Citizens* Bank expected from the sale to Hope 
and Company was to have funds in the hands of its agents upon 
which it could draw bills of exchange* Therefore, after Fran­
cois deLizardl notified the Citizens* Bank of the sale, the 
Hev Orleans institution proceeded to drew many drafts on the 
European agents, mostly on Lizardi Henaanoa of Paris. Muoh to 
its surprise, however, the bank found many of the drafts pro­
tested which had been drawn on Linardi Henna nos. The Paris 
house pleaded that the bills were protested because they had 
act been informed by Francois deLizar&i of London that the 
hash was to draw on them, and that funds had not been forwarded 
to Paris by London to take ears of the drafts. Actually, what 
the Paris house had done was to use the Citizens* Bank funds 
to take ear© of the difficulties they were encountering in
23
CHIC, 1836, No. 1, P. 13.
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tt* M&reh money market ohaos.^
Hope and Company made its on©-third payment on the pur­
chase qf bonds and it was effected through Lizard! Hexnanos 
even though the sale took place through ifrnncols deLizardi• 
lizard! Hermanns took the funds for their own purposes9 that 
is, to honor their own obligations, Instead of placing the 
funds on account of the Citizens* Bank* When an avalanche of 
drafts drawn by the Citizens9 Bank arrived In Paris they were 
pretested on the pretense that the negotiations took plaee 
through Francois deLlzardi, and, therefore, they were not 
authorized to honor the bills because they had not been
as
advised to do so by the London firm.
A l a  action by Llz&rdl Hezmanos, not to mention the pro* 
tests by other bankers, nearly precipitated an immediate crisis 
in Wee Orleans* Many houses Ihiled, but the crisis was averted
The March episode on the European money market had its 
rest in England, or rather Ireland* In November of 1836, the 
Agricultural and Commercial Bank of Ireland failed and a run 
started in other Ireland banks; fortunately this was stopped by 
the b m k  of England* During the same month the Northern and Cen­
tral Bank of Manchester with Its thirty-nine branches faced 
difficulty and os lied upon the Bank of England for he Ip. These 
incidents resulted in the Bank of Englaad*s placing restric­
tions on Anglo-Amerioan relations* The crisis occurred in 
March of 1837 when three Anglo-American houses— T* Wilson A. Co., 
e* Wildes 1 Co., and T. Wiggins & Co. (the three W 9e) — found 
thesselves unable to meet their engagement a. This had enormous 
re percuss ions— the Paris firm of Llzardl Her 139 nos being in­
volved* (Of*, B. C. McGrene, op* clt.. p. 14) .
E50BXC, 1838, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, pp. 13 and 14.
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VtttiX Miy when the panic was nation-wide. Lizard! Hermanos, 
according to a letter written by Francois deLlzardi on Itoy 09, 
finally accepted ttoe drafts, tout toy then the damage toad been 
dene* The result of the affair was that the Isaak changed Its 
ageney in Paris to Andre and Cottier Company. That was in Oc-
teter, 1337, and it created quite a stir in the affairs of the
Citizens9 Bank which increased in intensity as time went on* 
IdWBi J. foretell, president of the bank and agent for de 
llzardl, offered his resigns tion; and while it was not 
accepted, it remained a chafing incident*
The Lizardi Kexso&nos episode, ttoe Panic, and the dla*
wlceal of the Paris agency, however, did not disrupt the nego­
tiations* Bonds continued to toe sold, and for a time Francois 
deLlzardi continued to act as agents for the Citizens* Bank*
Xn July, 1837, Hope and Company purchased another 300
27bonds at ttoe same xate as before the crisis and within a
28had sold them at par* On July 26, 1,175 bonds w e n
sold toy Francois deLlzardi to Marquis Casa Riera; the agents,
however, claimed that they toad to give up all commissions to
29effect the sale within the limits set toy the bank* Between
the 83rd and 30th of October Mr* P* J» Trlcou, in behalf of
the Citizens9 Bank, entered into a contract with Mr* L* J.
Itold*. Ho. 28» p. 17 
Ibid*
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Fowtail, agent for Francois deLiaardi, to sell to the London
f i m  800 tends of each, of the five series, that Is, 1,500 
S O  __
tends. The price offered was £705,533*33. the fhee vain© 
of tee tends was £656,650. In brief, it was an advantage
31
or premium. for the Citizens* Bank to the amount of #36,673.33. 
Thns ended 1837 with the Hew Orleans institution having dis­
posed tte faee-value s m  of #5,300,000 in State pledged 
tend©.3*
The year 1833 began with another sale of #360,000 of
tends. In January, Hope and Company agreed to purchase 825
tends for b 77,784. 13.4, or approximately £343,500. Two
54months later they acquired #500,000 more* On the seventh of
ifereh, Hope & Company wrote to i\ deLlzardi of their intention
to purchase 1125 tends more on the same terms as those of Jan-
35wary and the bonds were transmitted to them on the ninth.
36
The price paid was t 105,847. 6.0, or about $469,960.
Another 400 tends were taken in May for h 37,955, or nearly
S0C3IC, 1836, So. 31, p. 21.
The reason why ?. deLlzardi could offer such a price 
was that they received 8 per cent in premium when they sold 
their dxaft. to obtain the funds to effect payment in New 
Orleans.
CBI0, 1842, p. 4.
Ibid.; 03IC, 1836, Noa. 41 and 43, pp. 24 and 25.
34CBXC, 1842, p. 4.
55CMC, 1836, Ho. 44, p. 25.
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HW|ttO. fto Moalalog 785 bonds ot their series was
JtO
t> l »  mi June SO. This resulted in there being a nego­
tiated capital by the Citizens * Bank of $6,666,666,67 at the
38
end of Augrat, 1638• ft bat the Hew Orleans bank actually 
received on the sale of the bonds, however, cannot be asoer- 
taiaed because the bank kept no records; that is, no entries 
appeared on its books in relation to this matter*3^
In September, 1838, the friction existing within the 
Direction of the Citizensf Bank grew into a cleavage; which be­
came a wide-open break that came near assuming catastrophic 
proportions• It nearly destroyed the bank itself, not to 
Mfttloa the effects on the market of Louisiana securities.
On the surface the claim was that the majority of the direc­
tors was opposed to the multitude of irregularities committed 
by Francois deLlzardi for whom Mr. F. y. Foret all, president 
of the bank, was the American agent. Underneath it was a 
rebellion against the strict and regular operations of the 
bmir when "easy-credit" under any terms was in demand. Xt was 
also a Jealous rebellion against the president, cashier, and 
a few of the directors. The result of this affair was that Mr. 
Fora tall resigned and Francois deLlzardi & Company ceased to 
be agents for the bank. The affair Oi>ened the way for grandiose 
scheme a and unsound practices— the beginning of the end of the
■ I b K U . NO. 50, p. 28. 
gCUIC, 1842, p. 6.
CMC, 1838, No. 65, PP. 35-36
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Citizens' Bank* A  change of agency was voted September 24; 
the reasons for the change were:
1* That la May, 1837, F.deLlzardi & Co*, in conse­
quence of their imprudent operations, became unable 
to pay the sum of $157,000, accruing from the sale 
of Bonds of the Bank,and of which they had received 
the amount*
£* n e t  in May, 1637, the Bills of the Bank of Baris 
were protested for non-acceptance, and that this is 
as muoh the fault of S1*- deLlzardi & Co* as that of 
Llsardi Hermanns, and perhaps more blame is to be 
attached to the former than to the latter. By this 
eiroumstanoe the credit of the Bank was necessa­
rily very much impaired.
3. That F. deLlzardi & Go* sold 1175 Bonds below the 
limits, and in violation of the Instructions pre­
scribed by the bank*
4* That F* deLlzardi & Go* borrowed $43,000 on pro­
tested Bills, the property of the Bank*
5* That F* deLlzardi & Go* were wanting in sincerity 
when they sought to excuse Lizardl Hsnmnos by pre­
tending that there had been no transfer of funds 
from London to Paris*
6* That on the 23d of July last ( 1836 ), P* deLlzardi 
& Co* did not take measures to pay in full at matu­
rity, a note of %234,444.44, accruing from the sale 
of 1500 Bonds (including the 1175 Bonds sold in vio­
lation of the Instructions of th© Bank), although 
the Bank granted them, for reimbursement of this sum, 
ell the time that they had themselves asked for*
7* Lastly, the majority of the Committee are of opinion, 
that the Bank la selecting as their agent in London, 
some other House, older and better known, than that 
of 7. deLlzardi &. Go. which Is of recent formation, 
would find it easier to negociate the remainder of 4n 
the Bonds: a result deaired by all the stockholders. w
Ibid* * Ho* 61, p. 29* This change of agency was final­
ly voted on October 22, 1838*
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Reid, Irving and Company was selected to replace 
Francois deLlzardi and Company* They and Andre and Cottier 
of Paris acted as agents of the Bank for the remainder of the 
bonds that were sold.41
By the end of 1838 Andre & Cottier sold 250 bonds, pay­
able In post-notes at fifty per cent discount* That brought 
the total of bonds sold by January 1, 1839, to $6,777t777*78.4S 
From then until the middle of 1642 both new agents proceeded to 
sell small amounts at various prices and terras* In July of 
1839, the total capital by sale of bonds amounted to $5,822,000* 
A bond sale of only $44,222 had been made in six months* From 
July, 1839, to July, 1840, another $44,000 of bonds was sold, 
bringing the total to $5,866,000. From July, 1840, to July,
1841, the amount rose to $6,927,000*00, and by July, 1842, the 
bonds sold amounted to $7,188,888. After that time no more bonds 
were sold, for the bank went into liquidation in October.4®
Operations of the Citizens* Bank, 1836-1842
The Citizens* Bank commenced operations in rJarch, 1836. 
Inasmuch as the Act of January had made the conditional con­
tract with Hope and Company a legal and accepted contract, the 
firm was in a position to draw on its new accounts with the 
London agents handling the sale of bonds with the Amsterdam
ttCBIC, 1842, p. 6.
42Ibld.. p. 8.
4gIbld.. p. 22.
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company* Against these accounts the officers of the bank, 
therefore, proceeded to discount commercial paper, and within 
two ninths;that is, by May 15, these discounts equaled the 
then existing oapital. Loans were also granted to the stock- 
holders as soon as funds became available; each stockholder 
was permitted #25*00 per share*44 Business was soaring dur­
ing these early monts and the bank was extremely active.
Scarcely six months had passed when difficulties appear­
ed on the horizon. Along with the other banks of the city, 
the new Citizens* Bank was feeling the tremendous drain on the 
specie reserves. Unlike most of the other banks, however, 
this property bank had the means of acquiring specie. The 
bank’s bonds continued to sell in Europe and these sales built 
the firm’s accounts with the European agents; these accounts 
permitted the bank to draw bills of exchange with which nec­
essary speoie could be purchased from Havana and Mexico.
Most of the bankers of the city were of the opinion 
that by offering a premium for specie it would check the flow 
out and even encourage It to return In sufficient amount to 
meet the demands. Mr. Forstall, president of the Citizens’
Bank, however, was opposed to the move. To him, such a policy 
would be tantamount to an acknowledgement of a depreciation of 
the paper currency. He proposed In its stead to have his bank 
import such amounts of specie as might be needed.4^ The Asso­
ciation of Bank Presidents took to the Idea*
44Ibld.. p. 2.
25 Cong. 2 Bess#, Ex. Doc. Wo..79, p. 651.
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At first, It m s  thought that <£3,000,000 would be 
seeded, but as discuss ions progressed among the bank pres­
idents, it m s  felt that the immediate importation of 
#1,500,000 would suffice,46 The refers, the Citizens' Bank
use authorized to import #1,650,000, which would be taken by
the various banks as a loan, according to the terms of the
47agreement signed by the bank presidents.
To obtain the importation of gold and silver, Messrs,
H, deLlzardi and Company of Bow Orleans were requested to
Issue their domestic bills for sale la Havana and Mexico to
purchase specie there. This specie, Messrs, dd Lizard! were
to deliver to the bank when received, and to reimburse them-
selves they were to draw against the bank's account with y,
48dsLlzardi of London,
46GAML, Citizens1 Bank to Consolidated Association, 
M m  Orleans, Octobe r 11, 1856 •
ATmjj- orders for specie by the various banka were as 
follows:
Canal and Banking Co. ----------- ^200,000
Bank of Orleans 100,000
Consolidated Association------- 100,000
City Bank 200,000
Mechanic and Traders ----------- 150,000
Improvement & Banking Co, 200,000
Gas-Light and Banking Go, ------ 300,000
Commercial Bank 100,000
Carrollton B a n x ----------— *--- 100,000
Bank of Louisiana 100,000
Atchafal/? ya B a n k ---------------  100,000
Ll,650,000
*aCf. CBIO, 1838, No. 67, p. 49; and 25 Cong. 2 Seas., 
Ex. Doe., No. 79, p. 652.
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Mr. foretell, who was talcing an active part In the 
settings or the Association of Bank Presidents during Septem- 
ter and October, orrered several sound suggestions on banking 
practices and principles. Hot too much attention, however, 
was paid to them at the time, but the Citizensf Bank was fol­
lowing them, which probably accounted for the strong finan­
cial position of the bank, a financial strength which remained 
even through and after the crisis which followed *
la a latter written to the bank presidents, October 11, 
1836, Mr* Foretell suggested a principle for sound currency 
and basking which was later incorporated in the Bank Act of 
1M&* His idea, of which he did not claim to be the origina­
tor, was that good comaercla 1 paper served as & sound basis 
for a stable and elastic currency provided there was suffi­
cient spools backing the currency in order to prevent sudden 
expansions and contractions* By having the circulating notes 
backed by two-thirds ooasaerci&l paper these notes could vary 
in amounts of circulation according to the demand and market 
conditions* Nevertheless, currency needed an equi libra tor to 
prevent sudden and dangerous fluctuations and a one-third 
specie reserve, therefore, was essential in order that the 
currency might also follow the movements of the meteUios.
His statement was:
Nxperlenoe has proved that with a circula­
tion of paper of no less a denomination than $5*00, 
each Bank ought to regulate its operations so as 
to have in Its vaults an amount of specie equal to 
ose-thlrd of its Cash responsibilities* were this 
Rule strictly adhered to, and made a fundamental
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part of the Constitution of all monied Institu­
tions, tbs Currency of the Country could never he 
disturbed— to extend or curtail suddenly is equally 
dangerous— a good medium will always he obtained 
by following the movement of the no tallies
The members of the Association of Bank Presidents agreed 
with Mr* yorate11* s idea and they authorized the Citizens*
Bank to acquire the necessary specie for their respective 
banks* After operations had begun on the acquisition of specie, 
however, there m s  a change of attitude on the iart of the 
bank officials, which change reflected the feeling on the 
part of the public. The people did not care for money which 
was readily convertible; they were suffering from a lack of 
currency, even paper notes, and they wanted plenty of money 
and cheap money. A maintenance of specie redemption of paper 
currency could only serve to further contract the amount of 
notes In circulation. Both the banks and the public— with a 
false illusion— were now looking at a suspension in specie re­
demption as a means of relief. The imported specie, therefore,
was not employed by the banks and Messrs. M. deLlzardi were
50
left with the bulk of it *
**GA.1£L, loc* olt.; and 25 Gong. 2 Bess. Ex* Poc., Ho. 
79, p. 656.
fows^* i*aportatioas from
jii’kj Jga?
247^846 m y  &
iS'S» j*114,9/9 August
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Tfcs Ifey crisis of 188? occurred scarcely a year after 
the bank had begun its operations and its activities were tem­
porarily dttsrupted in spite of the fact that it was doing 
"iWi to ft oil i tat e the eomaeroe in the Mississippi Thlley
^  SIthen any of the Banks in Hew Orleans.M And, too, the crisis
threatened the financial status of an Institution which at
that tine was In an excellent condition, according to a lagls-
52 1lative exemining oommittee• ? m  the chaos first created
by the Stale, however, the hank was soon able to resume near- 
fiOtSftl operations though it continued a suspension of specie 
payments* The oont lnuation of the sale of bond® enabled the 
institution through the sole of hills of exchange on their 
Xsidsa and Bstrls agents, to discount notes, and to grant loans.
By December, 1337, specie payments, to a limited extent, 
were resisted. The shock had been resisted, and the firm had 
#872,000 of specie in its vaults a^tinet a specie-paying lia­
bility Of #85,000. It had #1,275,000 in capital funds, and a 
portfolio of eoesaerolal paper amounting to #4,000,000. Against 
these It had e #1,730,000 debt, much of which was payable in
* - S3
leeal bank notes.
A fatal step was taken in April, 1336, however. It was 
the first move toward the decadence of the Citizens* H&nlc, and, 
actually, it was a violation of the provisions of the charters. 
The directors, with the consent of the Attorney General, voted
®*S. A. Caldwell, OP. olt., p. 50.
^Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Louisiana* p» 18. 
1042, p. 4.
£53
unanimously to emit post-notes in favor of the stockholders.®4,
The eleventh section of the Act of 1833, stated that 
the stockholders had a right to a credit equal to one-half 
the value of their stocks. The Interpretation of the law was, 
furthermore, that the loans on stocks be proportionate to the 
amount of capital negotiated. That would have meant that the 
stock loans were to be limited to 60 per cent of the capital 
received, and that interpretation had been followed by the offi­
cers until this time; $3,600,000 had been loaned on stocks with 
the negotiated capital to the amount of $6,000,000. In April, 
1338, it was ordered that $3,600,000 of post notes, payable In 
3, 4, and 5 years, and bearing 5J per cent interest,®^ could 
he issued in order to make available a means of circulation so 
badly needed.
The April resolution called for an emission of post- 
notes. During a period of nine months a total of il»495,000 
in post-notes was issued. Of this total, $784,300 of post- 
notes was bought back by the bank from the stockholders in order 
to resell them to P. deLlzardi and Andre and Cottier, and a 
total value of only $£16,700 was sold by these European agauts, 
and on account of this small rate $567,600 had to be kept by 
the bank.®®
Strength remained with the bank, however, after the 
move was taken. The President continued to adhere to sound 
principles In spite of the desires of many of the stockholders.
5*1bid.. p. 5.
S5Ibld.,
seibid.
E M
0 m  tiroTi which was not foreseen when committed 9 wa0 the ac­
ceptance of the Federal Government fs offer to use the bank as a 
depository, and that misgiving was caused by the imprudence of 
a later administration. The bank felt strong and there was 
serious talk of resuming specie payments in June* 1038. It had 
#300 *000 In specie in the vaults* and $300*000 more was being
imported from Havana. The circulation had been reduced to 
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11*860*000. That was about a one-third reserve on the 
circulation.
Good management ceased in September of 1838 when S. J. 
For*tall resigned* and after that the gross irregularities com­
mitted by the new administration started the bank toward its 
downfall. They simply refused to listen to Mr. Forst&ll’s
sound advice which he gave upon departing. Had they done so*
53the picture might have been different.
One year after the firm had Issued post-notes* it had 
$888*700 of them on hand; they had been returned because no 
market could be found for them. These post-notes which had 
been issued to help the hard-pressed stockholders and debtors 
had failed to be of substantial assistance. Therefore* an­
other plan was proposed— thnt of granting an additional loan 
of $16.00 per share to the stockholders. A strong minority 
aroee against the measure but it passed.
^Ibld.« pp. 6 and 7. 
**®CBIC, 1838, pp. 5-7.
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The minority objected to the new grant because it felt 
the consequences would be disastrous• It submitted convinc- 
ing date to prove its point* According to the report, the 
bank's portfolio (not Including stock loans) was $3,805,990: 
that is, $1*796,500 In notes frora stockholders find |2,009,590
in other promissory notes* These were payable as follows:
Renewable at 10 per oe;*t discount I 950,665
Renewable at 20 per cent discount 2,487,790
Payable in full at maturity 567,455
Xn addition to the portfolio, the bank held $733,000 in specie, 
$59,TOO in foreign deposits and drafts , and  ^138,400 in local 
bank notes (then at a discount); in other words, current assets 
to the total of 44,786,890* Against these were current liabil­
ities of $2,277,000, circulation of $536,000, individual de­
posits of f 1,236,100, and a government deposit of $404,900* 
Taking the specie, notes of other banks, and deposits with 
ether banks, as against the current liabilities, the excess of 
active debts was $1,296,000* Furthermore, along with these 
figures, must be taken into consideration the fact that the 
bmt- already had reached |4,365,736.57 In loans to its stock** 
holders— $300,000 above the legal limit* The stockholders in 
tinea owed the bank in principal, interest, and otherwise, an 
amount of $6,162,036*57, that is, a sum equal to 90 per cent 
of the negotiated capital. The { 15*00 per share grant in 
pest notes, therefore, if all the stockholders availed them- 
selves of the privilege, would increase the current liabilities
S5C
e w  tb» t»nkfs resources by 1810,000. Moreover, there was 
the matter of interest payments to be met in August, and that 
« a « i  $B,5E7,S61* On the other hand, all the hank had in 
Its portfolio that would mature within the period before 
dugust was the paltry sum of *745,963.
However convincing was the argument against the grant 
of an additional loan of *15*00 per share, the xuajority was 
set convinced. Even the advice to invest only in short- 
maturity cornu©rciel paper failed* Instead, the policy chosen 
was to renew discounted paper in full at the time of raaturlty, 
provided additional security was given*
It was mentioned above that the Citizens9 Bank became 
a depository for the Federal Government in 1838, and that it 
feeeeae a source of great trouble for the bank* The Holt© af­
fair and what followed it were the cause of the difficulty—  
Vincent Holts was a Hew Orleans cotton broker who had been 
doing business with the Citizens9 Bank.
After the crisis in 1837 the ootton market fell and it 
remained low for soae time. The bank's policy, therefore, 
was to avoid making loans on cotton. But by 1839 the price of 
cotton was regaining its former level, and there were signs 
that the increase would continue. Therefore, the bank was 
tempted, persuaded to be exact, by Mr* Kolt© to grant him 
a loan on cotton.
The Directors, nevertheless, took precautions and did 
not permit the loan to exceed two*thirds the cost price of
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cotton, and the transactions were considered very sound.
Mr* Nolta’s transactions in cotton became speculative, how­
ever, and so fast were his dealings that he claimed he could 
not wait for the execution of the neoessary forms demanded by 
law and custom before approaching the bank for additional 
credit * He asked the bank, therefore, to grant him advances 
or a loan on the simple deposit of certificates from the cot­
ton presses and insurance policies until he could furnish the 
necessary documents* The bank granted him his wish, which was 
the very source of the trouble that followed and an imprudent 
aet on the part of the officers*
^hen they realized the danger involved, the Directors 
became frantic* In their frenzy and haste, they seized every­
thing of Noltefs that they could lay their hands on. Every 
legal device Imaginable was thrust at Vincent Nolte„ Wherever 
they found cotton which belonged or had belonged to Mr* Nolte 
they seized it. It so happened that others had granted Mr. 
Wolte credit on the same cotton and they too were seizing the 
cotton; sometimes as many as three or four had claims on the 
same cotton*
The vfcole affair was extremely complicated and many were 
involved. Only part of what occurred is included herein; it 
is simply an isolated case out of several others. Other trans­
actions were just as fantastic*
Messrs. Yeatman and Company had sold cotton to Mr. Nolte 
on credit. On this cotton Mr. then secured a loan from
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Messrs. A* and J. Denistoun and from the Gitizens9 Bank; the 
l&ssrs. Denistoun had the warehouse receipts. Thus , three 
concerns had claims on the same cotton.
The cost price of the cotton was $334,000. The Cit­
izens9 Bank loan on the cotton was $£71,117. The total claims 
against Mr. Nolte on this cotton was $375,000. What did the 
Citizens9 Bank do when it found that Mr. Nolte had obtained 
credit from three concerns on the same security? The behavior 
of the directors was astounding; they displayed a la ok of judge­
ment, foresight, and financial understanding.
All three creditors were fighting for the possession 
of the cotton. Finally, the Citizens9 Bank agreed to pay both 
claims in order to get the cotton in its possession. Messrs, 
Yeatman and Company9s claim was $143,698, and Messrs. A. and 
Denistoun9a claim amounted to $92,000, a total of $£35,698. 
The market value of the sequestered cotton was $170,000. The 
Citizens9 Bank cleared its claim on the cotton at a price of 
$65,689 more than cotton could be bought on the market. Fur­
thermore, the value of the cotton did not cover the $271,117 
loan that was made on it.
In its frenzy over the unsound loans it had granted 
the Citizens9 Bank seized everything that it thought to be a 
security, even that to which it had no rightful claims. How­
ever, it was not certain of itself on the claims, not certain 
of its priority rights contested by Mr. Nolte9s creditors. 
Therefore, a compromise was offered to put an end to the
z m
dlfflenXtiee and the bank accepted it* She result was 
catastrophic .
B »  beak ceded ita claims against those items which 
were claimed by Mr* Noltefs other creditors* Then it agreed to 
let Mr* Nolte transfer to the tank all his non-appropriated 
balances, #467,057 in cotton* This cotton was to be sold in 
Europe and the tank selected Mr* Nolte to sell it, advancing 
him #998 *000 upon a personal guarantee from his creditors*
Once in England, the cotton was seized by the Bank of England 
because Mr* Nolte had received a loan from it on the same cot* 
ten* To get the Bank of England to release the cotton the 
C&tlzans9 Bank sunk more money* In all it spent #660*000 to 
cell cotton which had been accepted at a value of £467,0$?*
As soon as speculators found out about the generosity 
of the Citizens9 Bank and what could be obtained therefrom, 
they flocked to its windows insurance companies, cotton press­
es, brokers, and boat captains received loans on cotton which 
the bank sent to England for sale .
Soon afterwards, cotton prices fell* A new disaster oc­
curred. More litigations and more legal fees were Involved*
•wd what is more, instead of making a profit from the Federal 
deposits in its vaults, the Oitlzens9 Bank became involved in 
the improper use of those funds; that is, It used the deposits
for Its speculative activities, and suffered a considerable
59
loss there, too.
50CHIC, 18*2, pp. 9-12.
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Tli© bank was to keep specie in special reserve for 
payment of the Federal Government deposits, but this it did 
not do* When orders cam© in June, 1639, for the bank to remit 
#3S0 #000 of the Federal deposit to New York between June 30 
and September 30, this caught the Citizens * Bank at a bad time* 
Xt had made large advances on cotton and it had little specie 
at its disposal * What current resources it did have were need­
ed to pay the August interest on bonds and to meet the promis­
sory notes discounted with other banks in the West* Deductions 
made, It had but #146,000 of current resources at its disposal 
and the specie it held amounted to #320,000*
The idea of sending the specie was rejected because it 
was rare and it would imperil the bank* After all, some specie 
had to be kept in the vaults to maintain a semblance of secu­
rity for the circulation and deposits*
Another way out would have been to draw on its agents 
in Europe, or secure a loan* That was not tried, however*
Instead, a scheme was devised to buy cotton for ship­
ment and sale— speculation* Cotton costing #237,000 was 
bought and sold with expectation of a handsome profit, but 
instead of making a profit, the bank lost #37,000*^
Largely on account of Its speculative activities through­
out 1839, 1840, and 1841, this New Orleans institution remained
®°It)ld. , pp. 12-13
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In a atata of legal proceedings, unsound credit expansion, 
and unlawful activities*
Before April, 1636, the stockholders had received $25*00 
per share on their stocks and by the post-note policy these 
ease stockholders had received an additional §15*00 per share, 
waking $40*00 in all* The owners of stock had not benefited 
from the $15*00 post-note grant, but in May, 1841, the policy 
of post-nores was resumed again. The officers ordered another 
issue of $10*00 per share in post-notes with the obligation on 
the part of the bank to repurchase them at 3 per cent dis­
count* Post-notes to the amount of $624,900 were issued: 
$150,000 sold in Europe; $124,900 were given to and re­
purchased from the stockholders; and §350,000 were not 
61negotiated.
The Association of Bank Presidents In New Orleans, in 
December, 1641, presented a resolution to resume specie pay­
ments one year later. The president of the Citizens9 Bank 
refused to concur on this resolution because he felt that a 
prolongation of suspension would hinder the bank*s progress 
in the negotiation of bonds in Europe* Therefore, this 
Institution left the Association and established Itself on a 
specie basis* Unfortunately, the situation of the bank was 
not such as to Justify the move:
The current assets were;
Due from other banks---------$673,416*70
61Ibld.. pp. 13-28
Local bank notes---------  $162,051.00
Municipality notes ----------  19,058.00
Other bank notes -------   470.00
Specie ---------------------- 570.196.00
Total $1,686,091.70
The current liabilities were:
Dus to other banks-------------------- $961,396.17
Post-notes -- ------------------------  £41,700.00
Circulation ---------------------  361,810.00
Government deposit ---- — ------------  13,906.32
Special deposits ---------------------  45,502.00
Individual deposits ------------   795,291.37
Deposits at interest --------------- 1,189,518.30
Deposits on certificates-----------  7,076.00
Deposits an certificates at Interest 10.800.00
Total $3,431,950.67
Xn other words, the current liabilities exceeded the current as­
sets by $1,805,658.68.
The year 1642 was the fatal year for this property bank. 
XtS portfolio-*current assets— became exhausted and all that 
warn Is ft were the eight and a half millions in loans to the 
Stockholders. Every action of the bank, therefore, gave signs 
that it was faltering, and the indecision became apparent even
ts»tte general public. It was seen that the bank was In a
financial position and a run was started. On May 30, with
£65
Its m © « m 8  exhausted the Citizens* Bank was the first %& 
suspend specie payments. By the end of 1343 a decree of for* 
feltnre was rendered at the inst&nee of the stv.te, thus the 
property hank was forced into liquidation.
liquidation of the Citizens* Bank
Because the Citizens* Bank was unable and refused to 
eoafoxw to the Bank Act of February 5, 1842, and because the 
State wanted to prevent waste and ex pens I've litigation, a de­
cree of forfeiture was rendered at the instance of the state 
on October 18, 1843* Thus the property bank entered into a 
state of liquidation which lasted until 1903* From 1853 on, 
however, this liquidation was carried on by the new State bank 
of the same name • Throughout, however, the State had its 
preblsBs with the bonds issued for and in favor of this 
original Citizens* Bank.
The history of this liquidation and how the State at­
tempted to rid itself of its liability— contingent liability, 
it was called— is sobs what analogous in many respects to that 
of the Consolidated Association, but it possesses peculiarities 
all its own* Furthermore, the xsanagement of the insolvent 
company was not as improperly carried on as that of the sister 
bank which was also being liquidated.
The Governor with advice and consent of the Senate ap­
pointed a Board of Managers which was to take over the affairs
“ ibia.. pp. 13—28.
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of the bank, and it started its duties October 27, 1842. It 
met jointly with the Board of Directors on November 5, and it 
wan decided that the hooks, assets, at cetera, be placed in 
the hands csf these managers on the twenty-f Ir?»t of the month 
after an inventory had been completed. In so far as this inven­
tory was act finished by than, however, the transfer did not 
oeear until December 10* The first business the new administra­
tion undertook consisted of the interest payment and the re- 
Ubarsanent on the bands.69
Bonds end Interest on Bands during the Period of Liqui­
dation. —  Kedemption of bonds was not a problem in 1842 be­
cause the first series still had eight more years before 
maturity, but interest payment on the securities was a press­
ing problem. ? ith the current assets exhausted there was no 
effective means of making payment. About $190,000 was needed 
for February, 1645, and a like amount for August, not to men­
tion the amount that was still due on the partial non-payment
64
in August, 1842. Therefore, on December 10, the Governor and 
Hope and Company were informed that the bank was unable to 
meet the February 1 interest.
The next step taken by the Managers was to request Hope
and Company to return 6,525 £tate bonds amounting to 
65$2,011,111.11 issued in favor of the bank, the unsold por-
69CBBM, 1643, p. 1.
p . 141
_________ p. 2; leg. Doc., 1843; CBBM, 1844; and New
Courier. November 27, 1843.
£65
tlon of the bonds issued by the State* Alsot it was ordered
that the unsold post-notes be returned* To accomplish these
two things, Colonel John Winthrop was sent to Europe as agent
for the bank:* and he returned in November, 1843, with
66$3,400,000 of bonds and post-notes*
Many acts were passed during 1842 to place the Louisiana 
banks on. a Sound basis* Namely they were: Act No* 1 7 ^  to
prevent violation of the law by banks, ^  Act No* 22 of
( gj (3)
February 5, Act No* 47 relative to banks, Act No. 59 to
(4) (5)supplement former Acts, Act No* 93 to amend Act No. 22,
/ c \
Act. No* 95 to prevent suits against the banks, and Act No.
(7)
98 to provide for liquidation of banks. All these acts were
considered insufficient to cope with the liquidation of the 
insolvent property banks— the Citizens♦ Bank and the Consoli^ 
dated Association--and another act was passed April 5, 1843. 
This Act firmly established the management of the Citizen9s 
Bank in the hands of the State through the existing Board 
of Managers, and the bill defined its powers* Furthermore, 
to facilitate commerce and the paying of debt by the stock­
holders, a provision was made whereby the bank was to 
accept bonds in cancellation of debt. Through this lest pro-
®6New Orleans Courier* November 27, 1843.
Niles Weekly Register, Vol. XV, p* 240.
67la. Acta. 1842, (1) PP. 26-28; (2) pp. 34-62; (3) p. 
112; (4) pp. 152-153; (5) pp. 214-228; (6)pp. 231-232; (7) pp. 
234-254.
681bld.. 1843, pp. 56-59. Of. Chapter III, pp. 130-133
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vision the bank managed by the and of 1645 to reduce the 
amount of bonds outstanding by f184,442.60, leaving the cap­
ital debt at 17,004,446.29?* By 1846* through this $eana, the
Edmund j # For stall again m s  elected president of the 
bank In 1845, and under his management, the institution m o  
able to materialize on Its resources and to pay the interest
president only for a year. In 1844, he was replaced by Mr* 
James B. Hull a; and under his administration the affairs were 
net conducted so soundly as under the previous president • 
nevertheless, the bank did continue to pay interest 
after the first three defaults.
Be ring resources to meet the interest payments was one 
matter; having resources sufficient to meet the payment of 
the maturing first series of bonds (due in 1850) was another. 
While the current assets were sufficient to meet the half- 
year dividend ooupons on bonds, they were by no means ade­
quate for the reimbursement of the 1850 series of bonds. 
Wherefore, in 1847 the State authorized the Citizensf Bank
72
to extend the maturity date from on© to four years.
bends had been reduced to |6,466,007 .21 70
as it fell due. Uhfortuna t ely, Mr. For stall rema ine d as
^Leg. Doo.. 1845. port of Board of Managers,
1340
71CBBM, 1843 
La. Aeta.
p. 10.
1847, Ho. 100, pp. 76-78
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By this saae Act of 1847 , the State mad© © change la 
the method of administering the affairs of the Citisens* Dank. 
It considered the hank well enough advanced in the process of 
liquidation to permit the stockholders soma say in the manage­
ment* Exclusive management, therefore, was relinquished; and 
thia was done by repealing the Aot of April 5, 1843.73
The exclusive management was oeded, however, to "sugar 
coat a hitter pill." The State directed the bank officers to 
assess each stockholder for periodic payments for a period 
not to exceed seven years, in order to establish Xunds suffi­
cient to pay current and post-due liabilities, Interest and 
ghe like* The contribution deolded as necessary was seven 
dollars per share, and they were to be made in seven one- 
year instalments starting from 1651 and continuing until 
M W . 74
After the 1647 Aot was passed, the bank proceeded to 
set its records straight. The Directors paid the current lia­
bilities out of their cash collections and from the sale of 
55 State 6^  bonds, and in June they entered Into negotiations 
with the bondholders. Terms were reached in .August,1848. The 
1650 bonds, amounting to #1,279,557.14 were extended in equal 
yearly instalments from February 1, 1851, to February 1, 1855. 
Bond interest in arrears, amounting to £675,000 (amount not 
paid in 1842 and 1843), was funded in seven yearly payments
73Ibld.. seoti onn 1 and 2.
7412 La. Ann. 286, Cltlssens flank vs. Levee Steam Cotton 
Compress Company.
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tram Aug«*t 1, 1848, to August 1, 1855.75
Condition. bsgan to etaaao is 1848. On til than the
•Wit* of the Citizens * Bank exceeded its liabilities. After
that tine the liabilities exceeded the assets— much to the
76n r r j  of the State.
Furthermore, not only was the bank showing a deficit 
in its assets to meet liabilities, but the default on extend­
ed debt of 1561 to 1865 was imminent. In all, the bank was 
faced with the need of nee ting a current debt amounting to
w
#1, 873,800. OS.
Mow s were made, therefore, to devise a plan whereby the 
State could rid itself of the obvious need to make good its 
promise to pay in the event the bank could not. Hen? best to 
extricate itself with as little loss as possible from the dilem­
ma in which it found Itself was a serious problem, and one 
which brought forth much controversy and disagreement.
Something had to be done to extricate the State, 
if possible, from its financially perilous position 
in respect to the bonds which, in an evil hour, it
75U k ,  Doc., 1849. "Report of the Board of Bank Manager 
m  the A^faira 'of the Citizens Bank and the Consolidated Asso­
ciation,7 and "Report of Board of Currenoy."
7^1bid.
77ieg. Doc.. 1851, "Report of Board of Managers of Cit­
izens * * IW_
Semi-annua 1 interest —  -----------— ^060,000.00
Interest on 1843 bonds 192,111.15
Instalments on 1650 bonds extended
f m  X351 to 1856 -----------------   621.683.37
$1,573,800.OS
269
had issued in aid of the Bank* Something had to be 
done to advance successful liquidation of the Bank,
If these things went on as they had been going 
the State would inevitable incur the great loss of 
having to pay the bonds with accrued and accruing 
interest
That something was Act No* 141, entitled "An Aot for the relief 
of Citizens* Bank of Louisiana," which was passed March 10,
1852, after much controversy.^^
The State, through the Act, released the Citizens*
Bank from the decree of forfeiture rendered on October 18,
1842, and permitted it to resume operation with all the prlv- 
ileges originally granted by oharter. The Bank, according to 
this Act, had to restore $800,000 of State bonds to the 
Governor, such bands to be purchased by means of contributions
80from the stockholders not in excess of twelve dollars per share.
The sum of $800,000 was specified because that was the
amount that had been estimated as the existing deficit in the
findings of the Joint Committee on Banks. Heal estates of the
Citizens* Bank, they figured, were worth about $5,600,000,
81
while the liabilities equalled $6,500,000.
7®108, La. Ann. 315, Hope &. Co. vs. Board of Liquidation. 
7^Kouse Jour.. 1852, "Joint Committee on Banks,", p. 46. 
8<W  Aots,1852, No* 141, pp. 109-111.
®^Such a deficit, however, the Joint Committee on Banks 
concluded, was only temporary because the stock mortgages which 
secured the State obligations were worth considerably more than 
the bonds outstanding. In other words, they estimated the real 
value of plantations and city properties mortgaged at $11,160,000; 
with other assets included, $12,300,000 stood to pledge $6,500,000.
"The Aot for the Belief of the Citizens1 Bank,” 
however, was vetoed by the Governor after it has passed hoth 
Houses of the Legislature, but the Legislators did not give 
up the plan* The bill was reintroduced and it was bitterly 
fought into passage over the veto.®^*
Even though the majority of the Legislators were 
successful in enacting the bill, the act did not meet the 
approval of the stockholders* In the case of Pollard vs. 
Citizens* Bank It is stated, the "Act of March 10, 1952, 
having failed to resuscitate the defunct Citizens* Bank a 
more successful effort was made under the Act of April 28,
1853, Ho* 246, which introduced a radical change in the consti­
tution of the bank and was accepted by a majority in number
S3and amount of stockholders, and so came Into effect
The **radlcal change** created by Act* No* £46 was that
the defunct property bank was revived as a stock bank; it was 
an set to authorize the Citizens* Bank of Louisiana to convert 
shares secured by mortgage into cash shares* How such a 
change was to take place, nevertheless, was left extremely 
vague and ambiguous:
Q*Sen* Jour** 1852, pp. 39, 47, 48, 58, 99, 111, 113, 
and 143*
House Jour*. 1852, pp* 46-47.
House Deb.*1852. p. 63,
Leg. Doc*. 1852, "Minority Report of Judiciary Co ■-
mittee on tne citizens Bank Bill," and Joint Committee on
Banks and Banking."
Z7X
• • • the Board of Directors ♦ * • shall 
h a w  p o s r  to raise oas million of dollars, by 
obtaining the payment in eash of 10,000 out of 
the 144,000 shares composing the capital stock of 
said Bank, and for that purpose the seid Board of 
Directors are hereby authorised to set apart, to be 
disposed of as hereinafter stated, a proportion of 
the stock held by each stockholder, not exceeding 
« M  <hS of a w r y  fifteen shares; which shares are 
set apart, together with such proportion of the 
eteek held by the Bank as will stake up for 10,000 
shares, axe to be paid In full at the tine and in 
the s u m e r  to be determined by the Board, in order 
to constitute a eash stock; Provided the mortgages 
sals ting against the stockholders to secure the por­
tion of the stock so set apart, shall not be consid­
ered as raised, and the contribution due on the same 
shall remain ss heretofore, payable by each of them 
reaps etlve Xy*
Shat was actually done was apparently a little different from 
what was Intended by law, if the law can be interpreted*
From what appears in writing, it seems as if the Legis­
lators wanted the existing stockholders to relinquish one out 
of fifteen shares held without altering the debt owed, the 
mortgages held as security, or the seven dollars per share 
contribution previously assessed* This share c out ri but ion by 
tbs stockholders would have given the bank 10,000 shares which 
it could sell for eash at $100 per share* That was not the 
interpretation given, however.
When reor^nlzed, the Citizens* Bank had two depart- 
masts: a mortgage department which Included the "dead weight," 
asr the fixed assets and liabilities of the old corporation; and
A eta. 1835, Ho* 846, pp • 807-208.
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a banking department which took over the liquid resources 
of the old firm upon the agreement to make up any difference 
occurring in the mortgage department. The banking department 
became the active part of the bank and the stockholders con­
trolled its affairs along with those of the mortgage depart­
ment, but they were not the same stockholders as before* Ac­
cording to the interpretation given the law, one-third of the 
shares of the old corporation became part of the stock of the 
new company, that is, five thousand shares were tinder the con­
trol of the mortgage stockholders. Ten thousand new shares 
of stock were issued and sold for cash, and this gave the new 
stockholders control of two-thirds of all the stock of the 
b^k.85
The plan of 1853 was accepted by 380 mortgage 
stockholders owning 88,992 shares, rejected by three owning 
458 shares, and not voted upon by 313 owning 54,442 shares—  
there were 143,892 shares in total.Therefore, the new 
bank started business as an active bank in February, 1854, with 
a stock capital of $1,500,000.87
If the opinions of the Courts of Louisiana were correct, 
the Act of 1853 was of great benefit to the 8tate and its peo­
ple. For instance, the case of hope and Company vs. Citizens * 
Bank has the following statement;
0®12 La. Ann.. 228, Pollock vs. Citizens* Bank,
86H. Heck, op. olt,., p. 37.
67Cltizens * Bank and Trust Company of Louisiana. p. 52.
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The evidence established that during the period 
from 1853 to 1680 the banking department paid the 
mortgage stock department alone on the half million 
stock held by the latter department in the former, 
$1,065,000, which was applied in payment of the 
interest on the bonds of the State. This amound 
would doubtless have been much longer, but for the 
Civil War and its resulting demoralization of busi­
ness and destruction of values, both in landed prop­
erty and slaves. In addition to the $1,065,000 so 
paid as profits, to the mortgage 3tock department, 
the banking department advanced its sister depart­
ment the further sum of $682,000 which was applied 
to the bonded indebtedness and which was under the 
termns of the compact of 1853, to be reimbursed.0*3
In 1866, shortly after the Civil War, the State once more 
saw the possibility of having to make good its pledge. Chaos 
had disrupted the activities of business to the point where the 
Citizens* Bank was facing the problems of meeting interest pay­
ments, and reimbursement as well. The bonds of the third se­
ries were maturing in two years, and there were bonds of the 
1850 and 1856 series that had not been redeemed as yet. There­
fore, the 1850,1856,1868,1877, and 1886 bonds were extended to
89mature on February 1,1901,1902,1908,1911. Throughout this 
period, however, the benking department was reducing the bonded 
debt of the Mortgage Stock Department,though the reduction was 
not great. Vhere the debt was $6,253,533.25 In 1853,^° it was
eel0S La. Ann.. 315. Hope and Co. vs. Board of Liqui­
dation.
0^43 La. Ann.. 738 and 108 La. Ann.. 315, Hope and 
Company vs. Board of LlQuldatIon.
90Lefl. Doc.« 1853, "Proceedings of the Board of Currency.n
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rsdueed to $4,803,683.33 by 1678;®^- in almost twenty years, 
searoely $1, 500,000 was paid off. It must be added, however, 
that during this interim, the banking department had issued 
$800,177.77 of its own bank bonds in exchange for State bonds 
end this amount had been reduced to $633, 533. 33. In 1866 
when the extension was granted, the citizens9 Bank State bonds 
totaled $3,797,333,33, a reduction of #£,466,199.08 from 1833.93
In 1874 the Funding Act was passed whereby the bonded 
indebtedness of the State was combined into a consolidated bond­
ed debt, and, as was stated with reference to the bonds of the 
Consolidated Association,9* This Act created some question as to 
the legality and the State’s obligation toward the bonds It had 
issued for and in favor of the property banks. As In the case 
of the Consolidated Association, the bonds of the Citizen9s 
Bank were not Included as fundable. Legal action on the part 
of the European investors was undertaken, therefore, through 
Eope and Company of Amsterdam. In 1889 representatives of the 
Dutch concern brought cult against the State for a conversion 
of the bonds Into consols, and the lower courts declared that 
they were not fundable on the ground that they were not includ­
ed as part of the bonds fundable in the Act of 1874. This
9iIbid., 1072 and 1873* "Heport of the Board of Liquida­
tion fro the Consolidated Association and the Citizens Bank," 
and "Beport of the Auditor of Public Accounts," p. 47, p. 178,
P . 36 «
92lbid., 1864-5. "Keport of the Auditor of Public Ac­
counts," p. X£.
93Ibid* . 1867, p. 31.
feonds Payable Feb. 1, I860 #1,265,333.33
•* " 99 1, 1677 1,264,868.89
q . " ” " 1A 1886 1,267,111.11
®4Chapt«r III, pp. 170-183
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decision m e  reversed by a higher court In 1890, but the
sent dismissed the case because the Amsterdam Company had not
95
followed the proper procedure for the funding of their bonds« 
When it was brought before the court again la 1891, the decis­
ion m s  rendered that the Citizens* Ban* Louisiana Bonds were 
funfeble into consols as provided by the law of 1874, that is 
It held that;
the limit of the bonded indebtedness of the 
State is not exceeded by funding the balance due 
plaintiff. At the tine that the amount of seeu* 
ritles collected was imputable, and at the pres­
ent, the State*a interest was, end is now, to 
pay its consolidated bonds and coupons.90
Instructions were given, therefore, to the Board of
X&fe&fetlaa to fund the bonds la accordance with the law of
1994, that is, to issue consols on the basis of 40 cents on the
feller of old debt. It was ordered, also, that the company be
scarfed interest an the consols at the rate of 7 per cent for
six years, 2 per cent for five years, and 4 per coat from
97
1BQ5 to the time of the funding. From the amount of the 
principal and interest, however, the following items were to 
be deducted:
®54S, La. Aim. 738, Hope and Company vs. Board of 
How*action; end 45, La. Ann. 555.
96Ibld.
97Ibia.: of.. 3. A. Oaldwoll, OP. Pit.. p. 109.
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!• Payments already made - $£,060,466.33
£• Interest on the payments - (not given)
3* Amount already paid by bank on .coupons 300,000.00
4* Gash in bankfa sinking fund for the 
retirement of bonds------------- 85,000.00
5. Amount of Hope & Qo*9s stock in Cit­
izens 1 B a n k ---------------------- 133,000.00
6. Stockholders* Wortgagea guaranteeing 
the bonds  ------------------- 800,000.00
nevertheless, the court’s decision did hot meet the ap­
proval of Hope and Company and they demanded a re-hearing, 
this was refused and the final liquidation was retarded until 
1908. At that time the remaining $230,999 .£2 of bonds were
converted into consols on the basis of 60 cents on the dollar,
99according to the Act of 1374 and ensuing amendments* * The 
end of the bonded debt earns seventy years after the inception 
of tbs third and last property bank incorporated by the Legis­
lators of the State of Louisiana.
The business operations of the Citizens* Bank did not 
eease in October, 1342, when a decree of forfeiture was ren­
dered at the instance of the State against the institution for
98S. A. Caldwell, op. cib,. p. 110.
99
Lea. Doe.. 1902, "Report of the Louisiana State 
Auditor"; iSsLa? Ann. 315, Hgge & C ompany ra. Board of 
liquidation; anT"Report of Louisiana State Auditor. 19^4. 
p.78. ’
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net abiding by the provisions of the laws of February 0 and 
teroh 1B«. Outwardly, business proceeded somewhat as before*
The chief difference was that the power to Issue bank notes 
was re voted. Policies with reference to loans and discounts 
vers not altered by the decree. Management, however, was 
pieced In the hands of officials selected by the Governor; 
a d  Che reason for the change In the administration was that 
the financial condition of the property bank was bod. Be­
cause of mleaanagoment and expensive litigations, the State 
felt it necessary to take control of the affairs of the Insti­
tution in order to protect Itself on the pledge it had made 
to the bondholders end, also, to protect the stockholders who
vers at the mercy of the previous bellgerent directors and 
100officers.
is the Law of March IS made provision for the selection 
of a Board of Managers for banks which were to go into liqui­
dation, the Governor appointed six man to constitute that 
board after the Fifth Diet riot Court of Louisiana rendered the 
decree. These men were; Messrs. &. y. Fore tall, B. Lepretre,
A. Boa, W. Treret, X. Rousseau, and R. Our re 11; and they to ck 
their oath of office October 27, 1642* Soon after they wears 
installed these new members formulated and adopted rules and 
regulations for the future operation of the bank now in the
10043. La. Ann. 736, Hope and Co. vs. Board of Liquids- 
tlon; end H. rSclc, op. clt., p* 34.
E70
State of liquidation; and under the leadership of Mr* For­
etell, president of the Citizens9 Bank from 1336 to 1858, the 
institution was reorganized in order to operate along sound 
policies and practices.**^
tecs use a large number of stockholders had h e w  in ar­
rears for several years, and because these arrears had deprived 
the bank of the means to pay interest on bonds and other obli­
gations, the Board of Managers voted upon measures to force 
payment. The bank’s attorney was instructed to notify all 
stockholders in arrears that unless the arrears were fully 
paid in eash, or in deposits of produce at a valuation of two- 
thirds of their marketable value, or by additional satisfactory 
security, it would be necessary to institute foreclosure pro­
ceedings* Furthermore, if produce were deposited, the bank re­
served the right to dispose of it at any time within ninety 
days by order of the depositor, or by the bank’s own pleasure 
after nlsety days, provided It was disposed of at the current 
market pries.102
Marly in 1843, Mr* Edmund 1. for stall was elected pres­
ident of the Board of Managers for the Citizens’ Bank, while 
he continued to represent Hope and Company of Amsterdam, 
bondholders and agents for bonholders of the firm’s securities; 
and thus he was In a peculiar position. Actually, Mr* For stall
1843, pp. 11-13
102Ibid.. p. 14.
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was acting for two separate and opposite groups simultaneous­
ly* Strange as this might hare been, however, he served to 
the good interest of both, although not without conflict and 
complication— but it was typical of Mr. Forstall. Under his 
supervision, the bank restricted its previously lax discount 
praetioes, refrained from placing Its income in ’frozen1 
assets, and insisted upon prompt payment on loan Instalments. 
Soe]| policies were to the good interest of the State, the 
stockholders, the bondholders, and the bank. That was because 
it was sound banking. Nevertheless, queer situations were 
soon to arise. For instance, after the Board of Managers ob­
served the financial situation of the firm It was decided to 
notify the Governor, and Hope and Company that the Citizens’
Bank could not meet its February 1, 1843, interest payment on
103the bonds, and this notice was given by Mr. Forstall - Being
the representative for Hope and Company, Mr. Forstall found 
that he had to-deliver a protest to the president of the bank—  
Mr. For s tall - -and to the Governor because of non-fulfillment 
of a contractual agreement. Mr. Forstall complained In the 
"Memorial for Hope and Company in Behalf of the Holders of the 
Citizens’ Bank State Bonds” that this protest was completely 
ignored by the president of the Board of Managers (who was Mr. 
Forstall). Obviously, however, these absurdities were for 
legal purposes and not too serious in nature* Defaults oon-
lOSlbld. a p. 9; Leg. Doc.. 1843-1844; and R. C. Mo 
Granc, op. cItT. p* 185.
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tilled and more protesta ware made without either group In-
dieating worry over the situation. Nevertheless , that there
was pressure cannot he doubted for Mr* Far&t ,11 found it
104nee* as cry to resign as president in 1644;.
April 5, 1843, the State passed an aot to facilitate
the liquidation of the Citizens* Bank, along with that of the
C sbs oil da ted Asaooia tlon. Again the law str ted that the assets
of the bank were to go into the possession and exclusive man-
agesent of the State, and the powers of the Board of Managers
were redefined and broadened* To facilitate the payment of
arrears cm loans and other debts, the act provided that these
debtors could offset or partly offset such loans or debts by
offering in payment any bonds of the State issued in favor of 
10Sbanks* This provision, as has been discussed in detail
with respect to the Consolidated Association, permitted the
cotton factors end the planters with a means of breaking the
English boycott on American cotton* It did not, however, place
IOCthe bank on a sound footing. It did not provide the insti­
tution with a badly needed portfolio— liquid assets*
Despite the management under the supervision of the 
State, and despite the provisions of Act Ko. 92, losses con­
tinued to mount— especially after Mr. Forstall ceased being 
president. By 1645, therefore, the Finance Consul ttee of the
10*IM.d.
Acta. No. 92, pp. 66-57.
1063u£ra>
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State Legislature was delegated to investigate the financial 
situation of the Citizensf Bank* They found the losses to he 
considerable, but they felt that if the stockholders were as­
sessed not more than twenty-five dollars per share, it would toe 
sufficient to cover the bank*s liabilities adequately without 
forcing the State to assume any loss whatever. In order to 
mate this assessment, the committee suggested, therefore, that 
the stockholders toe allowed to elect members on the Board of 
teasgen and Directors of the Citizensf Bank in order to repre­
sent their interest in the liquidation. Furtli©more, the com­
mittee advised an extension for the bonds falling due in 1850
so as to give the institution sufficient time to collect the
107assessments from the stockholders.
Therefore, in 1847, the suggestions of the 'Finance Com­
mittee were enacted Into law, and the State relinquished its 
exclusive management in the affairs of the Citizensf Bank* 
Instead of there being a Board of Managers for the Citizens *
Bank selected by the Governor, the State designed a Board of 
Bank Mangers which was to function in conjunction with the 
Directors elected toy the stockholders; that is, three men selec­
ted toy the Governor were to assist In the management but v;®ro 
net to have exclusive administrative control: one member of the 
board was to toe President of the Board of Bank Managers; the
107leg. Doe.. 1846, "jReport of the Finance Committee,” 
April 26, 1846; House Jour. . 1846, pp. 120-123; and it. G. 
MeGrane, op* clt., p* 15^
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otfcw, Pwslfiiat of the Consolidated Association; and the 
third. President of the Citizens* Bank* The directors were 
to he elected in the manner specified by the charter*^®
Hhlle this Aot Ho* 100 of 1847 did provide for an assess­
ment, the amount was not stated, the only provision being that 
the Instalments not extend beyond seven y e a r s T h e  amount 
of the assessment was left to be ascertained by the managers 
and directors of the bank, and it took them three years to 
deeide. TinaIly, in 1850, it was figured that seven dollars
per Share payable one dollar per year would ba sufficient to
110aeet all claims against the bank. That was considerably
leas than what the Finance Committee had suggested; but why
this assessment was placed so low Is difficult to visualize,
because the managers and directors knew that the fina was not
adequately prepared to meet even the current obligations from
111
the portfolio and the one dollar yearly instalment*
•?gfl11 as the ass6 3ament was, however, the stockholders, 
for the most part refused to pay* The reason given for the non­
payment was that the property owners were facing on usual diffi-
112
eultiee during 1851 and 1852.
The real difficulty encountered by the bank in not being 
able to » e t  its obligations from the funds that should have
La« Acts. 1847, Ho* 100, pp. 76-78.
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Ibid*
11047 ja ^ AjMlt 1374, D_* JU Breard vs. Citizens * Bank.
1 U Leg. Poe*. 1850, *Keport of the Board of Bank Man­
agers of the citizens * Bank*”
112Ibld* * 1851, op* pit*.
been available was not because the stockholders refused to pay 
their instalments or assessments, although that was a fac­
tor that limited the working capital of the bank. The more 
basic cause of the difficulty was that the bank invested its 
working funds in wfroreaM assets, instead of keeping the 
funds liquid, or readily convertible. The Board of Bank -im­
agers gives an illustration of this fact in & report to the 
Stats Legislature. In the report is described the action 
taken by the Directors when ihe St. Charles Hotel was 
destroyed by fire.^3
Included as part of the fixed assets of the Citizens* 
Bank was the St. Louis building in Hew Orleans which had been 
In a state of depriclation for several years and had been an 
untenanted and unprofitable establishment— a "dead weight.” 
When the St. Charles Hotel burned, it was though a good 
opportunity to make a paying affair out of the St. Louis
building. The directors converted the edifio© into a hotel,
114and at a considerable expense. The revenues therefrom 
were not what hed been expected and the investment amounted 
to another "sinking* of liquid funds in "frozen* assets, a 
good example of whet the bank was doing with funds which 
were to go toward the payment of interest and principal on 
their bonds. No wonder the institution was not in a
113Ibld.. 1851, OP. clt.
114
J The size of the building was enlarged, and it was 
made completely modern in order to make it equal to or rival 
any hotel in New Orleans.
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p»*p«roa8 situation; no condor the 3tat® became fearful of
having to pay the interest and principal on bonds it had
issued in favor of the bank; and no wonder plans were being
devised to change the characteristic nature of the firm in
order to establish & stock bank instead of a property bank*
Hew blood was Introduced when the Citizens’ Bank was re-
organised by the provisions of Act No, £46 in 1853, When the
sort gage stockholders accepted the plan of dividing the bank
into two separate departments they ceased to have exclusive
control of the institution. By the sale of 10,000 shares for
cash in order to create a banking department, the control went
to the new stockholders, with the mortgage stockholders re-
115talnlng but cne-t ird active interest. Thus,the cash stock­
holders operated the firm to their best Interest in order to 
keep the company solvent and reap profits, "Furthe more, the 
yanking department wes anxious to rid itself of the obligations 
It had assumed when it had accepted the resources of the prop­
erty bank. Therefore, for a few years the apparently wild 
scheme devised by the State Legislators v.aa operating to the 
good interest of every party concerned.
The Banic of October 14, 1857, however, disrupted the 
successful operation which had been in evidence since February, 
1854, when the reorganized bank opened for business. On Octo­
ber 14, the banking department suspended payments on its de-
115xs la. Ann, 226, Pollock vs. Citizens’ Bank,
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posits, but continued to meet payments on its circulation.
That suspension, fortunately, did not lest long* Timely and 
judloious assistance from the other New Orleans banks which 
had been reestablished on a sound basis after the passage of 
the Bank Act of 1842, enabled the Citizens’ Bank to resume 
payments on all obligations by November 3* Nevertheless, it 
was evident that the financial status of the bank was not 
such as to permit future payments of interest and principal on 
the bonds* The Board of Currency upon examining the affairs 
of the institution found that very few bonds had been redeemed 
from 1654 and 1857 and that there was the second series of 
bonds coming due in 1659* The Board of Ivlanagers felt that 
assistance was necessary*1*^ An extension of the maturity dates, 
therefore, was considered, but no extension was voted by the 
legislature.
The Civil War disrupted all the activities of the Cit­
izens’ Bank, and when it was over the revenue-producing proper­
ties were virtually destroyed, or extremely deflated in value* 
What was the bank to do to meet its obligations, past due and 
coming due? The State, therefore, made an effort in 1Q66 to 
relieve some of the pressure by extending the maturity dates
of the bonds due in 1859 and coming due in 1868,1877, and 1886
117to 1901, 1902, 1908, and 1911. Nevertheless, the extension
did not solve the immediate problem of meeting current oblige-
U Sheg* Doc* * 1857-1858, "Report of the Board of Cur­
rency t o t h e  Legislature, ” pp• 4-5•
1X743 L b . Ann. 730, Ho„e and Co* vs* Board of Liquida­
tion*
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felons; Interest jhymsnta and other debts wars paid whenever
1X6possible, but the revenues were not always sufficient, 
to obtain the necessary funds, therefore, the directors took 
atroRger measures to force payments on the mortgage stock 
loans; and when payments were not forthcoming, they insti­
tuted foreclosure proceedings.
fhe bank's policy of foreclosing on mortgage loans 
brought to the front many e ant rove rales. Sour of the proper* 
ties which carried with them mortgage stooks had been sold or 
transferred and the new owners refused to recognize any obli­
gation to the bank. Other property owners maintained that 
*11 their obligations had been fulfilled and that they were 
no longer responsible for any debt on the mortgage stocks: et
cetera. Court action after court action, therefore, took
119
place between 1866 and 1830.
Finally, in 1380, the State Legislature passed an act 
•to enable the Citizensf Bank of Louisiana to make a compromise 
ans settlement with its mortgage stockholders; to enable said 
stockholders to free t\ eir real estate from said mortgages; to 
secure the application of the amount© realized from said mort-
llflLe^. Poo.. 1067, 1069, 1372, and 1374, "Keport of
the Auditor of rublic Accounts."
11Q
Cf.. for instance, 22 La, Ann. 117, Citizens* Bank vs. 
8. A. KnajTn: 23 Ln^ Ana. 275, C. K. Bryae re. Citizens* Bank;
TB La. Ann. 295, STtizens* Bank vs.B. 3tAaan»: 23 La. Ann. 567, 
Citizens’ Bank vs. X. A. gluker; 24 La_. Ann. 273, mTA*.' feTlS 
U .  "Citizens * Bank; 26 La. Ann. 264, Citizens ♦ Bank vaTO. L» 
Jlssisl 28 La'.' Ann. 771. citizens» Bank vs. G. M. Bailey.
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M M  to the payment of the State bonds Issued in aid or the
Bank, and to the legal liabilities and necessary expenses of
120
m i d  mortgage stock department; • • •" That compromise was
reached in July, and by its terms the mortgage stockholders
more to hare returned to them their titles on the mortgaged
property upon payment of their obligations to the tank, and
their stocks were to be returned and canceled* Also by this 
*>
Compromise, which required the assent or the bondholders, 
arrangements were made to hare Hope and Company of Amsterdam 
be a m s as stockholder in payment of interest in arrears on 
the beads*3, 3
Thus, the Compromise of 1380 with the mortgage stock­
holders opened the way for the bank to free itself from the 
bardaasa&e mortgage stock department, and by 1911, when the 
bank was again reorganized, there were no longer any mort­
gage stockholders *
CHAPTER VI
INFLUENCE AMD IMPORTANCE OF LOUISIANA PHOPHWTY BANKS
degree and emphasis that should he placed on the 
influence end Importance of the Louisiana property banks in 
Lonleianav the South, and the Nation is difficult to deter­
mine or ascertain baeauee they were but a part of a far 
greater movement which in itself was complice ted and not too 
specific. These three Louisiana mortgage banks were neither 
Use cause of the optimism and the Inflationary practices ex* 
lading during that period, nor the cause of the crisis that 
followedy seen though they were contributing factors in both 
Instancies, They were more the result of the general attitude 
end behavior toward economic conditions. These bank& existed 
in a period of wild and speculative optimism when everyone—  
farmers, business man, speculators, and lawmakers included—  
operated under tie assumption that prosperity was permanent, 
amd each individual had, it appears, a different idea on how 
te proceed to reap quick profits while expanding to achieve 
greater and more self-sufficiency* Louisiana*s proper­
ty banks represent one of these ideas; they are but an inci­
dent out of a multitude of events*
386
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Trem X804 to 1824 Louisiana had beau somewhat moderate 
1* banting. During this twenty-year period the State 
granted but four charters for stock-banka, find of these only 
too were in existence in 1824* Ho state assistance had been 
glean to say of these corporations; the capital had been sup­
plied locally.
By 1884 eosBieroe had expanded so rapidly, largely be­
cause the steamboat monopoly had been broken by the 1817
1
fibrous vs. Livingston case, that the coumierelal interests
sad the la makers felt that the two banks with a nominal oapital 
2
Of »* ,500,000 were extremely inadequate to m&et the existing 
needs for development* Inasmuch as local private capital was 
insufficient to undertake a large banking program, and inas­
much as there existed much hesitancy on the part of foreign 
capitalists to acquire stocks which would entitle them to con­
trol the affairs of the banks, the State was persuaded to 
eater actively into the field of banking* In order to entice 
the foreign capital without relinquishing oontrol over the 
proposed company, the State became a stockholder In the Bank 
of Louisiana ami it Issued bonds for and in favor of the cor­
poration in payment for tho stocks received; the bonds were 
sold to provide the necessary funds for operation.
This Bank of Louisiana venture opened the avenue of 
through which the State could participate for the pur-
iSHESLP* 40 • 
Supra*» pp. 16, IB
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1 W S  ef towlopawat, The venturesome legislatere with hut a 
hasy conception of economic and governmental problem® felt that 
their young and growing State could be made self-sufficient 
sad prosperous through Investments In various enterprises by 
the media of banks * Their faulty conceptions concerning the 
functions and purposes of banks led them to attempts at ©rest­
ing wealth through the excessive use of banking privileges. 
Their wild dreams told them that there could never be too much 
capital; the proceeds from the sale of bonds could always be 
employed at a profit* and the earnings from the use of the 
capital fads would undoubtedly be sufficient to pay the inter­
est on the bonds and eventually to retire the principal. Most 
Of the experiments* however* proved to be costly and unduly 
burdensome on the State and its people*
In so far as the oos&erclal interests were not the only 
OSes witnessing the possibilities of large profits from the 
expansion of eomaerce* and in so far as commerce was not the 
only activity In which the lawmakers were Interested* other 
pressure groups were soon actively demanding assistance and 
privileges• The state was induced to venture into fields now 
considered to be reserved to private enterprise and to be out­
side the realm of - government function.
The most influential pressure group was the plantation
3owners* especially the sugjar planters. It was considered 
-a
According to F. X, ifertln, Louisiana was furnishing at 
the time almost half of the auger consumed in the United States 
and it was bidding fair to supply a good portion of the remain­
der. (Op * ©it., p. 43d.)
mto* sdtl prosperous class la society sad tlie members tod ©on- 
Sidereblo influence In the Legislature; many of them were 
leg! a la tors In one or the other branch of the legislative 
tody* It was not surprising, therefore, to have this group 
exert its influence to obtain assistance, and it was not sur­
prising sitter to see it obtain more privileges and assist­
ance than say other group*
The other groups to demand State help were the improve­
ment interests* The railroad, canal, hotel, public utilities, 
oft trade promoters were active in persuading the members of 
toe legislature that their programs needed privileges and as­
sistance to be carried into effect for the further develop­
ment sad benefit of Louisiana. They, too, wanted banking 
privileges* Some of the improvement companies were even suc­
cessful in obtaining direct assistance by receiving State 
bonds issued far and in their favor, although the amount of 
such bonds wee in no way comparable to the amount received 
by the property banks,
  from 1B27 to 1037 new banks were created for many
groups that promised to promote on improvement undertakingi 
the majority of these institutions were organised between 1833 
sad 1836. During the decade prior to 1837 no 1©3S than thlr- 
t o n  ton** were incorporated, and three of these were property 
beaks* Thus, in 1837 there were no less than sixteen banking 
eeapenies, all situated in Hew Orleans , and aojna of them had 
severe! branches in other important eities within the State *
f
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Altogether, these Institutions had a nominal capital of ap- 
premiss tely $55,000,000 and a paid-up capital of nearly 
f3®#OQO, 0 0 0 The State became part owner in seven different 
haute, and on their account had incurred a bonded debt of 
aboat **4,000,000.
To determine the relative importance of the mortgage 
teat log fiiaa, it is necessary to mate a comparison on other 
bases than the number of banka . Foremost, it is essential to 
eempaw the capital of the institutions with that of the or­
dinary stock corporations engaged in banking. The nominal 
authorised capital of the three property banks was:
Consolidated Association I2,500,000
TJhion Bank 7,000,000
CitIzens* Bank 13,000,000
i21,500,000
Of this amount approximately £14,000,000 In bonds had been 
negotiated by May, 1637, On the other hand, the nominal cap­
ital of the stock banks was:
4
There la no definite data which give3 the nominal and 
paid -up capital of the sixteen banks a® of or before May,
1037• The nearest date for such information is December 33, 
1037, at which time Edmund ,T. For*tall, chairmen of the Senate 
Committee, presented a chart on the banks of Hew 
Orleans (of- r s, A. Trufant, op» clt, > p. 8), For substan­
tiating data eee also 34 Ceng• 8 Sess* ’>x. Doc, Ho, 65, pp, 
188-103, and 25 Cong. 2 Sees* Fx, Doc. Ho. 79, pp. 654-655.
5cr.. S. A. GBiaw.ll, op. Clt., p. 82.
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Atehaffclaya Ball Bead and Banking CoK^ftay 
O w n l  and Banking Company 
Carrollton Bank 
City Bank
42,000,000
4.000.000
3.000.000
2.000.000
3.000.000
2.000.000 
6,000,000 
2,000,000 
2,000,000
Commercial Bank
Exchange and Banking Coopany 
Bn  tklaaas Gas Light and Banking Company 
I t pi oiNnt and Basking Company 
Beohsnloa and Traders Ba»k 
Iterate nta Bank s^ssuaa&c
$27,000,000
Of thin amount authorized only about $10,000,000 was paid-up 
by tfey, 1837• Thus, the capitalization for the ten stock 
banks created during the decade was slightly more than for the 
property banks; it was J5,300,000 more in the amount of au­
thorised capital, and approximately 14,000,000 more in paid-up 
capital• For the purpose of comparison, however, it is neces­
sary to include in the analysis the three stock banks in ex­
istence prior to 1327, and their capital was:
Host of their authorized capitalization was paid-up.
The relative importance of the three property banks 
is evidenced partially by comparing their nominal and paid-up 
capital with that of the thirteen stock banks. The mortgage 
banking establishments were capitalized at $21,300,000 while 
the others had $23,500,000. On a percentage basis the mort­
gage had nearly forty per cent of the authorized cap-
g
S. A. Trufant, og. olt. . p. 6; 24 Cong. 2 Sess. Tv*«
Poe., Bo. 65, pp. 152-loS; and 25 Gong. 2 Bess. Lx. Doe.# 
Bo. 79, pp. 654-655.
Bank of Orleans 
Louisiana State dank 
Bank of Louisiana
i 500,000 
2,000,000 
A*v$Q*.°Q9
16,500,000
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ltal while the stock banks had slightly more then sixty per 
ecmt; roughly, one fifth of the Hew Orleans banks— the prop­
erty bank*--had approximately two-fifths of the nominal cap­
ital* On the basis of what tod actually been paid-up, the 
« « tgcge basking firms held about twenty-seven per oent, or 
somewhere around three-eighths of the total paid-up capital.
The amount of capital of a particular group of institu­
tions, however, does not determine conclusively their impor­
tance in relation with other banking establishments. More 
convincing as a determining factor is the type and volume 
of business of each group.
Foremost to remember concerning property banks is thitt 
they employed a unique system to entice the capital for their 
operations• Tie stockholders did not supply the funds. In­
stead, they were the ones that wanted capital funds, and the 
mortgage banks were organised to assist them and the other 
property oners. All that these stockholders contributed 
were mortgages that served as security for the bonds that were 
issued to acquire the capital; the scheme was not an orthodox 
sms whereby operating funds ore procured by the sale of 
Meeks.
The other banks were regular stock corporations wherein 
the subscribers supplied the capital, and the majority of 
these institutions were chartered to foster seme definite iia-
V
The mathematical calculation is 39.09 and 60.91 per
eent.
*#5
prove nan t ^ r e g m «  Throat Gas Light Company, How Or*- 
loni mas equipped with a gas light system which gave the city 
the heat street lights la the Halted States, and so success- 
fal mas the enterprise that the State granted the company 
bsalrlsg privileges to facilitate the establishment of a light­
ing system la Springfield, Ha pole on vi lie # Ha rri e onburg, Alex- 
asdvl*, and Port Hudson. Through the Canal and Banking Com­
pany a navigable canal was constructed from lake Ponehertrain 
to B m p i t  Street. Through the Improvement and Banking Company 
the Salat Louie Hotel was bnilt. Through the Kxchange end
^  a
Baanng Company the Saint Charles Hotel was constructed. The 
AtChafklayn Bail Road and Banking Company was chartered to 
build a railroad to act as a "feeder’ to the Mississippi 
Blear txafflo. Most of the other banka too were created to 
faster particular developments.
The capital for the majority of these improvement 
Mnv* was obtained either In Louisiana or In the United States. 
ftqainr&tlvely little came from abroad; what was Induced from 
Barope earns by means of the sale of bonds which had been Is—
Seed by the State for and in favor of the corporations , not 
frue the sale of stocks. The bonds, however, were not secured 
la the same oszmer as for those of the property banks*
®s. A. Caldwell, pp. pit., pp. 61-58.
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CAPITAL Or STOCK BAHKS— WHERE HELD
Haae
Held in 
Europe
Held in
United
States
Held in 
Louisiana
Atehaf&lay* none none # 767,885
Canal #1,601,700 #2,016,700 381,350
Carrollton 614,000 176,550 1 ,285,300
Oity 153,100 918,600 928,300
c w i m l a l 297,600 742,900 1 ,959,300
Sxehaage none 833,560 559,510
Oas Light 43,200 937,210 872,045
XSPlOWMBt none none 1,597,732
Bank of Louisiana 1,665,600 56,500 2,375,580
Louisiana State dank 1,002,100 325,040 602,300
Maohsalts end Traders 193,000 883,950 921,440
K n o t a t s none 965,000 35,000
Orleans 107.500 102,900 214*000
$5,478,080 #7,358,710 $12 ,289,742
Banking privileges were desired by the Louisiana improve- 
■eat companies chiefly as a means of obtaining revenue to foo­
ter the development and as a means of facilitating payments on 
the construction under way* for the most part, they were in­
terested in issuing certificates of indebtedness which could be 
need as circulating notes in discounting commercial paper, in 
handling dcmastio exchange, and in accepting deposits. The 
prlmry interest of most of the improvement banking companies 
was not in granting loans to people, except as such credit was 
beneficial to the immediate building program* The ma jority of 
fcifHfi did not deal extensively In foreign bills of exchange,
£97
at least not to the extent as did the commercial end prop­
erty bank*
with the property banks circulation was less important 
than it w«a for the improvement banks* These Institutions 
were primarily interested in granting loans and in discounting 
esws w l a l  paper offered by the cotton and sugar factors and 
growers* Dealings in foreign bills of exchange ware impor­
tant for the mortgage banks because clients, whom they served 
in an effort to encourage agricultural developments and im­
provements, demanded an agency which dealt in foreign drafts 
in order to facilitate the sale of their products abroad and 
to provide the means of acquiring the equipment and the com­
modities desired*
While there are no figures available to verify the be­
lief that the property banks were more important than the 
regular stock banks in the granting of loans and In the deal­
ings in foreign exchange, the very nature of their organiza­
tion and purpose indicates that they were* There are figures, 
however, to substantiate the fact that they were relatively 
moere important than these other companies in the usual fields 
of business activity— discounts, individual deposits, and 
domestic exchange*
2*0
A COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OR THE BASES OF SEW ORISAHS,
September* 1606
Type of Activity atock Banks ’ Property Banks
Mseotmts 1 22,715,005 $ 13,415,879
Dosestie Exchange 7,011,965 3,211,000
Circulation 3,957,400 1,966,000
Individual Deposits £,96ot628 1, 524 , 300 q
OovenscBt Deposits 1,892,516** 2,650,000**
♦includes ten of the eleven stock banks existing at said
date: no report from the Orleans Bank.
♦♦The Commercial Bank and the Union Bank ♦
The three mortgage establishments handled thirty-three
per cent of the discounts, while the regular banks handled
fifty-six per cent Property banks dealt in twenty-nine
per cent of the domestic exchange* while the other banks dealt
11in slxty-one per cent. Property banks had thirty-four per 
cent of the individual deposits and the other banking companies 
had sixty-six per cent * Thirty-three per cent of the bank 
notes were issued by the three mortgage firms and the others 
leaned sixty-seven per cent* Sunmerlly, one-fifth of the 
banking establishments in New Orleans— the three property banks 
— handled about one-third of the banking affairs of the city.
*25 Cong. 2 Sess. Ex. Doc. X<o* 79* pp. 654-655.
10
The New Orleans Branch of the second Bank of the 
Oil ted States handled eleven per cent of the discounts.
13-phe Orleans Branch of the second Bank of th©
tfolted States dealt In ten per cent of the domestic exohang©.
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Beyond the State lines the Louisiana property banks 
were also Important and influential* Hie so banks along with 
the other hanking establishment a in Mew Orleans served a 
wide area and they were essential to the newer regions of 
this country. The cotton-grewlag region was spreading through 
the Gulf States, and Hew Orleans cans to replace Charleston 
as the leading cotton export center* "Moreover cotton was an 
cocport crop, as far as the South was concerned, and the ser­
vices of middleman and banker were a necessity to the plan-*
1£
taticn*" Fewer settlers inhabited these newer regions, but 
the demands for capital were heavy; Hew Orleans, as much as it 
was able to do so, was called up to assist In some measure to 
provide the necessary capital*
Cotton producers in surrounding states and territories 
like Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Mexican Texas shipped 
their cotton to Hew Orleans where they received bank notes for 
their produce* Cotton factors handled the cotton for export 
through the financial assistance of the Hew Orleans banking 
firms* Cosnerelal, negotiable notes resulting from these 
cotton transactions were accepted by the Hew Orleans banks for 
discount* Besides, because of the city's position as a center, 
individmls from without the state had substantial deposits 
in the New Orleans banks* Furthermore, the Inhabitants of the 
regions about Louisiana Imported numerous European, Asiatic,
L. H. Jenks, o p . olt. . p. 76
300
South Aiorlcaa, and Eastern products which came through How 
Orleans and they were financed largely by the banks of this 
elty* Those imports were British manufactured goods, French 
wines, Brasilian coffee, Hong Kong tea and silk, e& cetera, 
and when cotton was not sufficient to balance the payments, 
specie was called for find Hew Orleans was the source of sup­
ply through a redemption of bank notes or a demand of the 
payweat of the deposits In specie.^3
13For the period prior to 1337 Louisiana banks are 
sobs times accused of Issuing excessive amounts of circulation 
notes. Bad this been the case Hew Orleans banks would have 
been forced to suspend specie payments much before May of 
1837. For the most part the Louisiana banking companies were 
careful not to flood the Southwestern region with their notes 
simply because it m s  more profitable and advantageous for 
them to maintain sufficient specie on reserve for redemption.
Boras economic historians say that Louisiana learned 
its lesson from an excessive issuance of paper money and passed 
the Bank Act of 1Q4B to insure sound currency by providing 
that Individual deposits and circulation be secured by at least 
crae-third specie and two-thirds sound commercial paper* That 
statement is partly true, but it infers that Louisiana made 
no effort to control the issue of bank notes prior to 1342. 
Louisiana banks did come to issue more paper notes than was 
politic to do, but the banks did attempt voluntarily not to 
issue too many notes and to maintain an adequate specie re­
serve. Uhfortunately the voluntary action on the part of the 
individual banks was not sufficient to behave properly when 
over-optimism took sway. Even then, however, it was not un­
controlled printing of paper money; the lack of control came 
after the suspension of payments in specie after May, 1837.
Up to the end of 1836 the Hew Orleans banks cannot be 
accused of "Greenbackisra” or fiat money inflation. The Bank 
of Louisiana, the Louisiana State Bank, the Union Bank, the 
Citizens* Bank, and the Consolidated Association were quite 
ssrsful to maintain a safe and adequate specie reserve* The 
other banks, either voluntarily or otherwise, found it expedi­
ent to have a substantial reserve for redemption purposes; if 
they had not,the stronger banka would have embarrassed them 
financially, the Hew Orleans branch of the second Bank of the 
(Continued on next page)
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New Orleans and Its banks not only served the cotton
states surrounding it, but it served, also, a large area in the
upper Mississippi basin, although It failed to take proper
commercial advantage of this area and It was eventually taken
by the East* Before the days of railroads the vvest was quite
dependent upon the Mississippi River and its tributaries with
Sew Orleans as the outlet for trade relations with the outside*
The capital olty of Louisiana found Itself at the center of a
large trading area which it took for granted*
•By 1621 the fgolden period of commerce* in New Orleans 
14
was well wader way*" At first the produce of the upper
Mississippi region came down in boats that were dismantled for
the lumber once New Orleans was reached because these boats
were not powered to make the return trip* That meant that the
Western producers sold their produce for bank notes and a few
items which could be carried home easily* Later, when the
steanfeoat was developed and perfected, the process did not
change; the Westerners continued to get the bank notes and
15
their ships were allowed to return almost empty* Louisiana
United 3?a4esBwaS?Sf^Aave done the same, and the State could have 
forced them to forfeit tteir charters*
In 1835 the circulation and deposits totaled f8,248,382, 
while the specie held was £2,749,300, or a thirty-three and a 
third per cent reserve. Had the Louisiana banka continued this 
reserve policy toward the end of 1836, during 1837, and after, 
mo crisis would have depressed business to the extent It did from 
1S57 to 1643* (Cf * * 25 Cong. 2 Bess. F>x. Doc. No. 79, ip .654-655* ) 
14
S. A. Caldwell, op. olt., p. 31.
XCIbld., p. 34.
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Played a part in the process of distributing the pro- 
duoe, hut they failed to stimulate the import trade of that 
nee region; they were more concerned with the export and im­
port trade of New Orleans and the vicinity- Such a behavior 
was caused by either a lack of foresight or a lack of banking 
capital*
That .Louisiana la eked the necessary capital, to amply 
encourage the course of Western trade through its port city 
appears improbable according to the statistical data and the 
economic historians* The banking capital of New Orleans from 
1035 to 18A2 exceeded that of any State in the United States 
with the exception of Pennsylvania if the capital of the 
Uhited States Bank of Pennsylvania is included*^ Moreover,
BANKING CAPITAL OF CERTAIN STATES 
January, 1338
State Number or Banks Capital
New York 93 # 36,611,460
Massachusetts 134 37,080,000
Louisiana 16 39,943,832
Pennsylvania — 24,944,435
Georgia 11,790,573
diabase 3 10,150, 528
Florida 6 2,387,585
Arkansas 1 413,105<t v*
Mississippi U 19,231,123
^^Ibid.. p* 32; Financial Register of the United States. 
Vol. II, 55387 P* 37.
lTFlnanclal Register of the Ufa!ted States. Vol. II,
1838, p. JSTl
SOS
Louisiana *s State debt for the purpose of acquiring capital 
exceeded that of any State except Pennsylvania, and most of 
that debt was incurred for banks* property banks in particular*
VT.BTS or CERTAIN STATES OP TO 1836
States For Banks Total
Alabama $ 7,700,000 4 10,800,000
Arkansas 3,000*000 3,000,000
Illinois 3,100,000 11,600*000
1,390,000 11,890, 000
Kentucky 3,000,000 7,369,000
Louisiana 33,950,000 33,385,000
Maine 554,976
Miry land 11*493,960
Massaehuse tt s 4,390,000
Mississippi 7,000,000 7,000,000
Missouri 3,500,000 2,500,000
Mew York 18,262,406
Ohio 6,101,000
Busnsy Iranis 27,306,700
South Carolina 5,753,700
Tennessee 3,000,000 7,148,166- _ 
6,662,189Virginia
According to the Niles weekly Register the bank capital of the 
Southwest * of which the New Orleans banking capital was In­
cluded* was 463*407,764 in 1837 and 461,943,086 in 1839* That 
was comparatively larger than for the .aore densely populated 
and industrialized regions of the Eastern and Middle Atlantic 
States.
IS
E . 1. Bogart, op. Pit., p. 326.
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BANK CAPITAL XH THE UNITED STATES
StatM 1830 1837 1839
Uitaia
Kiddle
Southern
Southwest
Western
I 35,297,879 
43,791,200 
26,830,703 
1,688,417 
1,834,386
$ 65,023,241 
79,604,882 
29,920,858 
69,407,764 
23,927,571
$ 62,534,026 
79,024,708 
57,033,436 
81,943,086.- 
31,154,620
nevertheless, there Is some justification for claiming 
that Louisiana lacked the necessary capital to develop the 
Weston trade down the Mississippi River to New Orleans* One 
reason Is that the hanks in their optimism employed too much 
of the available capital to encourage the development of sugar 
and cotton at home* The immediate prospects of profits fran 
the sale of these produots and the importation of slaves and 
technical improvements concealed the losses t at were incurred 
by neglecting the traffic of the Silsslssippi Valley*
Another reason is that the State employed a good por­
tion of its credit facilities for the establishment of banks, 
sad neither the state nor the batiks had the necessary facilities 
to Improve the river navigation system and to establish a oys — 
tarn of railroads. The river by itself was not adequate to 
mfee transportation of the Western exports and imports simple
~  ■ — ig------
Niles Weekly Register, Vol. AVI, p. 54%m
50
S* A * Oaldwell, op_* cl,t-g .» p. 37*
805
sad inexpensive* According to an article In the ^Albany 
Argus* quoted la Hunt’s Merchants * Magazine,
A farmer on the Ohio, at a point, any Clneln- 
nati, equally or farther distant from New York than 
New Orleans, can transport his produce to New York 
and net as amah profit as to carry it to New Orleans• 
In the one case, nature had provided him with a mag­
nificent highway almost before his door, and art had 
provided ample at earners ready to carry it to New Or­
leans; yet, most perversely, he"goes up the Ohio to 
Portsmouth; traverses a canal of throe hundred miles 
by slow marches; comas to Lake Erie, unships his pro­
duce, and bears it 150 miles, on a boisterous lake, 
to Buffalo; unships It again, to a boat on the grand 
canal, end then toils along 300 miles, through a river 
4 feet deep and 40 feet wide, to the Hudson; and then, 
after one more shipment, he floats It down to Its des­
tination, the New York market* All this can be done, 
and with as much profit to the producer* as to float 
it down a single river to New Orleans * x
As long as the price of cotton and sugar remained high, 
and as long as the price of land remained inflated in value, 
the banks of New Orleans appeared prosperous; there was hope 
that the mortgage system of banking would be advantageous for 
Louisiana. Y/ben the bottom fell out of prices, however, the 
property banks were found to be unsound, and the credit bridge 
which they were maintaining between Europe and the Southwest 
region collapsed* After 1Q37, therefore, the Louisiana prop­
erty banks ceased to be of constructive importance* The Con­
solidated Association of the Planters of Louisiana and the Cit­
izens* Bank were reduced to a state of insolvency and they were
^Hunt's Merchants * Magazine * Yol* XXXX, p. 31*
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mnnbi© to eonf ozm with the more restrictive policies ©stab- 
llahed by the Bank Act of 1842. Thus they were forced into
liquidation. In the case of the Citizens* Bank it was deemed
advisable to permit the creation of a regular stock depart­
ment to take over the assets of the mortgage bank in order to 
facilitate the settlement of the affairs of the original con­
cern. The Union Bank was the one property bank which had been
more prudent in its affairs and did not become insolvent. For 
s time it continued to operate as a property bank under the 
provisions of the Act of 1842, but as soon es free banking 
laws were passed it was reorganized as a regular stock bank.
Beginning with the Crisis of May, 1337, and continuing 
until the time of final settlement or liquidation, property 
banks materially hampered Louisiana *s recovery and advance­
ment . They were a yoke which could not be removed and they 
sapped the remaining vitality that could have rendered possi­
ble the resumption of profitable activity; mismanagement 
Including dissipation of funds by the officers of th© two in­
solvent concerns was a burden on society* The only two means 
of blotting out their unwanted existence were not employed: 
one would have been u repudiation on the State bonds issued 
for and in favor of these companies; the other would have bean 
to clsar the property owners from the mortgages hold by these 
property banks. The State, however, felt that it could do 
neither.
Xf the bonds had been repudiated, th© credit of the
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State would ha we been seriously impaired* If the mortgages 
cm the properties had been cleared to permit a fresh start, 
the banks would ha we lost t: elr source of funds to meet the 
payments on the bonds, and the State would have had to 
assume the debt or repudiate It*
By doing neither, however, the State of Louisiana per­
mitted the over-capitalized, revenue-producing properties to 
re— In in a state of cons taut debt* If one property owner 
could not carry cm with the burden, his property was sold*
With the property went the mortgage because the security be- 
hind the beads could not be impaired* Such a situation, there­
fore, further depressed land values, and It discouraged in­
vestments* Without being able to reduce the capitalization 
the possibilities of profits were reduced if not eliminated*
CHAPTER VXI
31T4MARY ANP CONCLUSIONS
Inoaaistancy seems to appear between the study of the 
theory and principles of property banking, and the actual 
ease histories of the Louisiana mortgage banks* In the dis­
cussion of the theory and principles involved It was stated, 
in Chapter II, that property banks were not Inflationary in 
end of theaselves, that they could not cause a spiral Inf la* 
tiozu la the ensuing chapters it was indicated the Louisiana 
mortgage hanks contributed to the existing inflation* The 
contentions seem contradictory, but they are not* Both are 
true* Property banks were not inflationary in their organiza­
tion, but that does not preclude the existence or possibility 
of inflationary activities*
The reason property banks were not inflationary In and 
of t£i ease Ives was that the appreciation In valuation of tan* 
gihle property was not to serve as a base upon which they 
eould Increase credit through the issuance of additional 
mortgage stocks* The adherents of mortgage banking accepted 
the reasoning that property appreciated in value when It 
served as security for a medium of exchange, either credit or 
circulating notes, but they foresaw an inflationary spiral If
306
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the appreciated mlue was permitted to serve as security 
for additional credit or notes. They devised their plans, 
therefore, whereby the amount of appreciation on tangible 
property serving as security for the mediums of exchange 
could not increase the medium of exchange itself* Once prop­
erty was evaluated by appraisers it became the basis for the 
acquisition mortage stocks and no additional stocks could be 
Obtained on the same incumbered property because of any in­
crease In. its value; in so far as credit was granted on these
stocks at a specified fraction of their face value, spiral
1
inflation could not result.
The amount of credit extended and circulating notes 
Issued, however, might be sufficiently great to increase ap­
preciably the medium of exohange, and If this occurred without 
a corresponding increase in the amount of economic goods de­
sired end available, prices had to rise and this in Itself 
la inflation.
It must be remembered that the Louisiana property banks 
asms into existence during a period of Inflation which was 
considered to be a period of prosperity; the banks were cre­
ated to assist the property owners to take advantage of the 
prosperous, inflationary, economic conditions, especially the 
land boom, and their creation and existence contributed to 
the apparent prosperity and increasing inflation.
The "bard times" following the v ar of 1312 had barely
^ Supra. pp. 23—36.
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passed when the country entered a period of prosperity and 
financial expansion, moderate at first with occasional minor 
setbacks* but resuming with increasing intensity toward In­
flationary optimism. By 1829, when Louisiana's first property 
beak**the Consolidated Association of the Planters of Louis!- 
ana— began operations* the mania was entering into a ©tag© of 
speculative madness; lead values had begun to ©oar upward and 
developments of numerous types were under way.
. • • Behind this financial expansion was the 
irresistible surge of a nation that was in the 
process of spanning a continent, that was al­
ready thinking of Itself in terms of "manifest 
destiny.” A glorious future constantly impinged 
up cm an existing present. "Normalcy" itself in­
cluded a factor of acceleration that rapidly pro­
pelled ell financial activity into "prosperity”, 
then into boom times.s
During this period the entire country succumbed to a 
•bank smdness." The number of banks increased from 329 In 
1329 to 796 in 1837. Vild banking sprung from every locality, 
aa! It wee the chosen media for developments in the South. The 
combined banking capital in 1829 was S110,200,000, by 1334 
It wee #200,000,000, and by 1337 it reached £290,000,000. It 
wee nearly a two hundred and aixty-two per cent increase
a span of eight years. The circulation increased from 
$46*200 ,000 to $ 149 ,200,000 and loans increased from 
$137,000,000 to ^525,100,000 during these same eight years,
% .  J. Shultz and H. R. Caine, op. olt.. p. 189
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dm increase of o w r  throe hundred per cent and approximately 
three hundred ninety-cme per cent for each respective Item*^ 
Discounts more than doubled, and with some of the banks 
amounted to twice the bank capital. Furthermore, in paying
GRGsm car BAmzmP x a £ » - i Q 3 74
Date Banks : Capital C ireulati on :: i^oaaa ......
Number Xncr.;; Amount Xncr. Amount Iacr.;: Amount:Xncr.
MI
S
£
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
329 
906 
778 
>llar tt
54* 
66* : 
Lgures
'110,300 
•800,000 
:290,800 
are in tl
31*
49*
lousanc
j
«
a
It
48,SCO 
94,600; 
149,200
«7> :
57% j
•
e
«
*
*137,000 
:334, 100 
•528,100
137 JS 
62#
off its indebtedness the Federal Government released mi 11 Iona
5
of dollars available for investment or speculative placement. 
All this caused prices to rise and a corresponding business 
and speculative inflation* lasy credit resulted in specula­
tive aal business pyramiding to an unprecedented degree. This
SD. R. Dewey, op. olt.. p. *25.
*?red A. Shannon, Ecoaomio History of the Peoples of the 
t s t a t e s  (Hew York: The »cmlllan Company, X9M), p. 3So7
5*. J. Shultz and M. R. Caine, 0£. oit^, pp. £21-222$
2. I*. Bogart, op. clt., p. 368. Contrary to some beliefs, 
the United States Government had no heavy debt during this 
period rather there was a surplus in the treasury with which 
Congress did not know what to do.
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credit m  under the guise of wealth whan* in reality* it 
wee nothing hut a * botch* of practically worthless promises.** 
Louisiana ♦» property banks were no different from the 
otter banks in their exuberance to foster developments and to 
xuap profits and benefits from the prosperous times, They 
ben aim involved in speculative activities based on optimistic 
aspectstlona. They extended credit end froze their assets in 
nane-too-llquid enterprises.
Precautionary measures had been devised by the organiz­
ers of tease property banks to assure success. Stockholders 
were permitted to obtain loans equal to only one-half the face 
value of their mortgage certificates. This was because they 
desired to have more than adequate security behind any credit 
extended. Other property owners could obtain loans at only
Stte-telf the face value of their properties for the same 
7
Ten a on. Furthermore, to make certain that sufficient rev­
enue would be available to .met obligations and to provide 
far continuing and expanding activity, these organizers pro­
vided for "reasonable” interest charges on loans and discounts 
smft for the securing of capital funds at costs within the limit
M i  by law in order that capital be repaid by the revenues 
8
received.
The first precaution to assure success might have proved
efc. C. McGrene, The Panic of 1037, op. clt. . p. 6.
7Supra» p. 29.
®3upra, pp. 55» 56, 189, 831.
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effective If the face value of the security or collateral 
feed act been inflated* As It was, however* the appraisal was 
made on the existing and the anticipated earning power of the 
tangible property; w l w  of a piece of land was determined by 
comparing it with the price of similar properties and by es­
timating the expected annual revenue of such property. Both 
the land prices end prices of agricultural product6 were es­
timated at far above what they actually could yield, however. 
Especially was this true toward the latter years of this in­
flationary and speculative period. By the closing months of 
1836 the production of cotton and sugar, for instance* was
9
beyond the capacity of their markets. Credit that had been 
extended upon future hopes, found the security vanish. With 
the failure of the suctlt end cotton market, the banks were 
* ~ r r « t . d .ith *n impossible situation.10 Conditions bad 
ripened for collapse and failure instead of success.
fhe severe jolt of President Jacksonfa ominous Specie 
Circular of July 11, 1836, burst the high prices of land, not 
immediately, but within six months. The speculative purchas­
ers found that credit could no longer purchase new federal 
land, and since the movement of high prices had been fed by 
credit this threw land values as a whole spirally downward. 
This, accompanied by a scarcity of 3pecie and foreign bills
®W. J. Shultz and M* H. Oeine, og« clt.. p. 2ZZ
10L. C. Hilderraaa, QP» clt** p. 93.
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ef exchange» the raising of the discount rate by the
Bank of Sag land from two end a half to fire per cent, the
modified types of ecmercial paper to be used,^ and the fall
13of the price of cotton by twenty-five per cent, among nu­
merous other contributing factors, threw the country into the 
throes of the Banin of 1837* The prosperity bubble Inflated 
by fictitious wealth built on credit had been pricked and the 
Imaginary security vanished. Property which was taken to be 
ever appreciating in value was no longer adequate security 
for freely granted credit. Louisiana9s mortgage banks act­
ually did not possess enough real security to assure success.
Optimism had been so great and the demand for credit 
had assumed such proportions that the officers of the Louial- 
ana property banks had acquired capital funds in as large 
amounts as was possible and as rapidly as they could be ob­
tained, even if it was necessary to circumvent the stipulated 
charter terms. Though the cost of securing these funds from 
abroad was considerable and though the sale of bonds usually 
had to be at a substantial discount, it was considered prof­
itable and beneficial enough to justify the procedure. When 
the optimistic expectations did not materialize the burden of 
meeting the contractual obligations became a strain. The
11«f. CABL, Consolidated Association to Baring Broth­
ers, Hew Orleans, February 4, 1836. and to T. Wilson and Co., 
January 3, 1806 and June Z29 1S36 (Fr •).
lgs. a. Caldwell, op. olt.. p. CO; C£HL, Consolidated 
Association to Baring Brothers, New Orleans, March 30, 1837.
13
H. 2enks, op.* olt..» p. 87*
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revenues of two of the property banka— the Consolidated 
Association end the Citizens * Bank— proved Inadequate to meet 
these periodic payments and part of the assets was Impaired. 
Insolvency Instead of success was their fate.
The fiasco of the Panic, however, did not end the ex- 
internee of Louisianafs property hanks. The Consolidated Asso­
ciation and the Citizensf Bank, though insolvent, continued to 
operate, unhampered by the State, until the end of 18432; after­
wards they existed as liquidating banks until 1882 and 1902,
14
respectively. The Union Bank continued as an operating
property bank until 18S7, when it was converted Into a rag-
1Kular stoek bank. ** Despite the severe blow from the specula­
tion and Inflation, these concerns continued to operate, ad- 7 
he ring much to the same speculative and inflationary prac­
tises; they did not revert to cautious banking. The public 
Still wanted easy credit: this time to curb the depress ion. 
These Louisiana banks did what v?as asked of them, thereby 
e cot Inning to enjoy general good will for several years after 
the crisis. It was not until later that their existence was 
looked upon with disfavor, and many years afterwards when 
the!r prolonged existence was severely criticized; then, how- 
ever, the criticism was against tbs two mortgage banks in 
the state of liquidation, not the Union Bank.
14:Supra. pp. 185, 286. 
^Supra, pp. 226-227.
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The general history of these Louisiana concerns is 
here reviewed in order to ascertain more concretely the rest- 
M M  for the change of attitude toward property banking in 
Louisiana• First, without presuming to give a complete and 
conclusive answer, it may be stated that prospective debtors, 
ntaa they deem it essential to have money or credit to achieve 
e desired aim, usually look upon the credit or vith favor. It 
is when the creditor demands repayment, when the debtors find 
it difficult to meet their contractual obligations, or when the 
debtors fail to achieve the desired alms from the funds receiv­
ed that debtors arc more apt to have a disgruntled attitude 
lonrd creditors*
From 1827 to 1S37 the Louisiana mortgage banks enjoyed 
the general good will and the approval of the public, and their 
existence seemed to be a solution to the State 9s perplexing 
problems of providing the plantation end property owners with 
much demanded capital. Through the system of employing proper 
ty as security for State pledged bonds, capital i.as flowing 
Into Louisiana by the media of mortgage banks which granted 
So their stockholders— the owners of the properties 
serving as collateral foar the bonds— and to others. Mortgage 
Kinka assisted the development and purchase of land, the In­
stallation of modern machinery and equipment, the acquisition 
of more slaves, the building of beautiful homes, and the ©s- 
t&bllshs&nt of accessible markets for local and surrounding 
products. It was a "rose coined glass” through which per- 
petue1 prosperity could be imagined.
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Prices la general were rising as result of economic 
conditions partially abetted by the additional credit extended.
altuatioa gave rise to the belief that credit enabled the 
people to benefit froa the good prices. The spirit of op- 
tiwlsw was eo general and the public so confident that prices 
would m a i n  high and profitable, that asany Louisiana property 
o u s m  sought ami obtained credit on the basis of the high 
gstsoa for their products and properties. The cotton and sugar 
planters, for instance, usually calculated the anticipated 
revenues froa their plantations and used the inflated values 
of land as the base In determining how much encumbrance was 
Justifiable.
It did not tahe the Crisis of 1337 to indicate the
fa 11 soy of such a procedure. As early as 1831 the sugar
planters indebted to the Consolidated Association were un-
13able to pay their interest on account of crop failure*
Jm  the revenues of these debtors were not what had been
anticipated and many had to default* Again in 1333 the sugpr
17
a m p  was a failure and more defaults followed. The cotton 
esap failure throughout a large portion of the South in 1333 
was another severe blow; even with the good price and the in-
demand for cotton, the revenue was not forthcoming
18be asst the current contractual credit obligations. These
lftSupra. PP* 99-101; CABL Consolidated Association to 
Bering Brothers, New Orleans, April 6 and 13, 1832 (Fr.).
tuprft. pp- 101, 222.
f.,25 Cong. £ 3esa. Ex. Doc. No. 79, p. 386.
318
e&leal ties, i o w w r ,  were regarded aa temporary and the re­
sets bllahoent of "normalcy" was expected, Ko undue pressure 
was exerted upon the debtors to cause dissatisfaction* These 
famtei were able to extend the time Tor interest payment and 
usual Instalments because they continued to receive capital 
froa Europe and the funds cm hand were sufficient to meet the 
eerreat obligations on the bonds. ? urtheraore, the values 
of the properties serving as security had not depreciated, 
sad, apparently, they saw no os use for s l a m  and no need to 
alter their liberal credit policy,1*
When the Panic of 183? occurred the property owners 
feu# their supposedly "ewer appreciating” properties depre­
ciating and the prises of agricultural commodities insufficient 
to provide adequate revenues to pay off burdening debts. they 
had no ehoioe but to beg for an extension of time on thalr 
payment® or/and to become more heavily indebted In an effort 
to sect or partially meet currant and past due obligations.
The mortgage banks could not successfully force pay- 
masts for at least two reasons: the debtors had no means of 
paying, to force collections under such difficult circum­
stances would bring forth irate criticism from both the public 
and the State officials. 2van If the officers had attempted 
foreclosure thu results might not have been satisfactory; 
the security behind the loans and the discounted note® had
^Supra> pp• 104, 117, and £&&«
2519
fttpxtclaUd considerably, a w t l i B s  to a wlue which -was 
less teas the amount of the debt*
Uhder these depressing circumstances the property 
banks, instead of res trio ting the amount of credit extended , 
pursued a policy of gianting mors loans. Both they and the 
people calculated that if there was more lending it would 
provide a M a n s  of greater activity and better markets, 
whlofe would stimulate business back to "noxssa 1* and would 
enable the debtors to acquire income for payments of debts 
in fall* The reasoning appears to be illogical; the idea 
see me to be, In pert, that if an additional loan was granted 
to the debtor so.as to pay off his first debt it would ease 
hie burden and enable him thereby to pay the entire debt* 
nevertheless, the idea was practiced. The result was an ae- 
eestwstiea of depressing circumstances.
In so h r  as the banks were able to continue selling 
bends they did so in order to obtain the funds for more 
leans and discounts• vhen they could no longer acquire sat­
isfactory amounts of capital through this means, they resort­
ed to the Issue of post-notes.
Debtors and stockholders of a property bank, desirous 
Sr trader the necessity of borrowing more from the concern, 
Offered mortgages on unencumbered property or/and on existing 
future crops. In return they received post-notes— one, 
two* or three years Interest-booring notes— v;hich could be 
used to pay off debts with the bank and as circulation•
m o
When in the bank's possession, these notes were usually 
sent to Europe for sale In the hope of obtaining more cap­
ital. Post-notes, however, did not sell too well abroad, 
furthermore, the debtors and stockholders did not benefit
Ort
from their credit as had been anticipated.
Trm. 1857 to 1342, therefore, when Louisiana fs prop­
erty hsnlw might have reestablished themselves on a sounder 
financial basis, they failed to do so. Because of their easy 
credit policies they continued to laaintain some degree of ap­
proval from the debtors. They behaved in hs.rs.ony with the 
general belief of the period; people wanted more and easier 
credit to conquer the depression and the mortgage banks com­
plied with their wishes. Toward 1840, 1341, and 1342, however,
when the credit inflation failed to bring forth the expected
21relief, opposition to their practices increased.
Prior to 1842 acrimonious disapproval of these and other 
State beaks was expressed by those who wanted to achieve better 
eeememic conditions through a sounder banking system and more 
stable credit. The banks, however, enthralled these reformers. 
Vest of them were indebted to the banks and opposition to the 
practices pursued was ordinarily met with foreclosure or a threat 
to do so. Such action, nevertheless, accentuated the growing ac­
rimony. In spite of the resistance on the part of the banks 
the Bank Act of 1842 was passed.
^Qsupra. pp. 116-117.
^^Supre. i>p. 117-121.
2%>U£Ta, P. 122,
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The State became somewhat uneasy toward the proparty
banks for at least two reasons: on© wae that the fixed rate of
late rest on th© bonds ha d to b© paid Irrespective of the d©~
pressed economic and financial situation; the other was that
the financial affairs of these concerns were such that there
existed a strong possibility that the State night be called
upon to fulfill its pledge on a good portion of the bonds
Issued for and in favor of these companies, or at least on
tee interest payments *
Before 1837 the general feeling of the legislators was
that In spite of the fact that capital was secured from abroad«
these foreign ea pita lists could not receive more then a fixed
and specified rate of Interest out of the income realized from
the nee of the funds; the profits over and above the interest
cost were to remain in Louisiana and benefit the property 
23earners* But after 1637 when the revenues , if any, realized 
were not great, the Interest charges were looked upon as a 
burden. When the property hanks were not making a profit, the 
necessity of seating the semi-annual interest payments was con­
sidered as a drain upon the assets and income that could other- 
wide be employed to relieve somewhat the existing distress.
The losses of th© Louisiana mortgage banks were mounting 
daring the depression years; some of these institutions were 
or nearly were insolvent/. That worried the State. The State
^ 2 5  Cong* 2 Sean. 2x« Doc* I£o# 79, p* 612,
yledgsd bonds of these corporations were certificates of In- 
debtedness, not certificates of ownership. Non-payment of 
Interest and principal could not be exercised at will with a 
e ini at that It was the result of an entrepreneur 11 risk assum­
ed in organizing and operating the business. iion-payment of 
et these obligations was a breach of contract* Inasmuch as 
Idle State was a party to the contract as a guarantor for its 
fulfillment, any breach by the banks affected the State - 
Therefore, the legislators were desirous of placing the prop­
erty banks la a position where they could meet, the terns of 
their contractual agreement and of ridding Louisiana as rapid­
ly as possible of the contingent liability which was giving 
Indications of becoming an actual debt of the State and 
which was threatening its credit standing.
The general banking reform introduced In 1848 was not
24directed specifically at the property banks, but it served 
to place the Insolvent ones— the Consolidated Association and 
the Citizens * Bank-—in a stats of liquidation. The Union
was able to conform to the law, and, the ref or©, was en­
titled to continue as an active bank* These decrees of for- 
felture rendered at the Instance of the State against the two 
insolvent concerns was the first jbb jar effort by the State 
to deal with Its contingent debt. It took over th© assets of 
the two companies and th© affairs were placed In th© hands of
la. Acta. 1342, No. 23, pp. 34-62.
£5
Supra. p, 122; 35 La, A m  *, 425; and GBBM, 1843, p* 1*
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officials appointed by th© Oowornor with the advice and ©on- 
sent ot  the Senate* Such a move, however, was resented by 
th# stockholders, mainly because they feared that liquidation 
would for## them to meet the payments on their debts Immedi­
ately* The bank officers were opposed to the action because 
It deprived them of the profitable privileges they had ex­
ercised in their administrative capacity. European bond­
holders were dissatisfied and they voiced strong opposition 
to liquidation on the ground that these concerns were sound; 
they disapproved, however, largely because the news of the 
liquidation had reduced the market value of the bonds*g&
Upon assuming their duties in the liquidation of the 
Consolidated Association and the Citizensf Bank, the managers 
decided that these institutions had to default on their in­
terest payment, and the defaults which came in 1343 placed 
the State in a position of becoming directly responsible for 
the debts* It was evident, too, that there were possibilities 
of having to become responsible for additional defaults on in­
terest and probably on the principal* A series of measures 
wore taken, therefore, to assist in the payment of Interest, 
to reduce and fund the debts, and to provide for better ©co­
nsole conditions, especially In the cotton trade* Son© of 
these measures met the approval of all concerned, but several 
were opposed by some group or other; disapproval of mortgage 
ag began to spread and become more intense*
^ Supra, PP* 134-135*
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If measures were not taken to better the market for 
cotton and thereby provide the banks with income whereby their 
bfended debts could be reduced, the State felt it might have 
a serious debt on its hands* Thus, in 1Q43 by an act to facil­
itate the liquidation of property banks, the State provided a 
means of improving the cotton market and a method by which 
the amount of bonds could be reduced*
Measures had to be taken to better the cotton market in 
order to provide th© banks with income whereby their bonded 
debts could be reduced. An act was passed in 1843, therefore, 
to facilitate the liquidation of property banks, whereby these 
insolvent firms could acquire and retire part of their out­
standing State pledged bonds.27 Cotton which had been boy­
cotted because of American defaults on bonds served in a large 
measure to acquire the securities from the European bond­
holders. Debtors were permitted to present State pledged bank 
bonds and have them accepted at face value in payment of debts 
owed these banks. The bonds had a market value which was sub­
stantially less than their face value and it was profitable 
to acquire them from European bondholders. The exchange could 
be effected by offering cotton and an incentive for the ex­
change was to accept the Louisiana bonds at slightly above 
their market value. This policy helped the cotton interests, 
provided the banks with a means of reducing their bonded 
debts, assisted the State in reducing th© amount of Its con-
27i,a. Acts. 1843, No. 92, pp. 56-59.
m ®
hi&geat liabilities, and quieted the European bondholders.
Cotton moved to Europe and part of the bonds returned to 
SB
LflOltkBa. The 1343 Lav, nevertheless, was not wholly »P- 
predated by the English bond agents* A storm of protests 
arose and they advised the bondholders not to relinquish 
their seeurities. They criticized Louisianafs action in both 
the American and English press* It started a aeries of Bng-
OQ
lieh complaints against Louisiana's pledged securities.
.Profitable as the 1643 scheme was it did not complete 
the retirement and cancellation of the outstanding bonds is­
sued for and In favor of the property banks* By 1347 
$5*354,616*13-worth of these securities had been retired* 
leaving still outstanding a total of $12,395,333.37.50 
The maturity dates of many of these outstanding State pledged 
beads were soon approaching* Lavs ware passed, therefore, to 
or tend these dates of maturity* Provisions were also made to
riStumn toe stockholders of the Insolvent Citizens' Bank and
51Consolidated Association* These assessments, however, 
aroused the antagonism of the mortgage stockholders* They
asSupra. pp* 133-137; L* K. Jenka, QP* clt. * p. 107*
go
3 t t P X & , p p .  134-137; R. C *  UcGrane, op * clt* * 
pp. 103-184*
S0Th* debts stood at:
Union B a n k -------------  I 3,534,000*00
Consolidated Association 1,953,775*00
Citizens' Bank --------  7,237,608*87
Leg. poe. 1647, ’Report Of the State Auditor, ’
January*, 1848, p. 16*
gZLa* Acts* 1647, No* 100, pp* 76-78.
and some of them refused to pay the deluded con- 
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trihut ions, Those who protested most vehemently were the 
property owners who claimed they were unaware that their pur* 
eh&sed properties were mortgaged to the property bunks for
eg
at Ochs. General criticism was heard against the lengthy
liquidation and against the apparent mismanagement and dissi­
pation of funds by th© bank managers *
In 1852 the Legislature enacted a plan for the relief 
Of the Citizens’ Bank which provoked considerable controversy 
end severe criticism. This Act of $fereh 10, 1352, waive red 
the decree of forfeiture rendered in 1342, and permitted the 
ecneexn In the process of liquidation to resume operation as
34
a H o e k  hank. By so doing the state relinquished its right 
to control the assets end effairs of the bank, Several mem* 
bare of the legislature, therefore, opposed the measure vigor-
lly, but they were in the minority. The bill passed even
% i 
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35over the Governorfs veto* The stockholders, however, did
act approve the hill. They wanted more favorable terms.
Supra, pp. 143-154; Leg, goc. 1352, "Report of the
 of Managers the Citizensf Bank and the Consolidated
Association of the Planters of Louisiana."
Sapra, p. 163.
^La. Ante, 18S2, No. 141, pp. 109-111.
, Jopr.. 18SS, Pp. 8®t 47, 40, 38, 99, 111, 113, 
•at 148; U w y o u r . . PP. 46-47; House Pet... 1852, p. 63; 
l w .  Poe., idea.
12 Lb . Ann.. 220, Polloclc TO Cltlaena’Bank.
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A new bill was passed, therefor©, In 1853, and th® Citizens9 
Bank was so averted into a stock bank with th© hanking depart-
M a t  assuming the bonds of the old mortgage bank maintained
37&® •* sort^g© department of the Citizens9 Bank* According 
to court opinion the set was a benefit to th© State and tee 
people. I'rom 1353 to 1380 the operating bank.ing~departm.eiit 
paid off more than a million dollars of the mortgage depart- 
M a t 9e State pledged bonds* More would have been paid off had 
it not been for the disruption caused by the war between the 
States* The new stockholders were Interested In sound opera­
tion motivated by the desire for dividends* As a result the 
engendering practices of the former administrations w©are
abandoned. The criticism existing during the period of iiqul-
38
dAtim pmtieclly ceased*
In 1853 the State also released what control it had 
over the assets and affairs of the Consolidated Association 
because it was considered too expensive to maintain a State 
Board of Managers solely for this bank, but the State did not 
permit this insolvent coneaxm to resume operation* The 
Consolidated Association under Its new management was even 
worse than it had been under State supervision* ftith the
S7I*. Act*. 1853, fTo. 246, PP. 207-203.
38106 La * Arm. , 315, Hope and C ompany vs* Hoard of 
Liquidation *
# Acts* 1853, WO* 113, pp*76-77 •
m U i r a » 4  squandering of funds and the Civil war to disrupt 
i t a i w U  m U y ! U « 8 i this tank was unable to terminate its 
liquids tioo la 1866 when it a extended bonds war® to mature* 
Instead, the the headed debt stood at 164?,70S .40, and the ex­
isting deficit amounted to |38f59B*9S.^ Another extension
41had to he granted and another assessment had tote  made.
Displeasure at the bankfa failure to terminate its liquidation
was intense* The stockholders were vehement in their protest
against the additional assessment, especially since the court
tad granted the right of receivership to representatives of
bondholders* Collectively, they took the matter of additional
assaaenante to court and eventually won a decision that they
could not to held for more assessments beyond the 1847 eon-
42
trihutlan demands*
The funding Act of 1874, accompanied with Its amend- 
■flats, tad fcar its purpose to consolidate the many otitstand­
ing direct debts of tte State incurred within the S25,000,00C 
eons 11 tut 1 one 1 limit* The latent of the law was not to In­
cites che contingent bands of the Consolidated Association 
Citizens* Bank as part of the bonds fundable into "con­
cede** fte framers of the law recognized the bonds of the 
too tanks as valid, but they felt that tbeir redemption should 
to bandied by the banks still in the process of liquidation—
*0GABL, forstall to Consolidated Association, Hew 
Orleans, May 7, 1666*
41i^. Acts, 1866, No* 33, p. 66.
42supra* PP* 184. 135*
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St not a repudiation by th© State of its pledge# When 
the Louisiana courts rendered decisions requesting the Board 
of Liquidation in charge of the funding to accept the State 
pledged bonds of the two mortgage banks for conversion into 
•consols"— outright State obligations—  strong disapproval was 
expressed# Xh© citizens felt that they w©r© being made to pay 
e tebt which had been Incurred for a privileged few many years 
previous sad far which they had received no benefit* Th© epi­
sode was a bitter one. Over twenty years bad ©lapsed since 
the liquidation of the two firms had begun and the bonds still 
outstanding when the conversion was ordered amounted to 
*4,*03 ,0fS3«33.^* Once the conversion of property bank bonds 
was settled, however, these banks ceased being an irritating 
thorn# The prolonged liquidation ended soon afterwards# The 
meetj i f i stockholders finally had their properties relieved 
from mortgage#
The termination of the mortgage banking episode in 
Louisiana was not a repudiation of bonded debt* All the bonds 
and interest thereon were honored, even if th© portion remain­
ing In 1874 was redeemed by a conversion at sixty cents on th© 
dollar# The debts contracted during a moment of inebriated
4*Ls » Acts * 1374, Ko# 3, PP* 39-40*
**The State pledged b&nk bonds outstanding in 1874 were;
Citizens * B a n k  ~—-----~  ^|4 ,296,633 .S-S
Consolidated association----  506,400.00
30 La  Ana* 411* LegasSier and Binder vs Board of Liquidation* 
4 3  L e t  fn&P  741« Hope aad coapeuftg vs 3our<S of Liaj51s$±aBLs.
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prosperity were eventually settled at no loss to the bond- 
holders, but after many years of depressing effects up cm 
Louisiana * The semi-anhhal interest payi ents f repayments of 
prinelpslt and the riotous misuse of funtfs by the bank offi­
cers and managers were oppressive drains upon the debtors and 
the State. Laxity of the State of Louisiana was Largely re- 
spemelble for sueh a state of affairs.
failure of the Louisiana property banks to achieve 
d m  aim for which they were designed can be summarised as 
f o H e » :
1. The credit extended to the property owners served to 
eeoautuate the credit Inflation existing at the time 
ratter then to provide the means for sound develop* 
meat. Louisiana needed capital, but it appears that 
r the acquired funds were diverted toward fostering
speculation instead of promoting sound and profitable 
economic improvements •
8. The exitleed capital was acquired at a substantial cost 
to the property banks. The employment of this capital, 
however, failed to yield revenues that enabled punct­
ual and easy repayment*
S* Poor management and the dissipation of funds were prob­
ably responsible in part for depriving these batiks 
from being a success.
The reasons for failure appear neither to substantiate 
a contention that the Louisiana property banks war© inherently
nor to prow that they ware destined by nature to 
fhll* That the Louisiana experiments frilled can b© attrlbu- 
tad largely to the conditions of the period and the erroneous 
practices pisotioes of the? r nt&n&gers and officers -
Security is rn important factor to consider when lead­
ing, hut it is not the essential and primrry requisite for 
credit* While it may Indloate the earning capacity of the 
property upon which a loan Is granted, It is not necessarily 
a good guide* The character and capability of the debtors 
ai© sore important then the security itself. Kad more atten­
tion Ween paid to these two factors the history of Louisiana's 
property hanks might have been quite different, although it 
would not have assured success*
Furthermore, agricultural banka attempting to operate b 
on th© sane basis practiced by commercial banks find themselves 
in difficult ciroTsastancea« Agricultural banking does not af­
ford the same degree of liquidity in portfolio* This was 
later recognized, but at the time the Louisiana property banks 
were la existence these two forms of banking were not sep­
arated and were not recognized as having different functions* 
The present Federal Land Banks and the agricultural cooperative 
bento apply eotaswhet the general principles that were part of 
the Louisiana mortgage banks, but they were not permitted to 
operate as eoitn©rc ic 1 benks •
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